This is such a bad take.
1. A proof of concept is not an exploit kit, it simply needs to demonstrate that there is an issue, improving it to be more reliable only serves to help bad actors get to real exploits sooner.
2. Memory corruption bugs are notoriously flakey, crashing the target without getting code execution is generally always a possibility. Sometimes it is random from run to run, sometimes a particular attack pattern simply won't work against a particular target. Failure to find a working pattern does not imply that no such pattern exist.
3. Attacks only get better. This is usually said about cryptography, but applies just as well in this case. Data execution bugs have this tendency to make idiots assert confidently that it is improbable that such a condition would occur without the program crashing. And so the bugs get to live on until someone finds out how to tickle the program in just the right way to make the improbable a lot more likely. Even if existing attacks were as bad as the author implies, it would almost certainly only be a matter of time before someone managed to tweak them to become a whole lot better.
4. A big part of why this gets so much attention is the sheer number of high value targets, so many servers run PHP, and they were pretty much all vulnerable. Usually bugs like these still require that the PHP runtime is configured in a particular way and/or the actual PHP code run a particular function using attacker controlled data. That is still bad, but attackers will need to do a lot of digging to find the vulnerable servers.