In particular, IRV satisfies the important "majority criteria," e.g. if the majority of people vote for a candidate, that candidate should win. Approval / range voting fail this criteria. See, again, Arrow's Theorem. http://archive.fairvote.org/monotonicity/.
Additionally, voting so as to strategically take advantage of non-monotonicity using IRV/STV/Ranked Choice Voting is NP-Complete- see http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.127....
Your link also discusses the later-no-harm criteria for Approval/Range leading to strategic voting, but all the examples I've seen for this seem to talk about giving a marginally preferred candidate an advantage in the absence of any truly disliked candidates. I think in practice, people will be far more interested in keeping disliked candidates out than furthering their marginal preferences.
Meanwhile, IRV suffers from Favourite Betrayal, which is a much more obvious incentive for strategic voting IMO. (Your link about NP-completeness of strategy only talks about STV.)
www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv
IRV can elect X even if Y was preferred to X by an arbitrarily huge majority and got more first-place votes than X.
www.electology.org/core-support
Regarding favorite betrayal, you might enjoy this video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
If I love candidate B and C, kind of like D, and hate candidate A, but all of candidate A's supporters are bullet-voting, how should I vote? It's ridiculous.
It doesn't allow voters to express their preferences without strategic voting -- it's totally baked into the process. The range voting folks have come up with various metrics that say their system is the best, but completely ignore the most obvious reasons why its flawed.
For the record, though, I'd vastly prefer any system over the current plurality elections (including range voting).
Just to be clear, you're not imagining people have to share their vote between parties are you? Range voting means you can give every party 100 if you want to.
>If I love candidate B and C, kind of like D, and hate candidate A, but all of candidate A's supporters are bullet-voting, how should I vote?
If you really hate A so badly that you think any one of B, C or D would be vastly better, then go ahead and give them all 100. If A not getting in is that important to you then your "strategic" vote is in fact, an accurate representation of your preferences.
www.electology.org/bullet-voting
> (100/100 points for candidate A).
Score Voting (aka Range Voting) does not limit the number of votes. That's WHY it's so resistant to tactical voting. If you give Ralph Nader a "perfect 10", you can still help Gore against Bush as strongly as you want. You could even strategize to give Gore a 10 and Bush a 0.
I would expect approval voting to reduce the polarization of politics and allow moderate candidates who are reasonably liked by everyone to enter political office. Rather than see our laws and policies flip-flop every 4-12 years due to one or the other party taking control, maybe we would actually have politicians focus on the mutual good of society rather than the parties' individual power.
http://scorevoting.net/RichieRV.html https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/fact-check
That first link is written by Warren Smith, a Princeton math PhD who's the protagonist of William Poundstone's book Gaming the Vote, and arguably the world's foremost expert on voting systems.
I've hung out with Arrow in his Palo Alto retirement community condo by the way.