That depends on what your trust model is. Somebody is resolving the DNS query, and then the result gets transmitted to you. If all you're worried about the result being MITM'd during transit, then encryption is sufficient. You can set up DNSCrypt to deal with this today [1].

But often the provider resolving the query is itself untrustworthy. Most providers these days (including OpenDNS) redirect invalid queries to their own landing pages (which poisons caches and has other bad effects). Providers may "censor" certain domains. Or be subverted by state-level actors (see: Belgacom). In DNSSEC, the root of trust is the administrator of the DNS root zone (e.g., Verisign, whom you're probably already trusting anyway).

[1] But encryption is not a panacea. As soon as you visit the address(es) returned, someone will get a pretty good idea what you looked up.