I find it strange that it doesn't mention lack of salting among the most common mistakes.
True. I believe bcrypt requires a salt, so you can't forget it. Bringing that up would have strengthened the case.
In order to retrieve the original password a hacker has to crack multiple hashes instead of only one." Nah, guessing is only more time-consuming.
The article is using that as an incorrect argument for repeated hashing, and goes on to detail why it isn't necessarily more time-consuming because it increases the probability of finding a collision.
This applies for bcrypt as well.
You can tune the work factor, so in a few years when computers are nearing fast enough to brute force your hashes, you only need to increase the work factor, not re-write all your code. You can't do that with something like SHA. The article could probably be clearer on that.
And for his "attack" on "Hashing a password N times in the form of hash( hash(password) ) * N" you would need a working preimage attack for the hashing function used.
I don't see why. If there is a probability of a collision existing for a hash, repeated hashing will increase that probability, turning something that has a low number of collisions into a high number of collisions. The more collisions, the easier it will be to find one.