653 karma · joined October 19, 2015
1. Charge a fixed fee to everyone hooked up to cover the cost of maintenance and repair (and servicing any bonds).
2. Don't charge a fixed fee, but increase the electricy rate by 36x (365/10) so the overall income is the same as before. This will bankrupt those few folks who can't afford their own solar-battery system (or don't have sunlight reaching their rooftop).
3. Have the government maintain the grid and generation infrastructure, similar to roads. This is very similar to option 1 (especially the means-tested version of #1), except the money is collected via taxes instead of a bill from the utility.
4. Let the grid fail by not maintaining it. Everyone must maintain their own self-generation infrastructure, with no economies of scale.
I don't think options 2 or 4 are wise...
If you don't want to pay for the convenience of having on-demand power whenever you need it, disconnect from the grid.
Now whether these fees should be income-based is another debate, but some sort of flat connection fee makes a lot of sense in the future...
Poor folks don't have the capital to install solar or upgrade the insulation on their houses, and (in California) typically live in a much more hostile climate. They need to consume significant energy to live and end up paying for a significant portion of the NEM 2.0 "subsidies" as part of their power bill.
Government subsidies could come from the general revenue of the state, which is mostly fed by progressive taxes (poor folks contribute much less money than rich folks). It would be better to subsidize green energy directly from general revenues.
NEM 2.0 was a ridiculous transfer of wealth to rich households who could afford panels, and I'm glad it's over.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Calgary/comments/194yg8x/how_are_yo...
General consensus was that while some models lost ~40% of their range, the cars were more than adequate for getting around the city, even when parked on the street overnight.
You are putting too much faith in your VM monitor to keep you safe. There's a lot of attack surface in (for example) QEMU peripherals, and there's plenty of examples of VM escape [1]. CrosVM is probably the only publicly available VMM I'd be willing to trust, and even then I'd be nervous running state-sponsored malware on a machine with important data.
Thunderbolt 3 uses 64b/66b encoding (unlike display port 1.2 alt mode), so there's more bandwidth left over for non-display protocols.
CAT8: $0.55 / foot
Max speed; 40 Gbit
Max length: 30m
(https://www.monoprice.com/product?p_id=42957):
---
2 strand OS2 single-mode fiber: $0.09 / foot
Max speed: 800 Gbit (today; theoretical max speed is much higher)
Max length: >10km
(https://www.cablewholesale.com/products/bulk-cable/fiber-opt...):
OS2 has been around for decades, and will be more than good enough for the next several decades.
Maybe there's a few niches (single player games?) that don't need memory safety...
Sometimes I do run across problems that are difficult to express in Rust without resorting to interior mutability, and it can slow me down to figure out the best way to model my data.
The idea here is that if the "evil crate" is prevented by the compiler to call out into any os functionality or use unsafe, the worst it can do is return bogus values, mutate anything it has a &mut reference to, and leak heap memory. And if the toolchain were perfect, that might be achievable.
This was the promise that Java Applets made, which wasn't achievable due to the JVM being too bug-prone.
That said, most build systems can access everything the user has access to, so it's not really a regression from the industry standard.
And Rust's typesystem on its own isn't enough to protect against malicious crates, even if you ban all unsafe code, procedural macros, build.rs, and filesystem/network APIs. Several soundness issues were found in previous versions of the standard library that allow a malicious crate to take advantage of undefined behavior to run arbitrary machine code. It seems likely to me that there are similar unknown issues lurking in today's standard library or compiler.
If you care about security, you have to audit your dependencies very carefully, no matter what language you are using.