6,259 karma · joined March 20, 2007
https://twitter.com/dcurtis
But to clear a couple of things up:
1. I've since learned that the reason this happened could be due to an unusual confluence of events including Apple Card, autopay, and the online Apple Store.
2. The disabling of iCloud, App Store, and Apple ID accounts is actually an Apple Card policy for overdue accounts, and they have a team dedicated to handling these account de-activation issues. (I think this is absurd, which is why I am drawing attention to it.)
Also, "my ilk" are the very people he praises, including Paul Graham and YC founders pre-2012. I'm tempted to write a rebuttal, because while I agree that there was a marked change in the startup community around that time, I think it happened for reasons very different from the ones Rhinehart outlines in his piece.
(For reference: https://dcurt.is/the-best )
Working on it right now, in fact.
We announced this publicly so that you now know: if you write on Svbtle, your content is vastly more likely to survive for a long time than if you used your own server (probably) or if you used another publishing startup.
Only in the case of something horribly catastrophic would we resort to using an external service like Archive.org--but unlike other startups, we would work very closely with them to archive all data. And perhaps even give them the domain name.
> “Use the title Dr. only when referring to a medical doctor.”
I changed the title anyway.
Nokia took the competition seriously, but made a single fatal error: it tried to evolve its low end platform into its high end platform. While that strategy makes complete sense in 90% of cases for market innovation, in the mobile phone industry--which, it turns out, was going through revolution--Nokia should have done the opposite. People often forget that Nokia still controls more than 70% of the worldwide phone market, and controlled vastly more of it in the mid-2000's. In 2007, they had no idea that 90% of industry profits would come from the 30% of the market that they were not focusing on.
You can't really fault them for that, because strategically it makes perfect sense. They regarded the competition seriously but had a flawed approach/response.
That being said, they had a bunch of half-assed hedges against their fatal strategy, like high-ish end platforms such as Maemo, Symbian's advanced versions, etc.., but in fast moving markets with extraordinarily complicated infrastructure/platforms, this approach does not work. You can half-ass evolution, but you have to full-ass revolution.
They realized this mistake fairly early on, but by then it was too late to develop a platform, and full-assing it would have put the company's core competencies at huge risk. So Kallasvuo was fired, Elop was hired, the company moved in with Microsoft, and, eventually, they married.