d-z-m

Looks cool! a bit of crypto hygiene though, I'd recommend passing the ECDH output through a KDF before using it in xsalsa20-poly1305.

Also, if you're using xsalsa20 anyway, why go through the trouble of doing incremental n0nces? One of the main benefits of opting for an extended-n0nce construction is that it simplifies n0nce handling greatly. Why not randomly generate the 24 byte n0nce and forget about the tricky and error prone project of ensuring n0nce uniqueness?

I would recommend Derek Lin's translation[0].

[0]: https://taoism.net/wp-content/plugins/wonderplugin-pdf-embed...

If you're going to stand behind your product, I'm not sure posting with a throwaway sends the strongest message.

also an unfortunate acronym

> 0¹²⁰10000111

for those of you(like me) wondering where this apparently spooky constant is coming from, it is a bitstring of the coefficients of the lexically first irreducible polynomial of degree b with the minimum possible number of non-zero terms, where b is the block size(in bits) of the underlying block cipher with which CMAC is instantiated. So, nothing up the sleeve here.

QUIC still runs over UDP. Are you referring to MASQUE?

> No it does not. If the packet is at your door it is too late already.

Too late for what? Again, it only makes sense to talk about "security" in the context of a threat model. You can debate the reasonableness of that threat model, but that's another discussion.

My threat model(for the sake of argument :^)) is an attacker with a static public IP address trying to bruteforce access to my service via repeated login attempts.

I'll maintain(for now) that fail2ban can be an effective tool that does provide some security against an attacker of this kind.

use a vpn that does not advertise its presence, like wireguard.

"security" is a term that has to be defined in relation to a threat model. If your threat model is an attacker with a static IP hammering your server, fail2ban does provide some security against that sort of attacker.

Link appears to be broken.

In context, I believe interpretation number 1 stands on firmer ground than yours.

In the previous paragraph:

> Unlike his wife, Hemingway never went ashore at Normandy. On June 6, all he could do was watch from a landing craft as American soldiers fought their way onto Omaha Beach.

> Even though Gellhorn scooped Hemingway, his story ran first. “Voyage to Victory,” proclaimed the cover of Collier’s July 22, 1944, issue. The article identified Hemingway as “Collier’s famed war correspondent” and included a photo of the whiskered writer with Allied soldiers.

Only then does the section conclude with the line in question

> No mention was made of the fact that she was the only female journalist on the ground at Omaha Beach.

You can argue that the author just finds these and other facts interesting, and nothing more. I think that is ignoring the clear subtext present in the writing. The author is certainly making the case that she was not given the recognition she deserved; either because of her sex or her proximity to Hemingway. Because the author himself invoked her sex in the final line, I am inclined to think the former.

> using a model from a place like Huggingface means the author of the model can execute any code on your machine

To my knowledge this is only a problem if the model is serialized/de-serialized via pickle[0].

[0]: https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/security-pickle

I'm saying that when I import something, "foo/bar" "bar/baz" etc, The way I access the exposed functions and types in that package usually corresponds to the basename. e.g. bar.* for the first example, and baz.* for the second example. Is your criticism of Go that it is technically not required for this to be the case?

Happiness arises spontaneously when our desires are sated, whether they be sexual or otherwise. It arises also when our aversions are fended off.

  "Desireless-ness is wisdom.  The two are not different; they are the same."

  - Ramana Maharshi

"if you see the illusion, you are enlightened. but if you think that you are enlightened, you are in the illusion."

The original quotes are deeply profound. They point to something that is beyond understanding. I also found the attempt to invert them to be off-putting.

  "Do not belabor wisdom to examine it;"

  - Niutou Farong

[0]: https://www.dailyzen.com/journal/song-of-the-mind-xin-ming/

it means: this is normally how imports in Go work, is it not?

This is normally how it works, no?

For those with whom this resonated, you may also like the writings of Jacques Lusseyran.

Some selections from his works can be heard here[0].

[0]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bn4SHdeVz-o

In the linked video, is there a timestamp for when the TLS+DNS blocker is discussed?

> There are tons of things that linters warn about (today), that should have been errors too by their logic.

Can you give a couple examples?

> "Unused vars are warnings" is not a possible opinion for go, period. It's also not a possible opinion for go tooling like 3rd party linters.

Right, but that doesn't mean that Go doesn't have an opinion about unused variables. Go's opinion is that they are compiler errors.

> my point is that it's not a design choice but a side effect of choosing "we don't have compiler warnings".

What makes you think that? I don't think "we don't have compiler warnings" was behind the choice to make unused variables a compiler error. It seems like a deliberate design decision on the part of the Go team.

> SNI = nsa backdoor into https everywhere.

No. Not even remotely true. If you can write a coherent argument that substantiates this claim then I will address it.

> I don't see how you think NSI doesn't nullify https everywhere.

It doesn't. SNI doesn't leak the URL being accessed, or anything that isn't encoded in the hostame.

Do you protect against bruteforcing the TOTP code? I.e. via rate-limiting or a set amount of retries? I took a quick glance at the code and couldn't find anything to this effect.

The scenario I'm imagining is: someone opens the TOTP entry UI in their browser, opens devtools, and starts to loop through all possible TOTP codes.

There comes a point when "just asking questions" crosses a line into conspiratorial theory crafting. I can ask all kinds of crazy questions, like: "what if the world is run by a species of lizard people who live underground?". In the absence of evidence, it's pointless to debate such things. In general, people should be allergic to thinking in this way. That's not to say that conspiracies never happen, they do. However, it's on you to substantiate your insane claims, it isn't on your interlocutors to prove that they aren't true.

> Call me paranoid

You're being too paranoid. If you have a substantive disagreement with the content of the "Too Much Crypto" paper then we can talk about it, but to posit that Aumasson was compromised by a TLA(with no evidence) and that this paper is the result is pure conspiracy thinking.

Aumasson designed BLAKE[0], as well SipHash[1] and SPHINCS+[2](both of which he designed with DJB, btw).

[0]: https://www.blake2.net/#co [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SipHash [2]: https://sphincs.org/

can you elaborate?

Ideally I would not have to trust the signalling server to ensure I'm transferring files to who I think I am[0]. Not as much of a knock against your project as a knock against webRTC in general.

[0]: https://webrtchacks.com/webrtc-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks...

I looked around and couldn't find a description of the protocol by which two peers authenticate to each other/transfer files. Also, is the E2EE encryption referred to simply whatever is being used to encrypt the transport(DTLS/SRTP/etc)? or are you doing additional encryption/decryption of files?

Also I'm curious like others, does this only work if no nat traversal is required? or are you leveraging public stun/turn infrastructure?