The author effectively dismisses the point being about a malicious server: especially with "Just use the SSL", because, well, if you're landed on the server, SSL means squat.
The author is concerned about:
- the unavailability of secure functions necessary for crypto (as simple as RNG, as useful as an AES call, or as complex as a full-blown PGP API with transparent, ad-hoc key management) in browsers
- the unavailability of a secure, non-monkey-patchable runtime environment for JS crypto code to execute in, guaranteeing one can use the aforementioned functions as intended
- the vulnerability of the code as content in the channel itself (when not using SSL) or in the browser itself (XSS and all)
All of those being legitimate causes of concerns (IOW in crypto world, gaping holes rendering client-side JS crypto untrustable)
That one at least can be dealt with by web workers
And to address the quote from the article that you don't need JS Crypto if you're using SSL/TLS. It's a wrong assumption, there are still uses for it. It adds more security to the user data which is encrypted before it hits the server. A hacker owning the server at some point won't be able to get the data. He could, in theory, plant a exploit to collect user passwords (as they log in) but it's unlikely that it wouldn't get noticed very quickly.
The only (dangerous) thing an attacker can send on this case is Javascript.