So, for example, consider Britain. In 2006 and 2007, the pound-euro rate was quite steady, with the pound buying somewhere between 1.45 and 1.50 euros. When the financial crisis hit, the pound dropped like a rock, buying only 1.05 euros at the worst point. Since then, it's steadily re-appreciated, but even as recently as the start of this year it only bought less than 1.30 euros.
Britain's devaluation was no accident; it was in fact one of the main goals of QE (or conversely, on of the main mechanisms by which QE was meant to work). Imagine if Greece could have knocked almost 1/3 off the value of their loans to Germany, their pensions, salaries, hotel rooms. Things might have been very different!
Krugman has a column on devaluations in history you may find interesting as as well, he mentions Britain in 1992, as well as Sweden and South Korea: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/devaluing-histor...
In the present day, really, anywhere that had some form of QE was undergoing devaluation (under a floating rate regime, the way you devalue is to print a boatload of currency; since the demand is staying relatively constant, as supply goes up, price goes down). (Although keep in mind; devaluation is relative to somewhere else. Everyone can't devalue at once!)