cpleppert

I would say not really! The real problem isn't the effect can't be replicated it is that replacing cosmological expansion with something else requires the something else to exactly mimic all the other things we can observe about the universe.

Dark matter is a great example. Due to gravitational lensing this can mimic directly the redshift we can observe. But then you have to explain how all this dark matter is distributed(not to mention created) in a way that doesn't mimic cosmic expansion in one part of the sky but everywhere at once.

I found the teaching company course on cosmology(from what I saw of it) to be absolutely fantastic as a general introduction: http://www.thegreatcourses.com/tgc/courses/course_detail.asp...

I'm not sure I understand how this effect actually works. Cosmological redshift isn't due to galaxies moving away from us but the expansion of the universe occurring underneath light as it travels in an expanding universe. So replacing velocity with mass increases doesn't actually work as far as I can tell because the mechanisms aren't equivalent. You actually need some physical mechanism that produces this mass increase over time that happens to be exactly the same as that observed by cosmological redshift.

>>But I can't password lock my whole laptop because OS X requires that password before it will load up any applications, and I can't put a password in without my apps.

Why not just have the mac autologin and then immediately go into screensaver mode?

At the very least set /System/Library/Frameworks/ScreenSaver.framework/Versions/A/Resources/ScreenSaverEngine.app to open on start

Thinking about solving this programmatically, it wouldn't be too hard to set up a secure locking replacement for a screensaver that would offer a challenge response system to unlock the system without using a password anyone who hears could repeat.

>>This article is trash, the discussions on this issue are trash, and everyone is running around like a headless chicken.

This article is more than trash, it is totally misleading in almost every way. Any discussion of the fourth amendment in the context of Patriot Act 215 will invariably bring up a discussion of the third party doctrine which states that: "information loses Fourth Amendment protection when it is knowingly revealed to a third party[1]." The author seems to go out of his way to avoid discussion of any of the extensive legal precedents that have interpreted the fourth amendment. Just hyperbolic rhetoric and comparisons to the colonial government. It isn't helpful at all.

1:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138128

Well the NSA's activities have strong bipartisan support (at least as long as as the public doesn't have a great idea about what it does). No member of the intelligence committees has changed their position as a result of these recent disclosures. Both republicans and democrats have rushed to defend the NSA.

The problem isn't a rogue agency that doesn't have oversight. The problem is the law that allows the NSA to do just that. Take section 215 of the patriot act for example(it allows the government to obtain business records aka the verizon phone provision ); it is written in a way that makes it laughably easy to use for almost any use at all. The FBI doesn't even have to go to the FISA court but can choose any magistrate judge they want. The only restriction is "that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." Wonderful......

>>E.g. by saying "the Fourth Amendment does not apply to NSA's interception of Americans' international communications for foreign intelligence purposes" the NSA was implicitly also stating that Americans' communications that didn't meet those criteria were protected by the Fourth.

I might be missing something but just because X applies to Y doesn't mean X doesn't apply to Z.

>>It's just not clear what happened here

Do you mean that the statue or intention of congress was unclear or that it doesn't matter whether it is an article III court or not?

There is a tremendous amount of evidence that congress intended the FISC to be an article III court. Objections were raised specifically on the basis that it would extend the judiciary into policy making or not be a constitutional valid subject for an article III court.

Several courts since the 1980s have considered the claim that it is not an article III court and have rejected the argument every time it has been raised. (see United States V. Megahey or the second circuit appeal)

I think it is an important question for a couple reasons:

1) the minimization procedures that the court must approve are an extension of the warrant power that the court is granted to satisfy the fourth amendment.

2) the warrant power itself is generally understood to require a judge where a warrant is required in the first place(see keith 1972). Of course, there are cases where it is possible that an independent officer(not a judge) can satisfy this requirement but it is difficult to see how judicial oversight can be excluded in this case.

3) congress intended (by the committee reports) that judicial oversight was the only valid means by which the executive could be checked. Simply requiring documents wasn't enough for congress.

EDIT: reply to below

I understand the requirement that the constitution sets out for judges to apply to them specifically and not to any individual court. Thus temporary courts or tribunals(composed of judges that were appointed to other courts) can act as a proper article III court.

In terms of the subject matter of article III courts the constitution says that: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;" I don't think it requires that every court necessarily can consider all cases that the judicial power is entitled to hear; it only acts as to set out what the maximum subject matter that a federal court can consider. There are other courts like the FISC/FISCR that also have limited subject matter jurisdiction under statute such as the United States Court of International Trade that only hears customs cases yet it also an article III court.

>>And, most importantly, FISC judges do not have power that extends to all cases in law and equity under the Constitution. In fact, the only thing they're empowered to do is authorizing FISA certifications.

The FISA court has limited subject matter jurisdiction but I disagree that limited subject matter jurisdiction is impossible for an article III court. Article III says explicitly:"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity.." not that every article III court must be empowered to hear an case whatsoever. I contend that this refers to the maximal subject matter that any article III court may consider, not that every article III court must be constitutionally empowered to consider any case that falls under Article III sec 2 requirements.

If this was the case temporary judicial courts convened for a specific purpose would be plainly unconstitutional. I am no aware of no one who considers the Court of International Trade to be an article I court because of its limited jurisdiction. It only hears customs cases by law(28 USC 255). This is exactly analogous to the FISA Court/FISCR in their limited jurisdiction.

EDIT: See Kevork 634 F.Supp. 1002 "The defendants also contend that FISA violates Article III of the Constitution because the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is not a proper Article III court and because the Act delegates judicial power to the Executive Branch. In addition, the defendants argue that the structure of the FISA court denies its judges their judicial independence, making the Court a rubber stamp. These arguments were raised and rejected in... I also reject these contentions."

The court rejected the argument that the FISA court was not an article III court.

>>Article III courts can't be abolished by Congress. US v Cavanagh doesn't unequivocally say that FISC is an Article III court, but rather only that federal judges don't contravene Article III (and thus separation of powers) merely by sitting on the FISC.

I'm not sure I understand the point about Article III courts not being able to be abolished. Several courts established by the judiciary act of 1801 were abolished early in Jefferson's term.

I agree that it doesn't explicitly say that the FISA court is an article III court but some of the holdings are hard to understand if the court isn't. For instance, the court rejected the argument that it was not "properly constituted under article III because the statute does not provide for life tenure on the FISA court." If the court held it wasn't an article III court it would have not considered the argument!

Additionally, from a quoted decision in that section(Megahey, 553): "As such, with respect to their assignment to FISC for a seven-year term with no additional compensation, FISC judges do not differ from other federal judges who sit from time to time and when the need arises on courts other than that to which they are appointed by temporary designation"

I'm not sure there is any indication that the judges are serving on a non-article III court here. They certainly would 'differ' substantially from the example presented if they did.

Well, the FISA court is really strange in any case. For starters, I'm not sure how FISA warrants are actually warrants in any sense at all. I'm sure congress could screw it up even more.

Thanks!

The courts have ruled IT IS an article III court. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987)

>>Not only could Congress pass a law recalling any FISC judge

I'm not sure this would be constitutional. Courts have rules that the term limits on FISA judges don't impact their standing as regular article III judges. Arbitrary removal almost certainly would.

>>What Congress did with FISA was insert an administrative check on the NSA. They chose extremely confusing terminology and a confusing structure to do this with; they created a "court", appointed by the Chief Justice, to conduct internal hearings on the legitimacy of individual surveillance efforts. But that "court" functions unlike any other court in the US, because it isn't a court; it's a review board that happens to be staffed by judges.

The FISA court is an article III court(United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987)). It is not a 'regular' article III court but it is absolutely not an administrative tribual or article I court. It has all the regular warrant powers of a court.

Specifically, all its members are confirmed judges under article III procedures and the term limits do not impact the legality of the court.

>>Congress can recall any FISC judge I don't think Congress has an ability to withdraw a judge. The only check on an individual judge is the term limits which has been ruled before not to matter in its determination that the FISA court acts like an article III court. Congress simply couldn't remove a judge except though impeachment.

>>My feeling is that we have a very small chance to achieve a roll-back in (continental) Europe, because the uncovered actions of secret services here are much more at odds with the societal consensus on the accepted powers of the executive. For the big five prospects are IMO more bleak.

I strongly suspect that this isn't the case. The legal framework that governs the GCHQ is far less restrictive than that for the NSA. In the case of the DGSE the whole thing is basically apolitical and doesn't have any meaningful oversight. The FISA court at least approves the techniques of collection and then the targeting procedures. The NSA doesn't get ruled against often but it does happen (the case in 2011 that dealt with targeting procedures I believe).

Sure Germany and other countries which have a strong commitment to privacy dont' operate the same programs but seem perfectly happy to take intelligence data when it is provided.

"Without any judicial order," The federal arrest warrant gives the State Department the ability to revoke passports it isn't 'unilateral' nor can the 'administration' revoke a passport for any reason.

This just doesn't come up in most high profile cases. The government will strike any juror who is a threat to use nullification.

>>All defendants have the right to make requests for such things...through filing motions in court.Snowden is asking (strictly speaking, his father is asking on his behalf) for extrajudicial guarantees that are not mentioned in the constitution or available to normal defendants.

Extrajudicial guarantees are absolutely meaningless in a judicial court. Simply because Snowden and the justice department make a deal to obtain his extradition doesn't mean that the court has to accept the deal. The court will rule based on the particulars of the case not on what is convenient for the government.

We know he has been in Moscow for a long time! There isn't anything new here at all. As others have pointed out the statement used British phrases instead of american ones so it appears this was drafted by wikileaks instead of snowden, which isn't very reassuring.

I don't think it reads like a plea for public support, if it was intended as such then it isn't worded well. It reads like a bunch of other wikileaks press releases that are generally political statements about the importance of transparency. The problem is that if he wants public sympathy he needs to avoid coming across as having political motives and if he does want to make accusations then he must consider the possibility that they will backfire and cost him public support.

A 'counterbalance' can often instead be a distraction which is what I fear happened here.

I would argue that instead of "lend[ing] his revelations more credence" what he has done is made himself the story instead of the NSA activity that he was opposed to.

>>What's more it's made the US appear internationally weak

If that is the case then surely there must be lots of countries willing to offer him asylum and the traveling documents he needs.

What is hurting his cause is a) making this about him and continuing to talk so we don't have to address the issues and b) releasing a lot of information that doesn't have to do with domestic intelligence (china, g8 spying etc) distracting people even more and turning the public against himc) refusing to talk about what technical capabilities the NSA has and framing the conversation, instead; we see releases of information (PRISM) that are immediately followed by a rush to figure out the actual capabilities of the program, this confuses the public and muddles the waters even more

Snowden should have released the slide and then explained exactly what is wrong with the program. Instead, he did a document dump and followed that up by giving a reveal all interview that shifts the focus from the NSA onto him and his motivations. Snowden still hasn't addressed what he technically knows about PRISM.

He also claimed in his interview he could get access to the presidents email. If he thought that was a big issue he should have gone into detail about it for reporters(the target list, how he could do it as a network administrator etc.) and supported his charge. Instead, it is a one off statement in the context of a long interview where he essentially lays out a political reasoning for why he has done what he did. Snowden still hasn't addressed any of the issues of concern about the NSA and the (lack of)oversight exercised over the agency and its programs.

He had a perfect opportunity to put his concerns before the public and I feel he blew it.

>>300 is a surprisingly round number.

"[l]ast year, fewer than 300 phone numbers were checked against the database of millions of U.S. phone records gathered daily by the NSA"

>>For future reference I might believe somewhere in the range of 15,000 to 50 million

You think that there are at least 15,000 terrorists/foreign targets of interest that would have any reason to call a US number?

The NSA brief to congress wasn't referring to PRISM at all. Telecommunications interception != PRISM.

The slide deck was always very ambiguous. But it was very interesting that it said that analysts should use both methods (PRISM and interception)

He might be interpreting the claim as being that Snowden could do that, which is, of course, false.

That would require a constitutional amendment to overturn 30 years of legal precedent that gives an enormous advantage to the wealthy and connected. It is illegal for Congress to put everyone on the same playing field and disallow wealthy candidates from self funding. So any public financing would simply give an enormous advantage to wealthy candidates and dark money groups with the resources to overwhelm the publicly financed guys.

Right now in order to compete you must fundraise constantly or risk not having funds to counter the spin of a bankrolled opponent. It would be interesting if the Supreme Court simply eliminated the contribution limits but this would give even more of an incentive for congressmen simply to sell their votes("Vote for us and we will give you X gazillion dollars over four years vote against us and we drop millions in dark money against you and fund your opponents").

>>I know that many Democrats want to cling to the belief that, in Perlstein's words, "the powers that be will find it very easy to seize on this one error to discredit [my] NSA revelation, even the ones he nailed dead to rights". Perlstein cleverly writes that "such distraction campaigns are how power does its dirtiest work" as he promotes exactly that campaign.

How in the world could he make this mistake? Are the five slides the only ones he has out of the 40,000 documents that refer to PRISM? Why hasn't Snowden directly commented on this issue, or even better; why didn't Greenwald contact him when this issue came up?

I do think he jumped to conclusions based ont the slide; but the truth is, it isn't a closed issue. Intelligence sources and company executives sources continue to give somewhat differing answers about exactly what PRISM is or does. Some suggest that Greenwald got it about right the first time and it really is capable of pulling data on demand from company servers. Simply saying that PRISM is just a GUI interface doesn't rule out the possibility that such an 'active' data source is closely associated with the program.

>>Are we going to have a system of law and order where certain evidence is presented or not solely depending on the decisions of the executive branch?

No, in the absence of a FISA order the information cannot be released. This isn't a legel dilemma at the moment(ethically certainly). There are almost certainly implied constitutional protections on the use of the data.

The only interesting exception would be if someone decided to waive their protections and petitioned the courts to grant access to their phone records. The courts may allow this as no constitutional rights would be violated and no else would have an interest in preventing this(except the Government possibly).

On the contrary independent candidates do better in larger elections that are given more attention by the media. Smaller local elections are dominated by parties with an established infrastructure that can turn out their members in low turnout elections.

The slide says "collection directly from the servers." If you look at the context it is comparing traditional SIGINT wiretapping with PRISM. Now it seems clear (as you suggested) that this refers not to the method(direct access) but rather to the provenance(where does it come from, directly not indirectly from wiretaps) of the data.

I'm not sure what to make of this article though: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-com... Everything in this article from the Wash Post directly contradicts what the government and the companies are claiming. It really is real time, direct access to data without any mediation from company staff at all.

The article seems credible as it comes from multiple intelligence sources and executives(!) at the company. I don't really expect executives to lie in a way would raise suspicions about their company like that. If PRISM was really just a dropbox executives would be very happy to say so(in private at least so reporters could calm people down)

It is a lot easier to imagine intelligence sources saying it is just a dropbox than executives at companies admitting they installed a back door for the government.

Right now, I'm undecided.

It is also, as far as I know, illegal to hack or disrupt computer networks in that way (even for the NSA). If they had warrants giving them access to information they wanted it would have been overkill to do something like that, risk getting caught, and now have to go to the company for intelligence cooperation in the information.