Do note that eBPF can still bypass netfilter entirely, as can containers, or any process using a separate network namespace.
I don't get this vulnerability, it's been out there for weeks, completely public, yet it has stayed extremely opaque. Usually, the day a high profile vulnerability is made public, there's all kinds of guidance out there explaining exactly who it affects how, and there are day 0 patches. This one I still don't know whether is an RCE or DoS in practice! I don't know whether a computer blocking connections via a "normal firewall" protects me or not! It's incredibly frustrating.
https://almalinux.org/blog/2026-10-30-cve-2026-98432/#tempor...
> This one I still don't know whether is an RCE or DoS in practice!
It is. It depends on dumping (potentially) a lot of traffic at you to "luck" into the cpu core scheduler but obviously computers can increase their luck by doing something a lot. The RCE is real, the risk is probably lower if you're not high profile simply because it requires some about of CPU spend on the attackers side, not something that you just fire off at anything that will respond to a ping or `GET /config.php`.
> I don't know whether a computer blocking connections via a "normal firewall" protects me or not! It's incredibly frustrating.
It doesn't. Apply the above rules until your kernel is updated.
Hard disagree... the packet could be part of an existing TCP stream and get processed by nf_conntrack before it hits the filter.INPUT chain. Or a local application could be sending packets to the loopback interface that bypasses the input chain in various ways.
A custom netfilter rule may already exist that accepts the packet before your mitigation does. And nftables allows custom chains that run at a higher priority than filter.INPUT and could be accepted before it touches it.
This is why vendors are suggesting to use the raw.PREROUTING chain instead.
And what I said before about eBPF still stands... someone has written a mitigation that uses that instead since it runs even before PREROUTING: https://github.com/sevaepsteyn/cve-2026-98432-ebpf
And again, any processes that are part of a separate network namespace will not have the same netfilter rules applied that one has added within the main namespace.
Local processes / users can also easily bypass netfilter entirely by way of creating their own network namespaces via unshare/firejail/etc regardless of whether user namespaces are enabled.
> On installation, ufw is disabled with a default incoming policy of deny, a default forward policy of deny, and a default outgoing policy of allow, with stateful tracking for NEW connections for incoming and forwarded connections.
https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man8/ufw.8.html
The more specific rule is probably more useful if you do intend to expose a TCP port though.