I think we're now finding that doesn't scale very well as it only takes one hole and it's broken. It's better to treat the network as some level of 'untrusted' and protect your servers/computers better as individual units accordingly.
I think we're now finding that doesn't scale very well as it only takes one hole and it's broken. It's better to treat the network as some level of 'untrusted' and protect your servers/computers better as individual units accordingly.
There are situations where the former can make sense, such as a siege, where e.g. a penetration is quickly obvious and you can use your interior lines of communications to rush reserves to the action.
The key, of course, is the "quickly obvious". Prior to the stats of the art allowing that (which sounds difficult and painful in principle), defense in depth is obviously the way to go. But you've got to achive it in some why where e.g. compromise of "bob@nvidia.com" + password doesn't quickly get you past any defense, or any that's relevant to bob.
I think its definatly time we started treating our internal networks as unsafe. Not as easier for the end user, but if done correctly a lot safer for everyone.
A little depressing, but its what would have had to happen eventually.