http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/publice...
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/publice...
I suspect that Garcetti v. Ceballos doesn't invalidate this position. In Garcetti, the issue was statements made pursuant to professional duties. I don't believe a letter to the editor criticizing your employer could be considered an action taken pursuant to your duties.
I'm just speculating, though. I can't be sure a given court would agree with me. So any government employees reading this shouldn't take my word for it.
I'm no expert on the Constitutional law in this area - it just seems like a very obvious can of worms, of the sort that the courts prefer to punt on.
I don't believe a letter to the editor criticizing your employer could be considered an action taken pursuant to your duties.
I think you could easily say you took an oath to the United States as opposed to your immediate supervisor, although in cases where people have made such arguments courts often seem to take the position that one should exhaust one's administrative remedies first - ie make complaints through channels, escalate to appropriate Congressional committees if necessary, etc. etc. Given the purpose of the TSA, national security issues could also come into play but I have no idea how those shake out.
They should be allowed to do that. And any publication willing to try to sell ad space flanking such drivel should be allowed to as well.
Freedom of speech is specifically and ultimately for the speech that you don't like. I find the ideas behind your hypothetical article abhorrent, but I absolutely and unwaveringly think people should be able to say those things. My main motivations for this stance are two-fold:
1. Preventing speech we don't like invites a slippery slope. If today we say you can't write articles excoriating Muslims, what's to stop us from barring editorials espousing atheism tomorrow? Or any religious stance but the current, socially dominant one the day after that? Better to allow distasteful discourse today than to risk dissenting discourse tomorrow.
2. I find it convenient when noxious assholes out themselves as such. It makes my life so much easier when people who think these kinds of things fly their flag loudly and proudly, so I know whom to avoid.
how would you legally distinguish between that critical of the TSA and that critical of some other class of people without privileging one set of political opinions over another?
Easy: you don't. Speech is speech is speech. Allow it all, or risk it all.
Now, a critical caveat here is that we're talking about speech, and not incitement. Expressing an opinion, however vile, should be sacrosanct. Encouraging people who might share your opinion to visit violence (and I don't just mean physical violence) upon the targets of your noisome nonsense is something entirely other. And I think that's a reasonably easy distinction to draw, as well, without privileging some opinions over others.
Look at the balance of harms in this example. On the one side, a TSA employee whose expression of sincere opinion is restrained by his employer, the government. On the other side, millions of innocent people who feel dissuaded from air travel on the grounds of national origin (see below) because they don't believe they'll be properly treated at airports and because they fear assaults , even if only verbal, from passengers emboldened by the slight imprimateur of official support for their prejudice.
(I say national origin rather than religion because most people seem to be in the habit of making judgments based on the former. Post 9/11 people like Sikhs were attacked because they were foreign-seeming and from a part of the world that has a lot of Muslims, even though Sikhism is a wholly different religion. a woman named Fatima Mubarak might be a Christian but most people are going to assume Islamic affiliation based on her name. Likewise, it's easy to imagine or identify people who are Islamic but statistically unlikely to be identified as such. In the aggregate, we're pretty superficial).
You have a balance of harms here, and I think ultimately courts would choose the harm that affects the fewest number of people, especially given the existence of numerous avenues for dissatisfied TSA employees to raise grievances through administrative channels rather than by trying to whip up public sentiment in favor of their political view.
Please note that it's not the speech excoriating someone else that I'm saying should be regulated - it's the publicity by the angry person of their official position with a government agency in connection with that speech, which shI say should be restrainable by the agency. If the TSA agent in this example thinks the agency so wrong-headed, s/he could resign from the TSA and then write things like 'I quit the TSA because they don't recognize the threat posed by Muslims' - to which the TSA could reply 'We are required by law to treat everyone equally and it is our policy to do so, which is why we parted ways with this employee.'
Now I totally agree that it's convenient when 'assholes out themselves as such.' The thing is that when they're in uniform (so to speak) what's convenient to you or me may be intimidating to someone else; things look quite different when you're a spectator rather than the target of someone's bias, and the appearance of official sanction for that bias amplifies the intimidatory effect. I'm saying that the interests of the agency in being seen to serve the public fairly and in accordance with law outweigh the interests of the individual agency employee who feels constrained by the agency's code of conduct.
When we regulate free speech -- in any way whatsoever -- we open ourselves up to greater regulation of free speech. Free speech is a special privilege in that only unrestricted free speech can argue against restrictions on free speech. Once you grant restrictions against free speech, you open yourself up to a position where your speech becomes so restricted that you become unable to even argue why it should be less restricted.
Furthermore I strongly disagree that restrictions on speech should be relative to either the social position of the speaker, or the harms posed by the speaker. If our justification for preventing speech is that the speaker's speech could be mistaken as the official position of some group (in this case the TSA), then this gives us a legitimation to shut down all speech, as we can simply twist the speaker's position as being representative of some group to which they're tenuously related. A woman wants to speak out unpopularly against x? Well, we can claim she represents all women, and her speaking out would sour the position of the public towards women. A black man wants to speak out against unpopular y? Same argument. Jewish? Same argument. And so on. This is why speech is an individual right, regardless of circumstance.
As for the (in my opinion, unpersuasive) argument that the harm caused by speech should be legitimation to close down certain speech, no speech in-and-of itself is harmful. Speech is just speech, and cannot itself be harmful. It is people's reactions to speech which causes harm. Even if we claim certain classes of speech (say, yelling fire) have predictable outcomes that can cause harm, we also have to accept that harmful speech can sometimes be necessary. When the founding fathers spoke out against the tyranny of the British (or so I hear; I'm British!), this lead to a civil war which cost hundreds of thousands of people their lives. Same again when Lincoln spoke out against the separatist south. Same again when Churchill spoke out against the Nazi threat. Yet few would argue the harms caused by these pieces of speech should cause them to be banned, even though these pieces of speech resulted in the deaths of millions.
This means that we cannot be logically consistent when we claim to ban speech based upon harm, so we either have to change our justification (i.e. admit that it's not really harm we're avoiding, but specific types of harm), or admit that we're being illogical in selecting lesser harms (discomfort felt by non-Americans, in your example) as justification to shut down speech, and greater harms (the deaths of millions, as above) as protected speech.
Honestly, free speech is simply too fundamental to both democracy and philosophical/scientific progress to tamper with. No matter what lesser right you put up against it, you'd have a hard time convincing me that it should trump free speech, the right which underlies our very society.
Why is this such a difficult concept to grasp?
Furthermore I strongly disagree that restrictions on speech should be relative to either the social position of the speaker, or the harms posed by the speaker. If our justification for preventing speech is that the speaker's speech could be mistaken as the official position of some group (in this case the TSA), then this gives us a legitimation to shut down all speech, as we can simply twist the speaker's position as being representative of some group to which they're tenuously related. A woman wants to speak out unpopularly against x? Well, we can claim she represents all women, and her speaking out would sour the position of the public towards women. A black man wants to speak out against unpopular y? Same argument. Jewish? Same argument. And so on. This is why speech is an individual right, regardless of circumstance.
No, that's bollocks because employment is a bilateral contractual relationship. I don't choose to be a man nor is the fact of my masculinity subject to the agreement of the male community, therefore it's meaningless for me to say that I speak for all mean by virtue of happening to be one. Someone in a position of authority in an organization by definition stands in an agency relationship to that organization. The very word authority implies an ability to act as the of author of that organization's decisions.
As for the (in my opinion, unpersuasive) argument that the harm caused by speech should be legitimation to close down certain speech
I'm not making any such argument. If you think that, you have wholly misunderstood my position and I apologize for my lack of clarity in explaining.
Your argument proceeds from the assumption that the balance of harms matters. Legally, it does not where political speech is concerned. This is pretty much the closest thing to a legal absolute as our system of laws has.
Restrictions on speech are generally subjected to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is not based on a balance of harms test. Rather, for a restriction to pass strict scrutiny, it must satisfy the following factors:
1. It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
2. It must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
3. It must be the least restrictive available means to achieve that interest.
Note that balance of harms doesn't factor anywhere into this analysis. The closest thing is the "compelling interest" test. But "compelling interest" isn't a test that weighs one interest against another. Rather, it simply asks whether the restriction's positive effects, examined on their own, are crucial, essential, or necessary, rather than merely desirable. This is a fairly high bar, by the way.
Getting back to our original question: A restriction on politicized hate speech by government employees would presumably trigger strict scrutiny, largely because of the political nature of the speech. So, does it pass strict scrutiny? Let's go factor by factor.
1. Does the government have a compelling interest in preventing hate speech by employees? No, because preventing such speech isn't crucial, essential, or necessary. It's merely desirable. Lives will not be lost, property will not be destroyed, and national security will not be directly compromised if a government employee engages in hate speech. The expected harm from hate speech by government employees is largely psychological. Further, the psychological damage inflicted by one crackpot will most likely be very small. While it's clearly a bad thing, it's not compelling by strict scrutiny standards. We could stop here, as the restriction has already failed the first test and thus failed strict scrutiny. But let's continue for the sake of the exercise.
2. Is the restriction narrowly tailored? If the interest is the prevention of psychological harm to minorities, and the law restricts that hate speech and nothing else, it's probably narrowly tailored.
3. Is the restriction the least restrictive means? Probably not. One could imagine an alternative solution whereby the government actively and publicly disclaims its employees hate speech. That would be less restrictive, and would probably go a long way toward achieving the goal.
A century ago, you would probably have been right. This speech has some significant bad tendencies that the government has a legitimate interest in regulating. If the government had been responsible in using that power, that might be the test today.
Unfortunately the trouble started in WWI, when sedition prosecutions were brought against individuals for encouraging people not to report for the draft. While the prosecutions were ultimately upheld, they made members of the court nervous. As a result the court, in Schenk v. United States, tightened up the standard a bit, to "clear and present danger" and including the famous bit about shouting fire in a crowded theater and laughing as people are trampled.
I think your hypothetical would be harder to justify under this new standard (in 1917) because it isn't clear that the danger is either clear or present. However, given prosecutions of alleged Communists in the 1920's I think it would stick.
The prosecutions of alleged communism, and the political antics surrounding them (HUAC, etc), eventually lead the courts to conclude that the basis of American democracy required a free marketplace of ideas. This eventually lead to the standard becoming a lot more tight in Yates v. United States (holding that urging people to accept the moral necessity of eventual violent overthrow of the government was protected speech, and not the equivalent of raising an army to accomplish such an end). In essence saying that workers must at some point unite and overthrow the government did not pose a clear or present danger but rather an unclear, future danger.
The danger in this context is not that a sincere opinion will be restrained but that the government will use its force to create apparent consensus for its preferred policies, and therefore deny the people a real voice in the matter. This is a structural, functional problem, and perhaps a less centralized, more local, more responsible and inclusive government might not have somewhere else.
All that aside, you seem equally hung up on whether someone is acting in some capacity as a TSA official or not. I maintain that unless someone specifically and explicitly claims they're speaking in that capacity, we should assume they're speaking as a private party.
I don't think it's the least bit ambiguous whether Mr. Harrington's blog posts — written while he was in the TSA's employ — nor this article, written after, are an official TSA position. Nor is it ambiguous whether your hypothetical anti-Muslim editorial, even were it penned by an active TSA employee — or, for that matter, officer or executive — is or isn't TSA policy. The legal system's notional "reasonable person" would be able to distinguish private speech from government policy in both cases, mooting your argument.
That poses some very interesting questions. If there is no right to a specific mode of travel, but some places can only be reached effectively by plane (say Hawaii) then does placing an American on a no-fly list impact that right to go to Hawaii? Does it matter if that individual is a resident of Hawaii and is thus effectively barred from interstate travel by this?
Internationally things get more complicated. I am not aware of any cases which hold squarely a right for Americans to travel about the world as they please. Certainly bans on spending money travelling to Cuba have been upheld. However what the government clearly cannot do is to take a protected criteria like speech, religion, or political viewpoint and use that as a basis for travel.
If an individual were to say that policy was to dissuade Muslims from travelling, the harm would be that Muslims would get together and sue the government in order to determine the scope of this misbehavior and put a stop to it. There really isn't that much harm when compared to the likely other uses of such a power (silencing discussions, for example, of what Islam means for politics in the US). On the whole disadvantaged groups are protected by bans on hate speech, given what the government has done in the past.
That's an invaluable (and otherwise largely unavailable, or at best, irredeemably subject to spin) contribution to the dialogue we, as a society, should be having about the TSA's form and function. Muzzling him a priori because he happens to have that perspective does disservice to everyone, including the TSA.