1,171 karma · joined April 2, 2009
I think that author makes a good effort to itemize at least one of the components, now we should be asking what the rest are.
We offer stock grants (basically RSUs without a formal vesting schedule) to key employees at my firm and have had no issues. You say that there are issues with the vested stock not being liquid, but the issuing employer can simply offer to buy the shares back if needed at fair value if liquidity is needed, which we determine according to a formula which inputs the firm's balance sheet and trailing profitability.
This has the advantage of being very straight forward, both to the owners as the issuing party, and the employees -- but has the cost of being disadvantaged by the tax code.
Contemporary startup options packages are anything but that. Most of the time neither the employee receiving them nor the HR person explaining them has any idea how they really work -- but for all that opacity, they get a preferential tax treatment.
It's probably worth pointing out that the only reason startups rely so heavily on option compensation as opposed to simple equity grants are for the reasons above: they are tax advantaged, and the employees have no idea what they're getting. I wouldn't mind seeing the startup world return to a more easy to understand scheme.
-They're cool. Who doesn't want to own one? I'd love to own a bar if I thought I could make money in the game. -They're visible. Everyone eats at restaurants, and in fact, a lot of people sit around in restaurants talking about what sort of business to start. -They have good perks. Free beer anyone? -They're familiar. I mean, things turn out pretty good when I BBQ, right? -They're (relatively) cheap to get into. If the minimum is $100k instead of $1M, you'll have more competition.
When it comes to small business, look for the opposite of all of those. The more obscure, boring and downright unappealing the better.
I'm sure some economist smarter than me could formalize the issue, but unless the cliff issue is solved, this sort of ownership scheme will not result in shareholders maximizing long term value.
A dominant founder-CEO could mitigate or overpower the incentives described above, but my guess is that any company that successfully gets of the ground using this scheme will replace their tenured shares with ordinary common shares at some point.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_energy_consumption [2] https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-insanely-profitable-federa...
Piggybacking off the article's example: Suppose news breaks that Facebook has made a catastrophic legal error which will result in them losing 50% of their revenue over the next year. This is obvious to the active investors who collectively decide to sell their Facebook shares, resulting in a fall in the total value of the index equal to the drop in value for Facebook. In the time it takes the old pre-news price to drop to the new post-news price, active investors have, on net, sold Facebook and gone to cash and will have shared in a relatively small portion of the crash, and passive investors will have bought Facebook due to churn, or held Facebook as part of the index, resulting in them absorbing a larger portion of the crash than active investors.
So how does this all fit into the "active managers don't earn their keep" narrative? I think what we've seen is a long term drop in the alpha available to the active share due to things like narrowing spreads, faster response to new news, etc. So effectively active management is in a secular decline, which allows for (1) bad results for active managers on net, and (2) failure of poor performers and their removal from the market, and (3) continued real value generation by the better and remaining active managers. So this idea of conservation of alpha is also silliness because the market will always be slightly oversaturated (net negative value for money managers) or undersaturated (net positive value for money managers).
If you doubt this, read Ben Graham's the "Intelligent Investor" -- In 1949 he thought it was quite easy (EASY!) for an average Joe to earn outsized returns with a little stock research (and I think history proved him right until at least the late '70s).
It's no big deal when the worst case scenario is being served up a search result you don't need or listening to a song you didn't request, but you definitely wouldn't want to link voice recognition tech up to anything non-reversible like a stock trade or the lock on your front door.
Let's go over some of the things that make up bitcoin's price:
-You can make legal retail transactions -- a very small portion of transfers, but legitimate. This is a 'regular money' use.
-Make large 'wire' transfers for less than it would cost through your bank. Totally legitimate and valuable in my opinion. This is a 'Regular money' use.
-There are future expectations of bitcoin expanding the above two points. Supports the 'regular money' points above.
-You can use bitcoin to (illegally) move money out of countries like China, which is now being cracked down on. This is a black market money / money laundering use.
-Use as a speculation instrument. Valuable in a way, but only bullish on net because it is supported by the above services. This can be done with 'regular money', but speculative financial instruments are primarily assets and not regular money.
There are many others, but those are the big ones I know about. The issue is that it appears the price is 80%+ speculation, 15% capital flight, and maybe only 5% of the demand for the asset is based on the traditional 'regular money' uses... What this means is that once the speculative support moves from net positive, to net negative (meaning, once Bitcoin gets a widespread reputation as being a dog) things start to go downhill hard.
Of course my estimates above are very loose, and in the future the expansion of bitcoin into a far larger mainstream uses case could overpower all of them, but either my estimates above need to be off (and they may be) or we need to see large scale adoption of bitcoin for legitimate uses at some point (also a maybe).
If you're trying to argue that, "it would have just happened anyway", all you're asserting is that the profits would have gone to someone else, but at a lag of several months to several years. Why is slowing down technological advancement an improvement?
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>without going through trades and transactions that are unfair
It's fundamentally impossible for one man to build even the microwave that preheats the meals inside a 747, but that's no reasonable threshold. The entirety of modern life is built on transacting goods and services that are fundamentally impossible to create alone -- are you trying to say that all transactions are unfair? Or just Bill Gates'? Or just transactions that are too skillfully done?
I think there's a lot of value in letting people that are 10,000x better than the average person at creating wealth do so. Maybe there should be something to limit the excesses of luxurious consumption (I for one, favor a progressive VAT), but I think trying to impose punitively high tax rates on very successful people makes society worse off in most cases.
And more to your point, we already have a defacto wealth tax in the US because inflation is not deductible. If you hold a bond paying 2% per year, and inflation is also 2% per year, you pay tax on those gains even though you've made a post-tax loss in purchasing power. At 2% long term inflation, the defacto wealth tax works out to be the 2% multiplied by your capital gains rate, or from 0.47% to 0.74% for high earners depending on what state they live in.