I think the point is that silent circle is secured by policy, not by technology. The validity of their security assertions only extend as far as you trust their word.
CALEA means you are actually prevented from building/operating some kinds of privacy tech within the US (PSTN voice without wiretaps for sure, and PSTN-interconnected VOIP is a gray area; a mobile-focused VPN would be a gray area too, although not as dark as some.)
If Tor Project ran a large number of Tor nodes directly, they'd be open to very simple legal attacks.
There are certainly examples of companies using the protocols you listed that have chosen where they operate with great care...
In practice, many operators do offer up access to 100% of their traffic, and to their endpoint devices to law enforcement and security agencies, but it's not a CALEA legal requirement.
I'd say the goal can only be to maximize both, because no single factor will ever give you the best solution.
And their strategic positioning certainly also benefits from this move.