aaronmdjones

MCUs refers to all sorts these days.

For example, the RP2350 is a $1 MCU that includes 2x ARM Cortex-M33 cores or 2x Hazard3 RISC-V cores running at 150 MHz.

The RISC-V cores have M-mode and U-mode, and a Physical Memory Protection unit.

The ARM cores have a Security Attribution Map and an Implementation-Defined Attribution Unit which tags accesses to devices like GPIO/PWM/ADC/... based on the security level of the code performing that access. It also has 2 Double-Precision Coprocessors for each ARM core, one for secure and one for non-secure code. It also has secure boot support if you run its cores in ARM mode.

> (Side note, doesn't 'zfs send' blindly trust TCP checksums?)

No.

https://openzfs.github.io/openzfs-docs/Basic%20Concepts/Data...

> End-to-end checksums are a key feature of ZFS and an important differentiator for ZFS over other RAID implementations and filesystems. Advantages of end-to-end checksums include:

> [...]

> - checksums on ZFS replication streams, zfs send and zfs receive, ensure the data received is not corrupted by intervening storage or transport mechanisms

Edit: Also, as Asmod4n points out in a sibling comment, neither zfs send nor zfs recv actually transmit or receive any data. They just generate a data stream that you are then responsible for handling somehow (piping to e.g. ssh, redirection to a file, etc).

TLS uses TCP, and TCP has checksums and retry logic. It therefore assumes any data corruption that made it all the way to the TLS layer is an unrecoverable scenario, probably indicative of an attack.

The problem here is that the thing computing the TCP checksum on the outgoing frame was the WLAN firmware running on the WLAN NIC itself; this is known as checksum offloading. It saves CPU time if the CPU can just hand off a TCP segment to the NIC and let the NIC checksum it before it sends it out. This only works properly if the data given to the NIC doesn't get corrupted in the meantime.

I'd hazard a guess that it's because Starlink service is denied in Russian territory and not denied in Ukrainian territory, and provides a way for Ukrainian citizens to remain informed and connected to their communities even with the Russian onslaught on their power and communications infrastructure.

The UK has Dinorwig power station, a pumped hydro station capable of storing over 9 GWh of energy. This alone rivals the entire combined 10.5 GWh of battery storage across the whole country. It certainly seems much more feasible when you have the terrain to allow it.

Some of their customers have even asked them to redesign their cameras so they don't look like Flock cameras.

No. Your calculated landing speed doesn't change depending on the winds, so you'll always be touching down at roughly the same airspeed for the same aircraft type, weight, and flap setting. Touching down with a headwind just means you don't need to use the brakes as hard.

It's beneficial on takeoff because headwind already factors into your airspeed before you even start rolling, which gives you more lift for the same groundspeed yes, enabling you to rotate sooner than you otherwise would.

Correct. See e.g.:

https://www.businessinsider.com/3-aircraft-fly-new-york-to-l...

No, they're reprimanded for continuing.

https://skybrary.aero/tutorials/stabilised-approach

That they passed their minimums and still weren't set up correctly is shocking, yes. How can you commit to landing instead of going around when you're not configured for landing?

The more egregious thing to me though is ignoring the GPWS callouts on approach because they were chasing the glideslope. If you can't maintain a stable approach, you need to go around, it's the first thing you learn.

You expect this behaviour from a first-timer in the sim, not a commercial cargo pilot.

This is true for takeoffs but not for landings. You want to land with a headwind because this means that for the same airspeed you have a lower groundspeed, i.e. when you actually touch down you're going slower on the runway than if you touched down at the same airspeed but with a tailwind.

> (unclear how speed didn't increase)

Large high-bypass turbofan engines take several seconds to spool up from idle (as they would be on landing) to full thrust. The 4 seconds that the thrust levers spent in the full thrust position in this accident was not long enough.

RSA operations are performed modulo n, where n is the product of 2 primes. A 2048-bit RSA key is an n that is 2048 bits long (with the most significant bit set by definition).

There are no consumer CPUs that have 2048-bit-wide registers; even AVX10 tops out at 512 bits. Thus, mathematical operations on RSA keys are performed using arbitrary precision integer libraries like OpenSSL's own BN (BigNum) library, or GMP (the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library) as used by GNUTLS, in software.

For example, adding 1 to an arbitrary precision integer is not a CPU add or increment instruction, nor is multiplying 2 integers (or an integer and a constant factor) a CPU multiplication instruction.

Sort of. Rolls Royce voluntarily developed this software modification in response to learning that their reasoning about it never being able to happen was incorrect and being unable to concretely account for how it happened. EASA, which was not even the relevant safety authority for this incident, upon learning of its existence, only then required it to be installed on all A380 Trent 900 engines.

Yes, but there are free resources available that guide you on how to go through the process without consulting a hallucination machine.

Judges don't like their time being wasted, and they doubly don't like plaintiffs and defendants who don't even go to the effort of trying to follow decorum.

And, I'm just throwing this one out here; contempt of court is one of the vanishingly few civil offenses you can be held in custody for.

I have to agree with GP here, this is pretty incredible. They contracted with a vendor to store their data, not to back it up. It's not a backup if you can lose it in the same instant you lose the data.

You're right, they are. If your data can't survive a single storage host vanishing from existence, you don't have a backup. If your data can't survive one predictable or regularly occurring catastrophic act of nature, you don't have a backup. If your data can't survive a piece of malware -- with all of the credentials you have -- erasing it, you don't have a backup.

EDIT: Also, if you don't regularly test that your backups actually work, you probably don't have a backup. Lots of companies learn that one the hard way.

Oh nooo! Anyway...

Same here. That's made my week.

No, it doesn't.

In the following SMTP conversation:

  MAIL FROM: foo@example.net
  RCPT TO: victim@example.com
  DATA
  From: service@paypal.co.uk
  To: victim@example.com
  Subject: We are updating our Terms of Service
  [...]

SPF checks whether the sending host is allowed to send e-mail from example.net (the envelope sender).

The recipient sees service@paypal.co.uk (the From address on the inner message), because most ESPs do them the great disservice of not indicating that the sender identities are not aligned.

Adding a DMARC record to a domain requires that e-mail whose inner messages claim to be from that domain must have sender alignment to the envelope sender.

The above message would pass SPF (if the spammer owns example.net and has created SPF records for themselves) but would fail DMARC (paypal.co.uk's DMARC record exists, so alignment is required, and yet example.net != paypal.co.uk, so they are not aligned). In this case their DMARC policy says to reject the message, so (if the recipient is checking DMARC) it would either be rejected outright or it would land in Spam/Quarantine rather than Inbox.

This is true, and yet DMARC v1 does not require you to use them in concert. Either one (a valid DKIM-signed message with sender alignment or a message that passes SPF checks with sender alignment) is enough to pass DMARC.

The addition of MCAS to the 737 MAX received type approval by the FAA in response to Boeing's documentation, not in response to anything Boeing approved or issued. No aircraft manufacturer has ever been allowed to issue a type certificate.

The self-certification process (airworthiness certificates) is the manufacturer (rather than the regulator's inspectors) stating "this one specific aircraft with serial number _______ has been built according to the design covered by its type certificate". Nothing more.

In other words, an airworthiness certificate only specifies that a specific aircraft is airworthy /because/ it is built according to an airworthy design. Whether the design is safe or not has always only been up to the regulator to decide. In this case, the regulator dropped the ball and approved an unsafe design. If Boeing was not allowed to self-certify their own aircraft, the FAA would still have issued airworthiness certificates for them, including the two aircraft that would have gone on to kill hundreds of people, because they were built according to the design the FAA approved.

You can also revoke Location permissions from your Camera app. I've done this.

https://i.postimg.cc/LRd1KbPf/scrot-20260630-085733.png

I'm afraid I don't know anything about ThinkPads.

Hazarding a guess I'd say it's using Thunderbolt (hence the specific port requirement) which allows you to tunnel PCIe over it.

Though it is odd that they wouldn't just go with the WiFi on the motherboard option.

vPro requires the NIC to be connected directly to the PCH (over PCIe/CNV). This is going over USB, which won't cut it.

An Intel WLAN card in an M.2 slot on the mainboard might work (given your givens; a vPro enabled chipset).

`errno` is a userland concept; the kernel returns negative error numbers that libc then turns into -1 and sets errno. Thus the correct manpage is errno(3).

> Am I understanding correctly that [...]

What I took away from the thread is that they're against services forcing attestation in general, and also pointing out that Play Integrity isn't about security, but rather about control, because Google could trivially make it work with GrapheneOS (which is more secure than any other Android OS on the market) but they won't.

You don't need any setuid binaries. You could just as easily use the vulnerability to add a job to crontab(5) that causes the cron daemon to run whatever you want as root.

If they don't have world-execute permission, an access(2) check for executability would return negative, leading to things like shells not tab-completing it. The kernel would also deny attempting to execute it, as it is not executable for your fsuid.

  $ sudo chmod 4700 hello
  $ ./hello
  bash: ./hello: Permission denied

You need execute access in order to launch it, but in order for it to run, the user it is running as (not you) needs read access; you don't.

> Without read permissions you cannot execute the binary

This is not correct, as when the binary is setuid-someone-else, you are not the one executing it; they are.

  $ cat hello.c 
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  
  int main(void)
  {
      (void) puts("Hello, world!");
      return 0;
  }
  
  $ clang-21 -Weverything hello.c -o hello
  $ sudo chown root:root hello
  $ sudo chmod 4711 hello
  
  $ ls -l hello
  -rws--x--x 1 root root 16056 Apr 30 22:22 hello
  
  $ ./hello
  Hello, world!
  
  $ id
  uid=1000(aaron) gid=1000(aaron) groups=1000(aaron),27(sudo),46(plugdev),100(users)

Removing world-readability from all setuid-root binaries on the system would be sufficient to kill the PoC script provided for this vulnerability. It would not be sufficient to prevent exploitation though; there are many ways to abuse the ability to write to files you have read access to in order to gain root, for example by using the vulnerability to alter the cached copy of a file in /etc/sudoers.d/, or overwrite /etc/passwd, or /etc/crontab, ... the list goes on.

A substantial portion of the things you need to know about layout are summarised quite nicely in the 4 YouTube videos in a previous comment of mine

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44549063

Note that the audio in the first video doesn't start until 40 seconds in.