I agree that self-preservation has probably been a factor in the more than dozen close-calls the world has seen, but I would hardly call it impossible. There are many instances of humans failing to self-preserve.
I agree that self-preservation has probably been a factor in the more than dozen close-calls the world has seen, but I would hardly call it impossible. There are many instances of humans failing to self-preserve.
Yes, but only within the limited circumstances of the cold war.
I strongly believe that nuclear war between two equal and opposing parties is effectively impossible. The game theorist Thomas Schelling wrote about it - each party can only 'win' by demonstrating they're more willing to risk all out destruction but, importantly, never actually go through with it otherwise they lose. With nuclear war both sides lose completely if they go through with it, but they can lose less by giving up. Consequently one side will always, eventually, capitulate before a nuclear war happens because that's actually better for them.
My problem with this reasoning is that it seems to assume perfectly rational actors. For most problems you can do that in the long run, and it's generally a sane thing to assume, but in this case it's a ruin problem - one irrational person with imperfect/delayed information in a power position is enough.
Actually, is a serious possibility. That stuff is all still there.
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/lau...