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WireWrap

96 karma · joined January 4, 2015

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WireWrap··on RFC 7540 – HTTP2
I appreciate you mentioning the Session ID and Session Ticket scenarios. Those can be disabled though, correct? HTTP/2 over cleartext TCP is also possible? Maybe still some increase in correlation risk due to those?

Do you think the Alt-Svc scenario we are talking about would guarantee two separate HTTP/2 connections?

WireWrap··on RFC 7540 – HTTP2
Well, this:

Clients SHOULD NOT open more than one HTTP/2 connection to a given host and port pair, where the host is derived from a URI, a selected alternative service [ALT-SVC], or a configured proxy.

suggests to me that if you have TopLevelOrigin1 open and TopLevelOrigin2 open, and they both embed content from ThirdPartyOriginA, you'd (likely) have only ONE connection to ThirdPartyOriginA. I thought that would be an example of "reusing connections for different origins", and there would seem to be a correlation risk.

I was thinking that the "one connection per host:port" would (normally) be based on host NAME. However, your comment and the fourth paragraph in 9.1 Connection Management leaves me thinking that it could (optionally) be based on resolved IP Address.

To further complicate things, Alt-Svc can redirect requests to a different host. So HTTPS requests to TopLevelOrigin1 and TopLevelOrigin2 could all go to example.com and its IP Address.

Maybe a (welcomed!) reply will help clarify the correlation risk scenarios. I'll also search for prior discussions about it.

WireWrap··on RFC 7540 – HTTP2
I've only begun to study the protocol, but some things in the privacy section do concern me. Particularly:

HTTP/2's preference for using a single TCP connection allows correlation of a user's activity on a site. Reusing connections for different origins allows tracking across those origins.

Imagine a home or business where devices are configured for some privacy (cookies and various other things generally blocked) and the machines are communicating through a NAT or Gateway/Proxy. Wouldn't reused connections represent a unique threat in terms of allowing (third-party) websites to discern the behavior of individual machines and users?

WireWrap··on HSTS Super Cookies
They were recently moved to the SiteSecurityServiceState.txt file: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=775370
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