Stripe explains that TLS is required in their docs: https://stripe.com/help/ssl
4,820 karma · joined September 7, 2008
Stripe explains that TLS is required in their docs: https://stripe.com/help/ssl
I don't see how any of that is attacking MySQL or MongoDB, just their stock storage engines.
Compare https://ericvh.github.io/9p-rfc/rfc9p2000.html vs https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5661
I do have some plans to do benchmarks for another use case that's more performance intensive, but it's buried in my backlog right now.
http://freelawproject.org/2015/03/20/what-is-the-pacer-probl...
http://qz.com/283772/why-pacer-should-and-should-not-be-like...
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/sjs/making-excuses-for-fe...
There are many more if you take time to peruse the Re: PACER document and click through the citations.
Contributors were also having a lot of trouble figuring out where to report issues and submit patches. On the whole the unified repo and build system has been a massive improvement to our productivity and the quality of the project. Unfortunately using components in a modular fashion can be harder, and we haven't come up with a great solution to that. We're still committed to keeping our components independently useful and would love to get feedback on what we can do better.
It would be a good blog post topic, I'll make a note of that.
> https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/8093 https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/9015
libtrust does not appear to be mentioned in either of these issues.
Maybe not new to you or Docker Inc staff, but I don't see any warnings that a pull could result in complete compromise. On top of this, the inaccurate "verified" image message is still in the current release.
> I have explicitly called out the need for containerization of the 'xz' process, and to run it in an unprivileged context.
Do you have a link to this?
> As this work comes out of review and a specification is finalized, we should expect to see a much better experience and more secure image transport
Is there a draft specification available for libtrust?
> However, as the libtrust and v2 image work, and subsequently, registry protocols are still in draft and security review, it is difficult for us to recommend that users yet attempt deploying these.
And yet you deployed it to production in 1.3.
> I wish the author had not omitted this crucial paragraph in the announcement he quotes:
I did not quote this announcement, only linked to it.
If this is intended to be prototype code, it should not be enabled by default, and certainly shouldn't be printing inaccurate messages to users in a 1.0 product.
Also, the referenced warning goes to the daemon log, and doesn't appear to ever be triggered.
http://opine.me/a-better-way-to-store-password-hashes/
http://opine.me/all-your-hashes-arent-belong-to-us/
http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/28481738192/security-thr...
[0] https://flynn.io
Short answer: A lot. At Flynn we're building solutions to what we see as the big problems that developers will face in the next few years. Deis seems to be solely focused on Heroku-like featureset.
Flynn runs anything that runs on Linux, including stateful services like databases. In fact, we package major open source databases as "appliances" that run within the Flynn cluster for ease of use.
Deis has historically required users to use very specific technologies (initially Chef, and now CoreOS). Flynn does not rely on a specific Linux distribution or configuration management system. In fact, Flynn was designed to be modular to give users the greatest possible choice of components (Deis uses a few components we created for Flynn).
Flynn is designed to be a single toolkit that lets you run everything, not just twelve-factor stateless webapps.
We have created a lot of new technology where necessary but we also use off-the-shelf components like CoreOS's etcd, which Deis also uses. Neither we nor CoreOS consider etcd production-ready, and we don't consider any platforms (including Flynn) production-ready until etcd and all underlying components are stable (Deis also depends on the CoreOS alpha channel).
When you see a "1.0" release from Flynn it will come with our full confidence in the stability of all of its components. We also aim to go well beyond what's possible in Heroku today.
$ curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hannob/bashcheck/master/bashcheck | bash
Not vulnerable to CVE-2014-6271 (original shellshock)
Not vulnerable to CVE-2014-7169 (taviso bug)
bash: line 18: 14885 Segmentation fault: 11 bash -c "true $(printf '<<EOF %.0s' {1..79})" 2> /dev/null
Vulnerable to CVE-2014-7186 (redir_stack bug)
Test for CVE-2014-7187 not reliable without address sanitizer
Variable function parser inactive, likely safe from unknown parser bugs[0] https://github.com/flynn/flynn/blob/master/sdutil/configure....
To date we've tried to push fixes upstream to buildpacks so that we can avoid the maintenance burden of keeping forks up-to-date.