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galadran

2,086 karma · joined April 16, 2016

[ my public key: https://keybase.io/galadran; my proof: https://keybase.io/galadran/sigs/fdhOgcmCp1kEKwClfElrV_dviWozxDM2n24qkisFN1U ]
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galadran··on Who killed the EV cert? A browser whodunit for Halloween
Ah, the sins are more to do with the design of 2-QWACs.

All the design needed was for the browser to check the TLS cert and the QWAC cert covered the same domain name. Instead, folks at ETSI insisted very stubbornly on the signature from the QWAC over the cert used in TLS - which is an annoying complication for site operators - and provides little additional benefit.

I'd also like to see the EU encode more information in these certs. Knowing a company's address is not very useful (IMO), but a machine readable label that the site is regulated by $COUNTRY_NAME financial or medical regulator would be a much more useful signal.

Good luck in your endeavours!

galadran··on Who killed the EV cert? A browser whodunit for Halloween
Clarification: Browsers or other user-agents are not required to trust QWACs for use in TLS. We fought very hard for this.

However, there are obligations to display 2-QWACs if sites choose to use them. Their keys are not used to authenticate web domains or encrypt web traffic.

Disclosure: I was Mozilla's lead for this effort and also helped design 2-QWACs (for my sins).

galadran··on Broccoli2Shell: Brotli decoder RCE in Node.js, Python and more
Mozilla reported it as an RCE in April

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2029458

galadran··on Broccoli2Shell: Brotli decoder RCE in Node.js, Python and more
Mozilla found and reported it as an RCE in April: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2029458
galadran··on Bye Bye Brotli? Google's Compression Library Is a Security Mess
Fx independently discovered the RCE which Google had silently patched and flagged it in April.
galadran··on Bye Bye Brotli? Google's Compression Library Is a Security Mess
Something that has flown under the radar and is missing from your timeline: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2029458
galadran··on CVE-2026-111943: Compromised Intermediate Certificate Authority
https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
galadran··on eMudhra intermediate CA compromise
The impact of this incident is very unevenly spread.

Over 10 years ago, Mozilla shipped OneCRL [1]. We remediated this incident in a couple of hours for Firefox users who were protected automatically without the need for updates. Chrome, Apple and Microsoft have similar tooling. Since then, we've built more advanced tooling to handle revocation at scale for leaf certs (CRLite [2]).

However, for the rest of the ecosystem, there has been little to no investment in revocation and for those clients, this is a massive problem. Hopefully, we'll see folks invest now. Efforts like upki [3] look promising.

[1] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-interm...

[2] https://hacks.mozilla.org/2025/08/crlite-fast-private-and-co...

[3] https://github.com/rustls/upki

galadran··on Compromised EMudhra Intermediate Certificates
https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
galadran··on NSA tries to weaken mlkem standardisation?
In effect, yes it does.

The Recommended flag is set for X25519MLKEM768. It is not set for any of the pure PQ key exchanges.

https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-paramete...

galadran··on NSA tries to weaken mlkem standardisation?
I'm afraid you've misunderstood. These codepoints are for the pure MLKEM key establishment that DJB is railing against.

All of these libraries also support the hybrid forms, which have different codepoints and are used by default. Nothing in the IETF process has any bearing on this.

galadran··on NSA tries to weaken mlkem standardisation?
This is garbage from start to finish.

There are already codepoints assigned for MLKEM 512/768/1024 (0x0200, 0x0201, 0x0202) and nearly every major library supports it already:

  - OpenSSL (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - BoringSSL (ML-KEM-1024)
  - NSS (ML-KEM-1024)
  - AWS-LC (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - Rustls (ML-KEM-768/1024)
  - s2n-tls (ML-KEM-1024)
  - Bouncy Castle (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - Botan (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - GnuTLS (ML-KEM-768/1024)
  - WolfSSL (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
galadran··on Pact: Anonymous Credentials for the Web
> If nothing changes, users will increasingly be forced to choose between their privacy and their access to the web

Shorter post: https://blog.mozilla.org/en/privacy-security/keeping-the-web...

galadran··on Cloudflare Collaborates with Leading Browsers to Develop Privacy-First Protocol
More details: https://blog.mozilla.org/en/privacy-security/keeping-the-web...
galadran··on EU Council and Parliament reach agreement for approving controversial eIDAS law
EU Commission FAQ (emphasis mine):

Recognition means that web browsers are required to ensure support and interoperability for the QWAC for the sole purpose of displaying identity data in a user-friendly manner. *Recognition of QWACs implies that browsers shouldn't question the origin, integrity or data in the certificate*.

However, the requirement to recognise QWACs does not affect browser security policies and leaves web browsers free to preserve their own procedures and criteria for encryption and authentication of *other certificates*.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_...

galadran··on Joint statement of scientists and NGOs on the EU’s proposed eIDAS reform
As I commented there, you've misunderstood this change.

There's a difference between certificates distributed with the OS and certificates added to the OS by a user. Right now Firefox ignores both.

This change ONLY picks up the certificates added to the OS by a user. Firefox will continue to ignore the certificates included with the OS store by default.

galadran··on Firefox Beta 120 trusts OS certificates by default
There's a difference between certificates distributed with the OS and certificates added to the OS by a user. Right now Firefox ignores both. This change ONLY picks up the certificates added to the OS by a user.
galadran··on Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security
"Agreed behind closed doors" would probably be better than "Secret Law" but I guess its a question of brevity.
galadran··on Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_trilogue_meeting
galadran··on Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security
https://eidas-open-letter.org

The open letter signed by 300+ researchers, professors and experts.

galadran··on Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security
Title should probably be: "Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security"
galadran··on Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security
https://last-chance-for-eidas.org/
galadran··on Firefox Beta 120 trusts OS certificates by default
This isn't the right summary. Firefox uses it own root store still and ignores any certificates distributed by default in the OS. However, if the user installs their root to the OS, Firefox will also pick it up. This is how other browsers work.
galadran··on Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) Effectively Defeats Pirate Site Blocking
Mozilla's launch earlier this week: https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/encrypted-hello...
galadran··on Encrypted Client Hello
I believe CF and others buckled under pressure from major websites which didn't want to be used as fronts for other website's traffic. ECH fixes this because individual sites get to opt-in to using it.
galadran··on Encrypted Client Hello
Any provider can deploy ECH, it's standardized at the IETF. Cloudflare are just first.
galadran··on Encrypted Client Hello
The point is that network operators can't tell which website the user is visiting, as it could be any of the sites hosted by the ECH provider.

In this case, Cloudflare are acting as the ECH provider and as they already host the websites, they already see the connection plaintext.

galadran··on This shouldn't have happened: A vulnerability postmortem
The disclosure and test cases: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/12/01/4
galadran··on Memory Corruption in NSS via DER-Encoded DSA and RSA-PSS Signatures
More details: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/12/01/4
galadran··on Rust for Linux redux
> It is not fun but frustrating to work in Rust.

Deeply subjective. Rust has been the most loved language on Stack Overflow for 5 years in a row now.

> add a new huge dependency

Sure, but setting up Rust is much much easier than GCC with all the trimmings.

> As an exemple, there is a common package in python that decided to start having their module in Rust instead of C. Now a lot of users of the module are pissed off, with good reason, because you can't build/install the module anymore in a little bit older or non conventional distributions.

Assuming you are referring to pyca, you are mistaken and there has been a lot of misinformation about the change. Rust support is needed to build the module, but not install it. Pyca works just fine for users without rust and works everywhere rust does. Users on niche CPU architectures which haven't been sold commercially for 15+ years were the only ones impacted.

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