belovedeagle

Can anyone explain what problem is being solved by this law?

I find it truly inspiring how many people suddenly care about democracy, even though "this isn't about the 2016 election". /s

Some might say that any support for a better system is good, despite the motivations, but I disagree. All this support will vanish as soon as our current system chooses the "right" (well, the left) candidate.

The thought of anyone getting ahead in life is truly frightening to these people.

> Consider instead that passwords are only entered into some special and distinct OS controlled textbox

No, I understood this already. This is the easy technological solution which doesn't actually solve the real problem: some users (or really all users some of the time) will always be willing to enter their password into some other box which looks nothing like the one that webpages are prevented from mimicking.

Hell, I did it myself today: I entered my work password into an intranet site which was showing a "certificate error", even though in past experience this site had valid certs. Could that have actually been someone who broke into the intranet and set up a honeypot? Absolutely. But I needed the resource that was behind that password box in order to do my job, so I entered my password anyways.

> It is also a zkp in case of a scheme with a challenge nonce

This is my point - it is not zk because as verifier you can show the transcript to a 3rd party and convince them that the thing to be proved is true, even if the thing to be proved can't let you successfully impersonate the prover thanks to a nonce. In a zkp scheme, the transcript proves nothing - it's as if you took the signing scheme transcript and made it so you couldn't determine which pubkey was being signed for: the 3rd party would have no reason to believe you hadn't faked the transcript.

In short, zkp transcripts must be fakeable, as counterintuitive as that sounds.

Note that signatures do not constitute zero knowledge proofs, however, because I can transmit your signature to a third party and convince them of the same thing you convinced me of, namely the authenticity (or whatever) of a particular document. Of course, larger protocols built around signatures don't suffer, because at worst you just need to make sure you sign a sufficient collection of data (to avoid interpretation as a different message given a different context)... but it's not zero-knowledge.

Unfortunately phishing is a social problem, not a technical one. Users will happily put their password into any random webpage which tells them they really really need to, regardless of how much you train them only to put it into a specific application.

They don't need to steal a card at all to do this. They're just guessing random numbers — everything after the issuer/cardtype numbers (first 5 or 6). So there's nothing to convert, and they only try a particular card number a few times.

In general I think the problems with this change have been slightly overstated. However, GP is correct.

The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution provides in relevant part: > [N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

A general warrant is one which does not "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized".

The amended rule provides in relevant part > A magistrate judge [...] has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media [of which the location] has been concealed through technological means.

Now, one doesn't have to be a constitutional scholar to see that "the place to be searched" hasn't been interpreted recently (if ever) to mean "latitude and longitude". However, there's a valid concern that the inability to even place the "where" to a particular jurisdiction is a massive weakening of the requirement to "particularly describ[e]". It may indeed be so weak that the result can be fairly called a "general warrant". How could the warrant be written otherwise? What information could it contain? I speculate the "description" will amount, in practice, to "unknown hard drive in unknown location, possibly containing X contents". That is a general warrant, because no hard drive fails to meet those criteria.

Do you have examples of goverment-negative papers? Do you have data to back up the other claim? I don't think you've grasped the concept of "evidence" here.

Do you have any evidence supporting this claim?

> whether or not we decide to distribute our plentiful resources

You can already decide to do this today, and the government will even reward you for doing so. What you're really talking about is redistributing others' resources.

> You move your mouse too much

This is the third time in as many days I've read that. Is this becoming the go-to excuse for rejecting applicants? I mean, as with all excuses it has a basis in reality -- I'd be bothered enough by an applicant sitting there futzing around with the mouse to have doubts about their technical competence -- and yet it's completely irrelevant to the actual job of a software engineer, which is to stave off manglement long enough to cobble something together.

Calling The Mind's I "Hofstadter's" is a bit misleading; he's its co-anthologist. Nevertheless, a great read; it introduced me to Borges which is praise enough.

My ISP delivers me Ethernet... I doubt it's that uncommon in midrise/highrise buildings. But they will only route to a single IP address (incl for 64-bit) so then again I still need a router.

So was it that

> Journalists were praising Asians for being hard workers who kept their heads down, cherished education and didn’t complain

? Or maybe it was just that

> Asians [were] being hard workers who kept their heads down, cherished education and didn’t complain.

I'll go further than another top-level comment and say that embracing the first sentence unironically is being intentionally obtuse, given that one literally has to write the second sentence to get there.

But it's the unsurprising consequence of a worldview that "hard work never gets anyone anywhere". Note that you don't have to reject the idea of privilege entirely in order to acknowledge that hard work is also a path to success; and this article goes to show that hard work and success is also a path to privilege, not [just] the other way around.

And, you know, you'd only really need one of them to actually police civilians; in fact it's probably better that way. And then you could split up rulemaking and dispute resolution responsibilities between the other two since they will suddenly have more free time. This is a really good idea; why have we never tried this before?!

/s

> just got handed a sentence

And here we see why the current American problem is uniquely American — because that would never have happened.

Fake news warning: this is pure speculation and this article has no basis in fact.

Come on guys, where is the fake news outrage now?

Fake news warning: article repeats a bullshit claim from Greenpeace that 90k people died as a result of this accident. The real number is less than 50. But, naturally, there will be no outrage since Greenpeace is left-wing.

Holy , you can see why I wrote my top-level comment. Even here people are already jumping on the "who cares if it's accurate, take away their freedom and their dignity at the first sign of trouble!" bandwagon.

Great, now society has an excuse to put scary people away with essentially no due process thanks to the magical label of "suicidal". For those living with mental illness, reasons to despair of safety and fair treatment are up, up, up. Seeking help will never have seemed so dangerous.

And what of [a-zA-Z0-9_]? Why should we allow them in both types and variables and functions? That's really confusing.

I don't see how the bool example follows; in what way is negating a boolean like dereferencing a pointer w/r/t types? ! is bool->bool; * is * P -> P.

The reason the same symbol is used is because of the way C types are read:

    int x; // (x) is an int
    int *x; // (*x) is an int
    int **x; // (**x) is an int
    int x(double); // (x(1.)) is an int

Voters should not be able to prove whom they voted for; enabling them to do so opens up the door to several kinds of fraud (vote buying, coercion, etc.).

All of these things are found in Haskell as well; it's not OO by any stretch of the imagination. You're confusing "oop language" with "modern programming language".

Rust fails many of the other tests mentioned. As for polymorphism, is Haskell OO? If so, then I think my claim that the term is meaningless is justified.

Because having your password manager unencrypted (so that biometrics can "unlock" it) is a great idea.

If Rust is OO then the term is meaningless. No inheritance; dynamic dispatch only via explicit indirection (Boxed traits); methods are (therefore) just syntactic sugar for regular functions.

Also, this fits in with advice #3, use common options. Users aren't "blindly" adding -v for verbosity; they're expecting it as a common option. Admittedly, the verbose/version/something else distinction is not as standard as I'd like, but if I were writing this I would have explicitly said in point 3, "-v is verbose. -V is version. -h is help. -?, if implemented at all, is a synonym for --help. -n is dry run, if that makes sense for your command. (By the way, unknown flags should cause the command to fail rather than silently do the wrong thing.) The first instance of -- causes all further arguments to be blindly accepted as positional arguments rather than flags, including further uses of --. If at all possible, all command forwarding (e.g., ssh, shell, autocall) is done using multiple positional params, not nested quoting nightmares."