If you sub-divide your app in separate zerovms, whether per-request, or split it up further into functional responsibilities, then you substantially reduce the attack surface by ensuring that an exploit against any one part of your application can only exploit the specific subsets of data it is allowed to work on.
You can do this without zerovm too, but the more you reduce the cost and difficulty of spawning a new vm or container, the more finely grained you can subdivide your application, and hence the fewer privileges each subset of your app will have.
I can find this technology useful only in areas where you want untrusted 3rd-party code to run without worrying about what it will do.
And about "3rd party code". If we have two developers, each works on a different module of the same application, isn't their code is "3rd party" to each other?
If I have to run a database, say postgresql, how do I run it? Inside the ZeroVM or outside? To run the DB I would need to give it file system access?
Now if there is a security hole in postgresql, how is it guaranteed that files other than DB files are never accessed?