HNHacker News
TopNewBestAskShowJobs

csoghoian

261 karma · joined September 24, 2011

submissionscomments
csoghoian··on I am under surveillance by Canadian agents, my computer has been backdoored
Although the details of the gov's investigation and harassment of Jake are largely shrouded in secrecy, his harassment at the border began right after giving a keynote at HOPE 2010 in place of Julian Assange, as the only US citizen identified in the media as a member of the Wikileaks team.

Although I think what the US government has done to Jake is quite clearly a disgusting abuse of power, let us not kid ourselves by somehow believing that the state has gone after him because he has publicly advocated for the use of strong crypto.

csoghoian··on Google's campaign for a free and open internet
Google was fined for violating its consent order with the FTC (established after the Buzz fiasco) in which it agreed to not lie to consumers about the extent to which they can opt out of Google's tracking.

The fine here was for lying to Safari users (Google told them they didn't need to opt out, because they couldn't be tracked, when in fact the company was tracking them).

The $22.5 million fine was _not_ for the covert tracking itself.

csoghoian··on Yahoo to ignore IE10's "Do Not Track"
The FTC reached a settlement with Google this year for a $22 mil fine because Google violated a previous consent order over Buzz.

Yahoo is not under an existing consent order with the FTC. For the most part, the FTC does not get fines unless a company violates an existing consent order.

Furthermore, Google didn't get fined because it circumvented Safari's privacy settings, but rather, because it lied about the extent to which users could opt out of tracking.

I've not seen anything that suggests that Yahoo is lying about the extent to which they will respect or ignore the DNT header.

The FTC's deception powers aren't going to be of much use against Yahoo here.

(Disclosure: I worked at the FTC between 2009-2010, and worked on the investigations of Facebook, MySpace and Twitter).

csoghoian··on Gmail security warnings for suspected state-sponsored attacks
I'm a privacy researcher, specifically focusing on government access to data held by Internet companies.

Google, your employer, will not confirm, on the record, what they will or will not disclose when they get an NSL. The NSL statute does not authorize the disclosure of transactional records.

18 USC 2709(b)(1) states that the government can only get "the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records"

Furthermore, a 2008 opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel at DOJ specifically confirmed that the FBI cannot use NSLs to get email to/from data, even though the government has asked for it in the past. See: http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/fbi-ecpa-opinion.pdf

NSLs are gagged, and so Google cannot confirm when it gets NSLs, or for which customers the government is seeking data. However, Google could very easily provide information to the public confirming what it will and will not deliver to the FBI when it receives an NSL. I have asked Google's legal and DC policy team for this info, repeatedly, and hit a brick wall.

csoghoian··on Court Filings Suggest Google Fighting Feds Over Megaupload Emails
Note, that the connection to the megaupload case is 100% based on speculation by the Paidcontent author (unless he was tipped to the existence of the documents in the docket.. he doesn't say how he stumbled across them).

What we do know for sure is that Google received a 2703(d) order (for non-content and subscriber info) and a search warrant (which could reveal communications content). Google later asked the court to unseal the orders.

I'm not sure why the government would seek both a d order and a search warrant for the same account (since a warrant also allows you to get everything that a d order delivers).

One possible option might be that the warrant (probable cause standard) was for one particular target for which the gov had more evidence, whereas the d order was used for other targets in the same investigation for which the government could only meet the "relevance to an ongoing criminal investigation" standard.

The recent order related to the continued sealing of the 2703(d)order: http://ia700807.us.archive.org/32/items/gov.uscourts.vaed.27...

The related order regarding the continued sealing of the search warrant: http://ia600804.us.archive.org/18/items/gov.uscourts.vaed.27...

csoghoian··on The YouPorn Chat leak revealed a lot more than email addresses and passwords
YouPorn chat was located at chat.youporn.com. As a reminder, YouPorn's website is www.youporn.com. Until recently, there was a prominent "Chat" link from the YouPorn website to YouPorn Chat too (which AFAIK didn't disclose that it was run by a different company).

I think people have a legitimate reason to be confused by the line between YouPorn and YouPorn Chat. Until this episode of total incompetence surfaced, I'd say the two firms were quite happy for this line to be as blurry as possible.

YouPorn was clearly making money from this arrangement - otherwise, why allow a different company to piggyback off their high profile brand. It seems only fair that YouPorn's brand now suffer.

csoghoian··on YouPorn passwords available for download, thousands of users exposed
Were you the CTO at YouPorn back in 2010, when the company abused a flaw (css sniffing) in web browsers that allowed your company to covertly determine what other porn sites users had visited? See: http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/11/30/history-s...

Do you think that it was reasonable behavior to engage in without telling your users?

csoghoian··on Chrome Privacy
You are a Firefox developer, right? Not a mere user.

Firefox takes a totally different approach to blocking cookies than IE/Chrome/Safari.

Firefox blocks the setting and transmission of cookies by/to 3rd parties.

The other browsers just block the setting of new cookies by 3rd parties.

An example of what this means:

A Safari or Chrome/IE user who has turned on 3rd party cookie blocking visits facebook.com in a 1st party manner (by visiting the facebook home page). He/she then visits CNN, where facebook is present as a 3rd party (via the like button). Even though that user has opted to block 3rd party cookies, their stored facebook cookies will be transmitted to facebook when it acts as a 3rd party, because the cookies were first set as a 1st party.

In comparison, when a Firefox user who has turned on 3rd party cookie blocking visits CNN, facebook has no idea who they are.

No one is visiting doubleclick.net as a 1st party, which means if Google turned on the Chrome/Safari style 3rd party cookie blocking, it wouldn't be able to track users for behavioral advertising (interestingly, Facebook could still do so). Were this to happen, I guess Google could always move away from using doubleclick.net and put everything under the google.com domain, which would get around this.

Mozilla's method of 3rd party cookie blocking does indeed cause collateral damage, which AFAIK, is why Mozilla hasn't turned it on.

Google doesn't have the same excuse for allowing 3rd party cookies, since Apple users don't suffer broken sites when they browse. (If the Flash fiasco has shown us anything, it is that websites will bend to Apple's will, and change whatever breaks in order to allow Apple users to visit their sites).

csoghoian··on Chrome Privacy
1. Keep my opt outs is not a serious privacy enhancing technology. If it were, it would be built into the browser by default, and enabled via a simple, easy to discover UI (or better, enabled by default).

Keep My Opt Outs is largely political propaganda, or if you will, privacy theater. It gives your DC people something to talk about when they testify before Congress or the FTC. It allows them to say, "look, we do offer users the ability to opt out", while knowing that few users will seek it out and turn it on.

Compare, for example, the 5% of Firefox users who have enabled DNT, vs. the 62k users of KMOO. That number of users is pathetic, given how many people use Chrome.

2. Since when does something need to have gone through the standards process for Google to ship it in Chrome?

Consider, for example, what Adam Langley wrote when he added support for DNSSEC certificates to Chrome:

"I'm also going to see how it goes for a while. The most likely outcome is that nobody uses [this feature] and I pull the code out in another year's time." See: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/06/16/dnssecchrome.html

Google's approach to security (and in many other areas) is to iterate, quickly, see what works, and if it doesn't, kill it off.

Likewise, Chrome supports an early draft of WebSockets. The spec isn't finalized yet though. Google added support to a draft spec, and then will update Chrome to the final spec once it is done. See: http://blog.chromium.org/2010/06/websocket-protocol-updated....).

It seems to only be in the area of privacy where Google wants to wait until technologies have gone through the slow standardization process. In the mean time, while you wait for things to work their way through the W3C, Google's ad business continues to build detailed behavioral profiles on Internet users.

The longer the W3C takes, from Google's perspective, the better.

Look - I get that it must be frustrating to be a privacy engineer working on Chrome, when upper management won't let you deploy serious privacy enhancing features to users. I get that it must be embarrassing to work on the only browser that doesn't support Do Not Track (usually, IE is last to the party). What I don't get, is why you tout features like KMOO and Google's involvement in the W3C process as though you expect them to be taken seriously.

Google is not committed to enabling users to easily protect themselves from Google's widespread collection of their private data. To argue otherwise is foolish.

csoghoian··on Chrome Privacy
Defaults matter. An extensive body of social science research tells us that users stick with the default settings.

In the area of security, Google recognizes the importance of setting safe defaults. See: "99.99% of Chrome users would never change the default settings. (The percentage is not an exaggeration.)"

http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html

Having an option to block 3rd party cookies, but then hiding it in the chrome://flags/ menu is essentially worthless for most users.

Privacy enhancing technologies need to be easy to use, preferably, enabled by default.

csoghoian··on Chrome Privacy
Ars botched the details in summing up the study. Read the original study here:

http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6694

When a consumer visits Google's opt out page (where you obtain a doubleclick.net opt out cookie), or gets one via the NAI, the doubleclick.net tracking ID is deleted.

Google does not support the DNT header.

csoghoian··on Chrome Privacy
Some ad networks already respect DNT. But you are right, many of the big ones don't. While Google can't force most of the ad networks to respect DNT, Google can choose to respect the header, which is currently sent by 5% of Firefox users, when it is received by the Doubleclick and Google Analytics servers.

Instead of supporting a header that millions of consumers are already sending, you instead offer a browser add-on for analytics, and "keep my opt outs" for ad network opt out cookies.

The signal sent by a consumer setting the DNT flag in their browser is just as clear as a consumer installing your analytics opt out plugin, or obtaining the doubleclick opt out cookie.

You could, right now, respect the DNT header as you currently respect your own opt out mechanisms, but you don't.

I get that Google is not a charity. I get that Do Not Track (or any other mechanism that makes it easy for consumers to avoid tracking) threatens your bottom line. What I would prefer though, is honesty.

Please just admit that you want to make it difficult for consumers to opt out, and that a single, easy to use mechanism built into the browser is something you want to avoid at all costs, even if that means you are ignoring millions of consumers' intent.

csoghoian··on Chrome Privacy
2 responses:

1. Chrome is the only major browser not to support the Do Not Track header. Google is also the browser vendor whose bottom line would be most impacted if users could easily opt out of tracking. Coincidence?

While I welcome folks from the Chrome team to weigh in on the reasons for this, my own understanding is that adoption of this feature is being blocked by Google's Mountain View based policy team, and is not a decision that is in the hands of engineers.

Compare this to Chrome's absolutely spectacular record in the area of security, where folks like Adam Langley and Chris Evans have been able to ship innovative features that haven't worked their way through the standards process. Examples include HTTPS certificate pinning (that recently led to the discovery of MiTM attacks against Iranian users using the DigiNotar certs).

In the area of security, Chrome's engineers deploy whatever they think will help users. In the area of privacy, Google's lawyers and lobbyists are calling the shots.

(Also, there still isn't a working API to let others support DNT in Chrome. An API exists, I think, but it is quite buggy, AFAIK)

2. Blocking 3rd party cookies by default. Apple defaults to blocking 3rd party cookies, Chrome does not. Both are derived the same webkit core (yes, I know there is different code now), but when Google decided to create Chrome, they went with a different default than the one that Apple had already used -- one that hasn't led to websites breaking for Apple users.

Again, which browser vendors' bottom line would suffer if Chrome users could not easily be tracked? Google.

Let me be clear - I don't think that Chrome is engaging in any sneaky shenanigans to directly track users. No, that would be too obvious. Instead, Chrome just makes it easy for Google's other services to track users, when they stick with the deaults.

← PreviousPage 2 of 2