275 karma · joined July 20, 2011
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http://docs.sympy.org/0.7.2-py3k/modules/physics/quantum/ind...
And the link actually only applies to traditional computers; quantum computers have no analogue of destructively setting a bit, because all operations on a quantum computer are fundamentally reversible, and hence do not entail any inherent energy loss to entropy.
The deletionist argument is not and has never been been that it's going to save storage or bandwidth. (Generally, it's about it being difficult to keep up the average quality of the encyclopedia when there's a lot of less notable stuff. Which is absolutely true.) You should at least try to understand the argument for the opposition before you make up your mind.
Policy debates should not appear one sided, etc, etc.
Which is more likely - coincidence, or that all of science is wrong? Because make no mistake, nothing less is required for exorcism or homeopathy or astrology to work.
Hint: It's the first one.
Or, to quote Minchin: 'You know what they call alternative medicine that's been proved to work? Medicine.'
Also: > “We can commit data at two different locations — say the West Coast [of the United States] and Europe — and still have some agreed upon ordering between them,” Fikes says, “So, if the West Coast write happens first and then the one in Europe happens, the whole system knows that — and there’s no possibility of then being viewed in a different order.”
That's a large enough scale that you have to deal with relativity (light takes almost precisely 0.03 seconds to go from Palo Alto to Paris, eg). So in some sense there is no correct ordering. Anyone know how they deal with this? Have they just chosen some arbitrary point to make their reference frame, for purposes of ordering commits?
(Unless there's some law about not charging consumers in different provinces a different pre-tax cost, or some province charges so much tax that to make other provinces eat a share of that cost would be unreasonable.)
When those two were paying for games it was obvious why that should be, since games on Linux are so comparatively scare, but it doesn't make so much sense with eBooks.
So express the number as a sum of numbers with factors drawn from that set, and draw a several diagrams, one for each summand. A quick bit of Python confirms that every number under 14925 can be expressed as the sum of no more than three such numbers in the most obvious way possible (ie using a greedy algorithm).
For example, you might write 9999 as 9800 + 196 + 3, all of which have nice factorization diagrams.
(For people who don't want to look that up, Grover's algorithm does searches on unsorted databases in root-n time, that is, in fewer operations than would be required to inspect every element of the database.)
There is no room 'n+infinity'. There's just not such a room, anywhere, even in principle. Each guest n can move to room n+1 because the guest there is moving to n+2. This works. That's the point.
And you couldn't, in fact, tell the guests to run down the hallway to find an empty room: There is no empty room until you move everyone.
Infinity is counterintuitive, you say? Well, yes, that's the point of this illustration.
A strong AI can say something different than the thing it's about to say? That's a neat trick. Not a part of any definition of strong AI I've ever heard, though. Could a human do it?
I wouldn't call that a definition. Here's a working one: my consciousness is the part of me which thinks and feels, which enjoys music and mountains and friends and so forth. Computers as of now can take input, but can't experience input the way I do; the gap is what I call consciousness. (To this definition your above description does apply.)
> "Do you think that this means your consciousness has nothing to do with your claim to be conscious?" Yes, that is exactly what I think. Although replace "consciousness" with "the act of experiencing existence" and that is a much closer semantic match to what I am attempting to convey.
This is the bit I'm having trouble with. For me, I experience things, and then state that I experience things. The relationship is direct and causal. From what I understand you experience things and then state that you experience things, and these facts are completely unrelated? I'm pretty sure Occam had something to say about that.