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donttellmypeers

9 karma · joined June 1, 2023

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donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
> they wouldn't have done NSEC3

Anecdotally, NSEC3 was known at its inception to be insufficient but done anyway to hush privacy advocates.

donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
> But when you get the records, you don't get the signatures; you just get a single bit in the header that says "I pinky swear that I checked the signatures".

Clients absolutely do get RRSIGs (and relevant NSEC/NSEC3) however they don't necessarily validate them.

donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
Well it looks like they are in this instance and neither they nor you have done anything to suggest otherwise. TLS and WebPKI have great usability for webservers but non-webservers cannot even approach being as smooth as for example Caddy's "Automatic HTTPS" configuration.
donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
Generally services not found directly at A/AAAA records for a name are found via another record that contains a hostname (HTTPS/SVCB, SRV, etc) at a leaf node below the name. So `_xmpps-server._tcp.example.net` might contain the hostname `hosted-provider.example.com` in which case `hosted-provider.example.com` will need to respond with a certificate for `example.net`, unless you trust the DNS, in which case it can respond as `hosted-provider.example.com`.
donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
I don't know how to put this in a more palatable way but you're looking at the world from the confines of a webdevs point of view. Can you really not imagine that there's any other protocol on the internet than HTTP? That there might already be a web server listening at a given name? That the person in control of that webserver isn't you?
donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
> What you ultimately want is to make sure you're communicating with the correct other party. And the way to achieve this is TLS with certificates, validated via the WebPKI.

That really only works well for web servers. If your service isn't the one found at the A/AAAA lookup for a given name it's much more difficult to obtain a cert for that name, and without that clients are reliant on what's in DNS alone to make the association.

donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
It's pretty easy to say what people back in the 90s should have been working on in retrospect. The zeitgeist around privacy only really changed in the late 2000s if I recall. Shortly afterward DNSCurve appeared and since it's arguably easier to deploy than DNSSEC it's noteworthy how little impact it has had.
donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
That's an answer to a different question. I asked if they let you put a DNSKEY RR in the RRset they serve. (To be clear: I'm not asking if they will import private keys and sign with them or anything like that, just if they'll let you place an additional DNSKEY in the RRset they serve.)
donttellmypeers··on Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits
Does Route53 let you manage the DNSKEY RRset (so you can add a DNSKEY to the set yourself) or do they have some sort of facade you have to interact with instead?
donttellmypeers··on DNSSEC failures are how you get people to disable DNSSEC
Is that a dig at the DoH crowd?

My comment wasn't suggesting a HTTP background is necessary for someone to help move the DNS ecosystem forward.

donttellmypeers··on DNSSEC failures are how you get people to disable DNSSEC
> If dnssec usage was wide spread we might reach some decent maturity with the tools and protocols, but I can't see that happening any time soon.

DNSSEC's lack of maturity is a symptom of DNS itself not having a healthy ecosystem. I feel like it'd take as little as a half-percent of the people writing new HTTP tooling to noticeable improve the DNS ecosystem as a whole.