> But suppose that instead you had asked, "Is your eldest child a boy?" and the mathematician had answered "Yes." Then the probability of the mathematician having two boys would be 1/2. Since the eldest child is a boy, and the younger child can be anything it pleases.
No, it cannot be "anything it pleases." That is the whole point of the blog post that we are all commenting about here on HN, which is re-told on the blog post you are linking to.
Since the post you are linking to is misrepresenting one side of the "argument," I strongly suggest that there is no actual apparentl contradiction here that needs to be resolved.
Yes, you can talk about the actual probability of something vs. making the best possible prediction you have. A good example raised in this post is the point about a biased coin; you know it is biased but not which way, so you assign odds of .5 for heads and .5 for tails. Fine. This is not some massive philosophical conundrum.
The fact is that actual knowledge is neither purely "out there" (e.g. "in the cards") nor purely "in here" (in the mind). This is the classic rationalism vs. empiricism debate, which was settled by Ayn Rand's theory of objective knowledge, where she answers that knowledge is in man's mind, but it is knowledge of external reality. So, "both."
Not understanding this, and other basic epistemological errors, seem to plague lesswrong.com. It is embarassing to see them supposedly championing "reason" under a non-objective epistemology. They come to bizarre conclusions, and that is, at least partially, why.