Facilities like the Udvar-Hazy Center for Air & Space charge for parking, but admission is free. If you're in Downtown D.C., this matters much less of course.
2,273 karma · joined May 20, 2013
Solutions Architect at Arpio.io
Facilities like the Udvar-Hazy Center for Air & Space charge for parking, but admission is free. If you're in Downtown D.C., this matters much less of course.
If he took a video call in the space using their VC equipment, that's bad enough. (the understanding being that, you use equipment for work purposes, announce that there's an uncleared call taking place, and sanitize the area).
Accidents happen. I've seen people forget they were carrying a phone, it beeps, and they go running out of the room to deposit it, and later self-report the breach. No biggie. But if he brought in an actual phone, and retained it, and then took an incoming call on it, from within a secured area, well, then I'd expect the consequences to be exactly what happened.
To be clear, The article doesn't make clear that it's what happened, but if I watched someone do that, I think my jaw would fall off.
Edit: This applies to U.S. Government spaces which the article seems to imply. Private company security policies probably mirror this in many ways, but I can't speak for them.
"“Before doing so, he made sure there were no classified materials or anything else pertaining to MDA’s (Missile Defence Agency) or Parsons’ work anywhere near him,”
That's an important tell. The only way the presence of classified materials would even be a consideration would be if he was in a SCIF (secure facility for the handling of such.) And to be in there means he had been read on to and periodically briefed on that room's procedures.
Placing a call, from inside that room, to a foreign country, is highly suspicious. Note that similar exfiltration of data has taken place in previous instances.
I'm incredibly suspect of the claim that he "accepted the call". "Accepted" a video call? Into an empty, random cubicle? That doesn't make sense. I suspect (speculating here) that the individual got a message like an email and was asked to call, and so went into an empty cubicle with the needed VC gear and called. And frankly, he should have known better. You need to make a personal call, you step outside.
"“Despite there being no policy prohibiting the call" - I don't think that's true at all.
I'm sad at the circumstances that lead to this, and I'm sure the individual was trying to act in good faith. But that was a really, really dumb move, and I'm not surprised at the consequences.
As you noted, there's labs working on this, they've said they're working on this, and I take the lack of minute-by-minute social media updates to indicate that it's serious and they want to get it right.
For everyone else: This project exists for the joy of the retro-computing community. No one in their right mind - retro-computing enthusiasts included - would ever recommend using any of these versions of Windows for anything other than amusement.
No, DOSBox is not always an alternative.
Retro enthusiasts are quite excited by this project. And for anyone wanting to rebuild an old PC running Win95 for fun, this is going to be a very helpful tool.
Michael MJD (YouTube) covered this yesterday in fact: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbeqLmSVqvs
In my opinion, the way to avoid many of the problems and complexities that author lists is to start with the goals. What are the business/mission goals? What is the workload (not the monitoring tool) trying to accomplish? What does the thing do?
Once you have that, you can go about selecting the right tool for the job. The author notes that there's no consensus on what logs are for. Or is buried under signal-to-noise ratio for metrics. But when you start with a goal, and then determine a KPI you want to obtain to measure that, you'll then be able to ascertain where a log, metric, trace, or combination thereof can reflect that. And you only need create the ones needed to measure that. The scope of the problem becomes far more manageable.
It make take a couple tries to get right, and a user may find that they need to add more over time. But the monitoring doesn't need to change often unless the deliverables or architecture of the workload does. And creating those should be part of the development process.
By starting with goals and working from there, monitoring becomes a manageable task. The myriad of other logs and metrics created can be safely stored and kept quiet until they're needed to troubleshoot or review an incident. That falls into observability.
Observability is something you have. Monitoring is something you do.
I haven't addressed the difficulties the author states in creating various traceability mechanisms, how to parse all of these logs from various platforms, or some of the other technical challenges he states. There are usually solutions for these (usually...), some easier than others. But by narrowing the scope down to what's needed to achieve your given insights, the problem set becomes only what's required to achieve that aim, and not trying to build for every conceivable scenario.
Note the "USA-###" launches in there as well with the basic orbital characteristics. (USA-327 being the first mentioned above, a ocean reconnaissance satellite.)
I take comments of China berating the US with collision threats with a grain of salt. But it does of course highlight the need to share such data and for parties to act in good faith.
As for the legality, that's a UN question. Sovereign airspace plays a role, along with whatever UN Security Council resolutions are applicable.
Most satellites are registered and their orbital data published. This includes reconnaissance satellites. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Registration_Convention
You can find them here: https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.htm... If you drill into the submissions from say, the USA, you can look up the "USA-###" designations and see USSF and NRO launches.
I believe however, that this data may not always be up to date, and might only reflect the orbital characteristics at time of launch, and not reflect subsequent maneuvers. Some reconnaissance satellites are then harder to track, and it's a bit of a hobby for those who don't have access to an enormous space radar. =P But that's where the Space Liability convention comes into play. Basically, if you launched it, you're responsible for it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Liability_Convention
No shade intended towards Mr. Clancy however. I got the impression that he was quite lauded for not simply describing tech (which other thriller writers did as well) but getting into the nuts and bolts of how they operated. That was what really set him apart.
https://www.thesr71blackbird.com/Aircraft/Stories/sr-71-blac...
https://www.amazon.com/Skunk-Works-Personal-Memoir-Lockheed/...
I wonder if that's the key point. It was Jeff's project, and like Alexa, is no longer protected now that he's no longer there.
...what happens when things go wrong?
One of the major advantages of cloud, be it AWS, Azure, GCP, etc, is the ability to bridge across failure domains. Properly architected, a workload can be resilient in the face of data center outages and circuit breaks.
To me, these savings from operating in a single colo are living on borrowed time. Because they're one data center fire or cable break away from failure. Can the workload survive a sudden outage for hours? A day? Will it survive a loss of the data center and implementation of the business continuity plan? (There is a plan, right?)
Every organization is different of course, and not everyone needs active-active failover, or 4-nines of availability, etc. But when figures of $400m start getting thrown around, I can't imagine it's in a state where "oh, we'll just rebuild it elsewhere" is the plan.
Show me where they achieve these savings and still have a viable DR/COOP, and I'll be impressed.
Disclaimer: I'm a TAM for AWS
I spoke at AWS Community Day D.C. last year, and there were a fair number of startups that attended. You can see some of them listed for DevOpsDays here. https://devopsdays.org/events/2022-washington-dc/welcome/
As someone else mentioned, health sector is big as well, and NIH has some big initiatives underway, many using high performance compute. And take a look at HHMI's Janelia Research Campus. It flies under the radar here, but they do some impressive work.
Aerospace has a lot going on, and plenty with geospatial. Not all of it defense driven.
So yeah, seconding the post above. There's a lot of great public good work beyond defense, it should just be noted that it's public sector, so a lot of bureaucratic strings come with that money.
- That the ending of a relationship is necessarily a failure.
- That two very young people are in a place to understand the implications of choosing a life partner.
- That extended families are necessary to "keep things from going south". (What does that mean? Helping mediate conflict, or to bury persistent issues in the name of stability?)
There's others here, but I'll stick with the three. But overall, while it may be good for some ("you do you"), I find a lot here to raise an eyebrow at and much too discomforting to simply scroll past. So much of this seems to reinforce unhealthy and oppressive norms that, in my strong opinion, lead eventually to so many destructing relationships in the long run.
For additional reading, I'd greatly recommend "The Way We Never Were" by Stephanie Coontz as to why this mid-century style relationship was highly unusual in the historical context. https://www.amazon.com/Way-We-Never-Were-Nostalgia/dp/046509...
Edit: Formatting
It's true, though in the latter case, it can't be helped.
I worked at an integrator from 2002-2005. Small outfit, building PCs and servers for businesses and local agencies. As a new member of their engineering department, one of the first issues we got asked to investigate was to look at heightened failures of network cards. Back then, we bought the ubiquitous 3Com 3C-905. All of our PCs were subjected to a battery of functional tests before shipping, and we were finding that an abnormal number of the cards were failing.
We started looking at the failed ones more closely, and found them running extremely hot. These were passively cooled cards, and didn't need a heatsink under normal conditions. But on any of these, you couldn't hold a finger against without burning yourself. Functional ones as well.
We got the batch of serial numbers, and send them to 3Com to ask what might be going on. And the answer we got was that they didn't exist.
A bit of back and forth between 3Com, the distributor (a well-known and established company) and ourselves led us all to believe that they were a counterfit batch that entered the supply chain. We tracked down all of the cards from that order, and opened up every boxed PC that was to ship with one (I'll never forget the company president with his business shirt sleeves rolled up and a box cutter in his hand. He set the tone) and we pulled out every one.
We sourced from reputable places, and I don't recall another instance of that occurring while I was there. But it was an interesting event in my career, and one I'll never forget.
(Disclaimer: I'm a TAM for AWS.)
But in short, the key is kept in memory on the HSM, and employees don't have access to it. They key can be referenced, but not actually read.
It also means that if a user accidentally deletes their key, there's no recovery. That's it. (Pro tip: Deleting a key is a faster mechanism to make data unreadable than deleting the data itself. ;)
Disclaimer: I'm an S-TAM with AWS.