Feel free to reach out if it interests you.
dawood@vulert.com
15 karma · joined November 13, 2021
Feel free to reach out if it interests you.
dawood@vulert.com
Most SCA products appear similar at first glance, but the results can vary significantly depending on features such as:
Detection of direct and transitive dependencies Support for lockfiles and package manifests Vulnerability database coverage and update speed Reachability or exploitability analysis Handling of withdrawn, disputed, or duplicate advisories Fix-version and dependency-upgrade recommendations SBOM generation and export formats CI/CD, GitHub, GitLab, and IDE integrations License-risk detection Support for repositories that cannot run an agent Noise reduction and false-positive handling
The most interesting difference is not always the number of vulnerabilities found. A tool that reports 100 issues may be less useful than one that clearly explains which five require immediate action.
I’m considering publishing a comparison using the same set of public repositories and measuring:
Vulnerabilities detected Transitive dependencies identified Actionable fixes provided False positives or duplicate findings Setup time Quality of the developer workflow
What features or test cases would you consider essential for a fair SCA comparison?
I’d especially like feedback from developers who have used tools such as Snyk, Mend, Dependabot, Trivy, Grype, osv-scanner, or Vuler
After reading about a 3-person startup that received an $82,000 Gemini API bill in 48 hours (normal monthly spend: $180), I started building CloudSentinel.
The core problem: GCP has no native kill switch. Budget alerts send an email. Quota limits throttle requests. Neither revokes a key automatically. And billing data is delayed by hours — useless for real-time protection.
The architecture:
CloudSentinel monitors raw API request count — updated in near real-time. We create an Alerting Policy inside the user's own GCP project using MQL. When the request threshold is crossed, Google fires a Pub/Sub webhook to CloudSentinel. We receive it and revoke that exact key automatically.
The security decision I'm most proud of:
Revoke-Only IAM model. The Custom IAM Role has three responsibilities: - Read API key IDs and metadata (never key values) - Create monitoring rules inside the user's project - Revoke a specific key when a threshold is crossed
The permission apikeys.create is not in the role. Not restricted — absent. Even if CloudSentinel is fully compromised, an attacker can only remove access, never create keys or touch anything else.
Early access open at https://cloudsentinel.dev
Have you ever dealt with a GCP billing surprise or a leaked key? Happy to hear your experience and discuss the architecture.
thanks again mate.
please feel free to reach out at info@devnack.com
thanks
Feel free to contact us.
This will help companies to be ready from future Log4J attacks. I’d love to get your feedback?
Best
atleast in this way we can secure ourselves from supply chain attacks