Anyone who fell for it would not only get in trouble for poor security practice, they would reveal that they were job searching. That opens an entire can of worms that creates problems beyond the pentest. This also angers other employees who see it as a double-trap being sprung on employees.
Another major problem is that responsible employees who accept the fake interview but then use their personal laptop to do the interview will have their personal laptop compromised by the pentesters. Responsible testers will immediately abort, but some will try to use the personal laptop to pivot deeper which is a huge ick. It’s also really bad if the company is compromising personal laptops of people who are doing the right thing (switching to personal gear for interviews).
Hired oentest has company permission to do stuff on company property. I do not imagine they have right to do so to personal property.
Game over.
Taking over that first engineer's workstation shouldn't ever have resulted in $6.3B of damages. I would consider it reasonable if those privileges could be abused (by e.g. the same engineer intentionally) to cause $6.3M of damages and the rest would be mitigated or prevented; so for this incident we could say that 0.1% of the impact was caused by the initial compromise of that workstation and 99.9% of the losses were caused by all the other failures - so it's effective for any pentest to focus on the latter part, ignore the social engineering and phishing part (since you can't really eliminate it anyway - unlike many other flaws) and assume initial compromise as a starting point.
If your laptop is successfully compromised by the pentesters then pretty much by definition you weren't being responsible. Though I agree that pentesters going after personal devices is ethically dubious.
> Though I agree that pentesters going after personal devices is ethically dubious.
It's not just ethically dubious. It crosses a lot of legal boundaries. A company can consent to have their personal devices hacked. An employee doesn't automatically consent to let a company's contractors access their personal devices.
For many build chains, that involves implicitly installing software.
That said I wouldn't trust a compiler to be hardened against malicious input and anyway you presumably need to run the output so all of that should be happening in a hardened sandbox regardless.
If you ever meet with Alibaba for any reason they'll ask you to download their conference software. Unfortunately most people in the China ecosystem don't have the guts to say no and will just gleefully install any .exe thrown at them.
Which is also why we, collectively, as an industry needs to not put up with that. It's easy for me to say from the comfort of it not being my job on the line, that if this happens to anybody they should quit and then name and shame the company, but a competent security team is going to have the idea of doing a fake phishing interview and then not do it because of how morale destroying that would be. The security awareness team sending fake phishing emails are embarrassing enough.