In an ideal circumstance, you'd average five minutes for a confirmation anyway. Blocks are usually generated every 10 minutes or so.
In an ideal circumstance, you'd average five minutes for a confirmation anyway. Blocks are usually generated every 10 minutes or so.
Also, "ideal circumstances" do not happen in the real world. IF you want to convince Amazon to adopt Bitcoin, you need to impress them with typical and realistic circumstances.
I'm sure anyone spending more than $750 on amazon is probably happy enough waiting for two or more confirmations.
Maybe, but if I can do it without waiting by just sticking with credit cards, why wouldn't I?
"Given that double spends are reasonably expensive"
I see this being tossed around quite a bit. I am not entirely sure where this idea came from. Can you prove it, the way that ECDSA (on which Bitcoin is based) can be proved secure as a signature system? When I hear this sort of statement, it sounds a lot like, "Nobody has published any way to double spend cheaply, and I cannot think of one; therefore it must be an expensive thing to do!"
I do not mean to be insulting with that, I really would like to know why people think double spending attacks are necessarily expensive. On top of that, how do we know that a double spending attack would be more expensive than the payoff -- especially when you are dealing with a complex marketplace, where a double spending attack may be just one component of a larger scheme. Maybe the point will just be to deny another person the ability to buy something, by double-spending until the merchant is sold out of the item, or as shills in an auction to try to inflate the price (should Amazon revive its auctions system).
This reminds me of the sort of argument I had with Hushmail users back before the infamous DEA incident. Your secret key is sitting there, on their servers; they could read your mail if they wanted to or if someone had a gun to their head. People said it couldn't happen, that the key would only be in RAM for a split second, that using their Java applet solved the problem, etc. Then the DEA turned up in court with a mountain of decrypted email from Hushmail (and then, as if the entire world just wanted to aggravate me, people starting saying that PGP had security problems). Cryptography tends to be black-and-white when it comes to security: you are either secure, or you are not secure, and there is rarely anything in-between (with multiparty computation, that might be changing; people are now talking about the "covert model" and "one-bit leakage" notions of security, which are in that middle area).
> Can you prove it, the way that ECDSA (on which Bitcoin is based) can be proved secure as a signature system?
I'm not experienced in any form of crypto, so not personally, no.
How can you? If a credit card transaction can be charged back, it effectively never clears (or doesn't clear as long as the chargeback is possible, if there's a time limit on chargeback). So in any situation where you would be willing to take a possibly chargeback-able, you should be willing to take an unconfirmed bitcoin.
"Nobody has published any way to double spend cheaply, and I cannot think of one; therefore it must be an expensive thing to do!"
The fact that nobody published a cheap way to double spend is strong evidence that it's difficult and expensive to double spend.
Also it doesn't really matter if there is some obscure method to cheaply double spend, since because of its obscurity it would only affect a small number of transactions (and presumably once it is used it will be detected and made public, at which point it can be fixed).
Nonsense. Bitcoin is only a few years old. It is not nearly well-studied enough to claim that there is any good evidence that double spending is costly. Keep in mind that in the first few years of RSA, people thought that 128 bit public keys would be sufficient for centuries. Bitcoin has not received anything close to the attention RSA received from the research community, or even that attention given newer ciphers like AES.
"Also it doesn't really matter if there is some obscure method to cheaply double spend"
That is kind of like saying, "It does not really matter if there is some obscure method to crack RSA quickly."
"since because of its obscurity it would only affect a small number of transactions (and presumably once it is used it will be detected and made public, at which point it can be fixed)."
Or it might turn out that there is no fix and that the attack would work no matter what you did to Bitcoin. Maybe not confirming transactions is an inherently insecure way to do business. It is equally possible that cheap double spending attacks are impossible due to some property of Bitcoin. Right now there is no clear answer; you just have to shrug and hope for the best if you neglect to wait for confirmations.
A double-spend is costly, a chargeback has no cost. One would think the number of double-spend frauds would be lower than chargeback frauds simply because these are more difficult.