I love the sanity check part. But really, you're keeping someone on hand to drag your ass out after you pass out while you sniff up toxic fumes.
I love the sanity check part. But really, you're keeping someone on hand to drag your ass out after you pass out while you sniff up toxic fumes.
In most datacenters I've seen, I'd probably be willing to do a run through with IR cam/temp probe, or just visual inspection, with a handheld 1211, especially if I had a respirator, if it were just "smell of smoke". Clear view and path to two exits, someone at the EPO switch, etc.
The "big scary things" are battery plant and generator plant, and any kind of subfloor or ductwork. As long as the fire isn't in any of those, it's far less of a big deal. I probably wouldn't EPO a room for a server on fire, either -- just kill the rack, which takes slightly longer.
I've been in places where "smell of smoke" was a fucknozzle smoking a cigar or burning leaves outdoors outside an air intake, and another where it was a smoker's coat being put on an air handler.
If you're not ready to use your DR plan it probably means your DR plan is inadequate to begin with. Why the hell do fire drills? Even cruise ships do drills. God forbid they pull their passengers away from that very important game of Texas Hold'em.
I probably wouldn't EPO a room for a server on fire, either -- just kill the rack, which takes slightly longer.
You fail to understand how fires start or why they spread. I mean why the hell do datacenters spend millions of dollars on fire supression when an IR cam and a handheld extenguisher is just as good, right?
The fire suppression exists for two reasons. One, is to get code exemptions to be allowed to run wiring in ways which would otherwise require licensed electricians to do every wiring job, and prohibit people from being in the facility. Two is to detect small fires early, and to prevent their spread, as well as to protect facilities from catastrophic facility-wide fire.
Servers are just not that high a fire risk, particularly when de-energized. Generally inside a self-contained metal chassis, less than 100 pounds each, metal/plastic, etc. The power supply is the most likely component to start a fire, and contains a max of maybe 250g of capacitors and other components. The risk of one server catching on fire is low, and the risk of it rapidly spreading to anything else is low, so yes, I'd be comfortable pulling a single burning server out of a de-energized rack.
Also, in big or purpose-built facilities, those components most likely to be fire risks (batteries/power handlers, and generators) are in separate rooms, separated by firewalls from the datacenter. A fire in the battery room is going to be dealt with by sealing that room and powering it off, dumping suppression agent, and bringing out the FD immediately.
Life safety is much more important than business continuity, but a lot of people have jobs where they accept a non-zero risk of physical harm to do their jobs. It's certainly not reasonable to demand a datacenter tech go into a burning building to rescue a database server or something, but approximately zero datacenter staff I know would have a problem with assuming the level of risk I would to find problems. (it's probably a bigger deal for employers to actually discourage risk-taking by employees, particularly when it's risk-taking to save themselves effort, like single-person racking large UPSes or very large servers, etc.)
Well, US flag passenger ships (among others) are required to hold Fire and Emergency drills at least once every week. But your point stands: it's only by having a plan, and executing that plan even if it's prefaced by "this is a drill..." is crucial if you want to have a hope of things going the right way in an actual emergency.
Here's the thing, though. If your people are properly trained in what to do, and how to use the equipment, then shutting down power to the rack and extinguishing fire on a single server with a fire extinguisher may be a reasonable course of action. But that contingency should have been considered ahead of time and be part of the emergency plan.
The time to decide what to do is not during the emergency.
As for walking around a smoky room looking for the source, that's nuts. I spent one long day (way too short, though) time at Military Sealift Command Firefighting School. One of the first things they do is put you in a room full of smoke and make you count out loud. After about 30 seconds you feel like you're going to pass out -- that gets the point across much better than lectures ever will.
Our colo went down. Fire system triggered it (no actual fire was harmed in the triggering, however). On Thanksgiving. When I'd volunteered for on-call seeing as my co-worker had family to attend to and I didn't.
He thanked me afterward.
Our cage was reasonably straightforward to bring up, once power was restored. The colo facility as a whole took a few days to bring all systems up, apparently some large storage devices really don't like being Molly-switched.
And which part of Oakland? That can be a pretty broad range of risk. :-)
Edit: It helps that you're the CEO of your company. The risk profile changes a little bit. :-)
Also, you should look up the agony, people would rather shoot themselves than take the "treatment"
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/open-pit-burnin...
I don't think the situation was that bad. The one really unforgivable thing was shoddy electrical work in shower trailers (I think ~10 contractors and soldiers were fatally electrocuted while showering while in Iraq! I certainly got 230v a couple times and went through the reporting process, and actually got MPs and a friend from Contracting to turn it into a bigger issue.)
It definitely happens.
Whether it was a redundant mains power system blowing (taking down the main PDU), spoiled diesel, failed generator cutover, UPS fire, smoke detector-triggered shutdown (associated with power management), a really bizarre IPV6 ping / router switch flapping issue, load balancer failures based on an SSL cipher-implementation bug (triggered an LB reboot and ~15s outage at random intervals), etc., etc., etc.
Just piling redundancy on your stack doesn't make it more reliable. You've got to engineer it properly, understand the implications, and actually monitor and come to know the actual outcomes. Oh, and cascade failures.
Yeah, in a sense it actually makes it less reliable as far as mean-time-between-failures go. As an example, the rate of engine failure in twin-engine planes is greater than for single-engine planes. It's obvious if you think about it: there are now two points of failure instead of one. Why have two-engined planes? Because you can still fly on one engine (pilots: no nitpicking!).
What redundancy does do is let you recover from failure without catastrophe (provided you've set it up properly as per the parent).
It depends on what you're protecting against, how you're protecting against it, and how you've deployed those defenses.
Chained defenses, generally, decrease reliability. Parallel defenses generally increase it.
E.g.: Putting a router, an LB, a caching proxy, an app server tier, and a database back-end tier (typical Web infrastructure) in series (a chain) introduces complexity and SPOFs to a service. You can duplicate elements at each stage of the infrastructure, but might well consider a multi-DC deployment, as you're still subject to DC-wide outages (I've encountered several of these) and a great deal of complexity and cost.
Going multi-DC doesn't increase capital requirements by much, and may or may not be more expensive than 2x the build-out in a single DC. It though raises issues of code and architecture complexity.
In several cases, we were experiencing issues that would have pervaded despite redundant equipment. E.g.: the load balancer SSL bug we encountered was present on all instances of multiple generations of the product. Providing two LBs would simply have insured that as the triggering cipher was requested, both LBs would have failed and rebooted. Something of an end-run around our Maginot line, as it were.
The fact is, there aren't that many flammable things in a data center. Nobody is going to die because they wandered up and down the aisles after they "thought they smelled something burning," in the absence of any visible smoke.
The guidelines in the highest-voted answer on the SO page make sense to me. 1: If you actually see smoke or fire in any significant amount, evacuate. 2: Make someone else aware of what's going on before doing anything else. 3: Keep your escape options open. 4: Think about how much time you can safely spend "guessing", and don't exceed it. 5: Don't second-guess your own common sense. You aren't paid to be a fireman or a hero.
"Not being prepared for them is unforgivable" - would mean that 99% of business do not deserve forgiveness.
It just doesn't make sense to have that kind of redundancy for such a rare event for all but a very, very small minority of businesses. (Telecoms, Google, Stock Exchange, 911, etc...)
Always plan for the single event because no amount of money will keep a single site running.
Of course they are idiots, they should never have powered their own mains of before they got the new one installed.
But it was still pretty funny.