There isn’t one root cause here or one person or entity at fault. Many things went wrong and bad choices were made by many people and entities to lead us to this point, and they ought to be all regarded seriously and addressed rigorously.
- Whomever at the hotel that approved this as the sole (or even primary) alert system is at fault. - The lack of training and experience this hotel employee had when in a position to make such a dangerous choice was at fault. - Ditto the alarm company - everyone involved in designing, approving, and implementing this system is at fault, as well as whatever process ensured that nobody had the experience or safety to be able to speak up about this dangerous design is at fault. - The regulatory system that allowed this design is at fault. - The health and safety inspection system that didn’t catch this risk is at fault.
I’m sure there’s more; I’m just spitballing here. But the point is that there’s no one person or thing to blame here, and no one fix. This should kick off a wave of personal and professional soul-searching and improvements.
What if the person who reads the email was gone that day? What if they forget to read it? What if the email system is down? What if it was lost? This is just careless and bad design.
At the very least you need a backup notification, like say a warning siren or noise at the pool? Probably you don't want to do that casually because "it could scare people".
It's not some tricky thing where you had multiple ways to detect it, giving some redundancy. Same thing if it was a text message only or a phone call only.
This is a poor safety design with a single failure mode on the notification.
If someone sends me an email, it will not get noticed. I think this is the general culture of most places I've worked at.
But even the slack alert channels get ignored by me because they're too noisy and we haven't yet prioritized denoisifying it. We aren't dealing with critical health alerts though
People had started sending calendar invitations for important emails, on the basis that recipients would then reply to the email and decline the invitation.
More properly said, you may cause panic. People genuinely don't know how to respond when they hear an alarm in an unfamiliar place.
And that's if you're lucky. I once had to deal with people who did not want to evacuate a building when a fire alarm went off. And when I got them out the door I had trouble convincing them to leave the building's deck. Some people seem to think that it is okay to ignore a fire alarm, even a probable false alarm, in a wood structure with a wood deck.
It just has to be annoying enough that even the most junior employee would radio in their supervisor to get it to stop
It's a well known irony that every system intended to prevent accidents eventually itself causes one.
We've been through this with smoke detectors, it's not a new thing.
The power failure would presumably shut down the pumps and end in the pool being closed. Then pools should have a power outage protocol they’d follow before opening the pool again. Checking chemistry would be high up on the list.
Smoke detectors need backups because a fire can cause a power outage before there’s enough smoke to trigger the smoke detector.
Also, I have a personal domain, some sites decided its not real enough and I can't get email from them.
Email is just not reliable. It could be part of a combined system of other things that are reliable.
This is not the case in aviation. Even in the most egregiously obvious single-cause failures, there's always an analysis of issues in the wider system that allowed that single cause to become the single cause in the first place.
I agree with your points, though. In this case, Microsoft absolutely takes shared responsibility. It is only a matter of time until a similar outage in some other wider networked system with a so-called 'five/seven/nine nines uptime guarantee' goes out for a couple of days, and takes with it some critical life-sustaining system, and people die.
And yet, as late as yesterday, the idiots in charge have announced that there is absolutely "No Need To Investigate the FAA Ground Stop".
Ford doesn't build all of the modules of their cars. They design specs and outsource manufacturing. But legally speaking, Ford is responsible for design, testing, and support / recalls. It's their responsibility to contract in the terms that both protect their customers' safety and Ford's liability due to spec / contract violations.
When your company is responsible for the health of staff and guests while dealing with deadly gasses, it's your company's responsibility to ensure that all of your vendors detail how their failure modes fail safe.
This is the same exact logic that has been migrating software companies to detail their risk by demanding their vendors all supply a "Software Bill of Materials" (which is very difficult in practice, but is necessary for the downstream users to protect themselves from upstream risk).
anything that was "at fault" that you can't do anything about doesn't matter. and you can't do anything about a microsoft outage, all you can do is design around it.
"Why did people get gas poisoning"
The point of a process is to constrain incompetent people into doing something that will work despite their incompetence. Five Whys is entirely subjective and can never constrain anyone; it's just something that some people think sounds deep.
yeah, these companies need to be told to stop relying on cloud services for everything.
its wild to me how many critical things that absolutely do not need the internet are relying on the internet.
much blame to go around here:
- whoever designed the stupid alert system.
- the marketing departments in countless companies ignoring engineers when they market to normie customers “connect everything”
- the hotel company for seemingly doing no dilligence at all. and just blindly listening to some salesman “connect everything”
- accountant types and their “we can save pennie’s if we cut all of these corners.” and the stupid corners they choose to cut.
- etc…
on a macro scale it’s amazing to me how many people are victims to slimey car salesman types leading to situations like this.
5/5
Knowing that your email could be delayed by days changes how you view it and the applications you deem it suitable for.
Regardless of high availability promises of cloud services, a local internet outage will supersede the risk and is a risk factor in most places of the world (probably everywhere). Risk that nobody aside the local ISP could quantify either. So logically any system critically depending on the cloud and isn't designed with an offline fallback has unmitigated risk factors.
Sure, if you host some online service, this risk cannot be mitigated. But it can for everything else. And if you need an offline operation mode, in most cases the non-cloud design is simply superior. So cloud is synonymous with having a single point of failure?
This case is one where on risk analysis was done at all or this would have surfaced pretty quickly. There are problems too if a pool doesn't get chlorinated, but it is probably better than to poison your guests.
Similar to doing regular restores of your data backups. If you never test a restore, you don't have a backup.
I did an apprenticeship as an electrical engineer and have been in those catacombs underneath such water park type of things. There should be such devices present, and of course personnel to operate them.
I mean, can you imagine your boss' face when you tell em the reason your entire system is down is you didnt get the email from checkmk that something is wrong? Instead of, you know, checking the dashboard yourself periodically.
Reformulated: If pool management's cue that something's wrong is because their guests are leaving the water, they are already liable for damage.
> the user of the pool should be able to notice that something wrong by them self.
Clearly, their motivations for autonomous self-preservation were insufficient.
The hotel picked a monitoring solution which relies exclusively on email, or configured it like that. If anything they are absolutely both to blame but for different things. The company for designing a safety related system like this, the hotel for selecting an inadequate solution/configuration thus allowing their guests to be harmed.
> But it is accurate to say that the cause of the issue was the outage
The cause of the issue is the more immediate one - the configuration of the monitoring system. This avoids going up the causality chain to far - shitty coffee caused engineer to take down email system, and such.
Not one but two of the hotel's systems failed to operate properly. The chlorine pumping system pumped too much chlorine and the last resort alarm failed to alert.
As I said, there's plenty of blame to go around as a matter of general principle. But for what happened here the hotel bears the responsibility towards their guests, not the pumping or monitoring system developers, not Microsoft. The only reason MS in the title is because that failure is big news these days.
On a technical note, even if they had a backup email provider they'd still be screwed because the people getting the alert were probably employees on the single provider (back to SPOF). SMS could have been a good parallel option. Ideally also some physical control panel that triggers an alarm when any safety critical condition occurs. On the chlorine pumping system, that shouldn't be a dumb preprogrammed pump, it should come with it's own sensors and detection loop independent of any external system, something that proactively stops it before it breaches the safety limits.
Using the unqualified "cause" is misleading click bait and in some places it could get you sued
1. Can there not just be a light / siren right next to the gas sensors? Easy to fix, but it requires hardware changes on-site.
2. Could Microsoft have not had an outage? Hard to fix.
3. Could they use some better notifications systems like idk self-hosted ntfy.sh with a warning if the server goes down? Yes but nobody wants to pay for that.
And you have to check those lights and sirens that they still work.
Everybody knew email was down.
The real problem is nobody thought of the consequences regarding the alarm system
Yes, they still have to work but first off, both of those are extremely reliable systems, alarm circuits have extremely low risk of failure. Second, testing them takes 5 minutes a week/month, press the button, look for flashing light and listen to wailing noise.
It's inexcusable to think that email/slack or whatever is acceptable as anything other than notification system so people not in facility can be notified that alarms are going off.
EDIT: You are defending this setup and I'm not sure why. This seems email only setup seem indefensible.
Testing requires staff and you can be sure those parks are understaffed.
Best thing is to avoid them, next best thing is a cheap solution with low maintenance by the staff to notify as much people as possible.
Email wins.
Not a good solution but the best you will get for the price they are willing to pay
Whether it breaks because a relay has corroded due to years of service in a chlorine-enriched environment, or because O365 is down, or because O365 tightened up on DMARC requirements: It needs tested.
And it's not a binary choice. This isn't the World Cup, the Super Bowl, or Highlander. There can be more than one.
The alarm system can wear a belt, and suspenders. It can send emails, and it can flash a bright light, and it can also sound an audible alarm.
Curious: what do you think has to be done with an email?
Sarcasm aside, in this case, the email should've triggered the literal lights and sirens. Preferably automated (tho in that case, why even go through email as middleman) but could also be an actual person flipping a switch.
You see this in software ops too: certain subject formats trigger a special ringtone or even a pager call. Emails are too subtle even with ALERT ALL CAPS SUBJECT LINES to be alarming.
Countless systems are relying on email as a means to alert people to issues, for better or worse. Having a physical alarm for everything is rarely practical for a myriad of reasons.
I worked in a data center 20 years ago that had alarms on the wall for when the halon was preparing to be released for fire suppression. There are likely dozens of things that could be monitored, but it was only the catastrophic thing that once it started, there was no stopping it, that got lights on the wall.
Too many loud alarms make people start ignoring alarms. I would guess that there is a fairly large margin of error in pools before there is a health risk, so it likely wasn't deemed alarm worthy. As someone who's been in a pool before, I'd also imagine that people would notice and say something, or it would be unpleasant enough to not want to spend time in it. That's what I find most surprising... that people weren't immediately turned off just being around it, to the point of staying out.
Maybe a waterpark resort, but hotels no. These days they barely afford a front desk employee and a cleaner.
Title: 5 nines of uptime
A grand piano is suspended from the ceiling with an electromagnet.
The electromagnet works as long as there is power.
No special battery backups, anything.
Guests are invited to stand underneath it, after signing a waiver.
That’s it. That’s the art.
I'm surprised an e-mail only alert is even legal for this. Or is chlorine level monitoring not something that is regulated?
Your second sentence is 100% correct. Your first is questionable; Microsoft, a kabillion dollar company has, for years, held itself out to be reliable and safe. And it repeatedly has shown that it is not. That opens them up to some liability here; and frankly deserves to be better held to the standards it (either directly or indirectly) claims.
And see e.g. "Implied warranty of merchantability" as a refuation of the possibility that you can wave this away with a Terms of Service.
> And see e.g. "Implied warranty of merchantability" as a refuation of the possibility that you can wave this away with a Terms of Service.
"Implied warranty of merchantability" is a term of art in United States law, and it applies only to tangible goods, not to services.
The greater concept is that the entire point of law is so that you CAN'T just wave away things in fake contracts.
When an incident like this happened, they might add new "system" to improve the situation, probably in the lines of having someone to patrol and check off a list routinely.
I know the S in IoT means safety/security, but there must be things that can be done for urgent notification.
Wtf?
I must have missed the memo where Slack Discord or “apps“ became suitable for safety critical task. Must be what USA has tried to use just before grounding all planes.
You know what they all have? An email account
I do agree with this sentiment. At the same time, it’s still unacceptable for a global service like MS365 to go down for extended periods of time. I wouldn’t be surprised if the hotel chain was sold on some MS guarantee that it would never become unavailable.
Although I would also believe a scenario where the hotel chain "IT” (aka the owners son or grandchild) just used default alert settings and didn’t bother to setup fallback alerting mechanisms.
In short, all parties suck here (MS and hotel)
Go invent a transport layer that will never fail, and make yourself rich.
Because right now, there is no such thing.
Email is not.
And yet, still not "guaranteed," which was the criteria specified by the OP.
And yet, still not "guaranteed," which was the criteria specified by the OP.
Yes it's true, no system is guaranteed to function, but for Pete's sake, it's clear to everyone that having only an email-based alarm system for chlorine levels is the wrong thing to do just because "well there's no alarm system that is guaranteed to alert people, so let's rely only on email, tee-hee".
Any redundancy would have been better than this. People's lives were at risk, and here we are, debating the meaning of the word "guaranteed". I'm going to be frank here, are you an MSFT shareholder or tied to the hotel in question?