> I don't see anything about government equipment on private company property in the slides.
Given the interface already laid out in what we knew about PRISM before, that's mostly an implementation detail. Maybe the company didn't want to have to send the data over the open Internet on their own (even encrypted) and wanted to pawn off that responsibility to the NSA?
I don't know where the info came from but I remember it being talked about when the news first leaked so it may have been sent by Snowden with the initial leak of slides.
I suppose the question is really how embedded into the company's subnet is the government equipment?
> The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court does not review any individual collection request
Basically this part from the article introduction: "The program is court-approved but does not require individual warrants. Instead, it operates under a broader authorization from federal judges who oversee the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)".
Keep in mind this is where the US/non-US inequality is at its most severe. Almost the only reason the FISC really cares about this at all is to prevent monitoring of American citizens in a way that violates the 4th Amendment. The program as constituted is less worried about ensuring the right person has their data collected as it is about ensuring that a U.S. citizen does not have their data collected.
So from that perspective such a warrant might appear rational on the part of the court.
That's admittedly a pretty large inequity between US and non-US persons but that's how the existing case law seems to approach it.