There is a lot of inconsistent thinking behind the advice given in the article:
- Hard-to-implement NIST curves suck, whereas GCM and Poly1305 are recommended.
- NIST apparently sucks, but NSA-designed SHA-2 is recommended.
- MACs need 256-bit tags, so UMAC and not-NSA-designed RIPEMD160 is apparently not fine, but GCM/Poly1305's 128-bit tags are recommended. On this note, 256-bit tags are pointless when the rest of the crypto infrastructure is sitting on 128-bit security.
- 3DES is not recommended because DES is 'broken', not realizing that this break is due to small key length of the original DES; 3DES is deemed to be quite secure (but slow).
- 64-bit block size is enforced, but for no good reason: SSH's 32-bit sequence number, along with counter mode, renders block size worries moot.