It supports features like "encrypted writes" where the host microcontroller encrypts data, sends the ciphertext on the SPI link, ATAES132 decrypts it, and stores the plaintext in internal EEPROM. Later the host can do "encrypted reads" where ATAES132 reads the plaintext from internal EEPROM, encrypts it (possibly with a different key), sends it on the SPI link, and the host decrypts the ciphertext.
Firstly, there is no mechanism in place for the host to securely share a key with ATAES132. The key would have to be pre-shared during manufacturing. Secondly, if the host has to have the key and has to do encryption/decryption by itself, why not just read/write encrypted data on a standard SPI EEPROM? Thirdly, if I am misunderstanding things and in fact plaintext or keys are exchanged on the SPI link, then nothing stops an attacker from sniffing the SPI link or doing active MitM attacks.
This whole chip smells like it was invented to satisfy PHBs who demand crypto but who have no understanding how to implement crypto correctly.