54 karma · joined August 4, 2021
And people worrying about the other end of the chat... come on, you talked to them in the first place. They can forward anything, even if it's via Signal.
The entire story is just hilarious and memeable. Users want backup; Apple open up the gate. Users want E2E; Apple shut up the gate. Users want iCloud recovery; Apple partially open the gate.
save hundreds of lives, would you?
Sure, why not.But let me ask some questions, because at this point I am not sure if people want Apple's system to be robust or jammable. If our fear is that Apple will tune the system to detect pictures of two men kissing, wouldn't an easily jammable system works in our favor because we can DDoS it or threaten to do so anytime we want?
The scalability issue seems to work in our favor because, perhaps, the normal usage will overwhelm the human reviewers Apple prepared and we don't even need to send troll images.
And for the entire time, our data remains untouched.
If I miss anything then surely I am willing to be corrected. But so far I don't see comments that show us how to penetrate the four-layer system (local hash check, semantic check by user, on-server hash check, and human reviewer).
(In case you have problem with me saying "so many", that I can fix.)
Surely you can easily fabricate innocent images whose NeuralHash matches the database. But in what way are you going to send them to victims and convince them to save them to their photo library? The moment you send it via WhatsApp FB will stop you because (they think) it is a problematic image. And Even if the image did land, it has to look like some cats and dogs or the receiver will just ignore. (Even worse, the receiver may report you.) And even if your image does look like cats and dogs, it has to pass another automatic test at the server side that uses another obfuscated, constantly-updating algorithm. After that, even more tests if Apple really wants to.
That means your image needs to collide ≥ three times, one open, one obfuscated, and one Turing.
Gmail scans your attachments and most people are cool with it. I highly doubt that Apple has any reason to withdraw this.
This also reminds me of the QR iteration, where you loose track of the matrix entries very quickly (after 2 or 3 steps into the iteration), but in the end the diagonal does converge to the eigenvalues.
(some date + 1 month) + 1 month ≠ some date + 2 months
has always been true for floating numbers.
This is exactly why you never trust
fast matrix multiplications---they rely on cancelations
of the form (a + b) - b = a + (b - b) = a.I would argue that 1 month is just having too few significant digits. You can even implement it as returning 30 with probability 60% and returning 31 with probability 40%. Then on average you would have
1 year ≈ sum([1 month] * 12)