ECDSA, ECDH, and ECIES (which we don't see a lot of) all require a curve. Saying "ECDH is good" isn't helpful if you can't safely choose a curve to run them over.
ECDSA has another problem: it has a hard randomness requirement. If you repeat the per-message nonce, leak bits of the message nonce, or even fail to fill the modulus for the message nonce, you set up a condition where attackers can recover your private key. DJB is trying to push ECDSA into disfavor, replacing it with deterministic signatures.
One-time pads are awful and should be avoided at all costs. Virtually every computer program developed by generalist programmers that claimed to be a "one-time pad" was instead a crappy stream cipher.
Shamir splitting is fine, although that's a strange thing to have in your "regular use" bag.