Of course, the reason Wittgenstein ultimately rejected this picture, as in rejected describing the meaning of words by formal definition, is that it doesn't accurately describe the way language is used in practice, and leads us to misunderstand situations.
"Does a tree falling in the forest make a sound?"
Albert: "no" => "Berkeleyan idealism makes sense"
Barry: "yes => "I refute it thus!" kicks rock
Of course, the question of course, is do we really want to understand the situation, or beleaguer Albert and Barry until they stop bothering us? The argumentum ad nauseum on lesswrong, by now an encyclopedia-sized blog, hints toward the latter. And there are plenty of bare, wrong assertions:
>Most philosophers would advise Albert and Barry to try to define exactly what they mean by "free will", on which topic they will certainly be able to discourse at great length.
"Most philosophers" probably wouldn't, unless you're at a conference of the Vienna circle. Philosophy admits a great many ways of approaching these questions.
If a tree is in a forest and nobody can ever hear or see it, is it really a "tree"? Is it in a "forest"? And can it really "fall"? After all, all of the trees and forests and falling we refer to in natural language (this is an empirical claim) are ultimately derived from (this is actually a propter hoc fallacy, but that's inevitable) our real experiences of trees and forests, in which falling makes a sound (this is not a definition, but a description). This is a sort of lame analysis, but at least I'm not trying to dodge the question.