I don't understand what you think the problem here is. Computers are machines that run programs; my laptop doesn't require an evolved self-preservation drive and set of motives to be convinced to boot OSX every morning. If we program a machine to solve an optimization problem, the machine will just do it, assuming the problem is solvable under whatever algorithm we implement. If the optimization problem involves a sufficiently flexible representation of the real world, and if the program's architecture is set up to pipe solutions into some sort of mechanism (even just a text interface) that acts upon the world -- as it would need to be, to interact and learn from experience -- then the machine will act.
What actions it will take depend on its utility function (i.e., on the optimization problem we gave it), but the vast majority of utility functions will lead to actions that are not aligned with human values. The space of utility functions is incredibly vast, an artificial agent would not be subject to the evolutionary constraints that caused humans to mostly fall within a particular very small region of that space, and pretty much all utility functions lead to behavior like "try to avoid being switched off" and "try to acquire more computing resources" since those are helpful instrumental goals for a wide range of tasks.
Sure, we're nowhere near having a "sufficiently powerful optimization algorithm" and a "sufficiently flexible representation of the real world". But these tasks are essentially THE goal of modern AI research. So it's worth considering what will happen if this research agenda succeeds, whether that happens in a decade, a century, or a millenium.