1,005 karma · joined June 15, 2013
Karl Fuchs described his mental trauma of being both a Western atomic scientist and a Soviet Atomic Spy[5].
There are many more references available, but it is seldom discussed. This is one of the reasons that the CIA (and other secret agencies) become so insular. The members are unable to be open with anyone else except each other, and so they tend to stick together.
Theres more on the extensive work that RUC and Special Branch had to do to maintain the sanity of the IRA informants they were running. There is a constant refrain, human beings do not operate well with secret identities under high stress environments for long periods of time.
[0] http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/20... [1] Undercover and Alone [2] Lu-CiFER: Memoirs of a Mongol [3] The Billion Dollar Spy [4] https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intellig... [5] https://archive.org/stream/sovietatomicespi1951unit/sovietat...
It depends a lot on how intense you expect the investigation to be. Strong protection comes from using a network connection that is not linked to you, in addition to using technology that masks your IP address. If there are CCTV, then that increases the risk exposure, as does bringing a mobile phone with you. It is a lot of trade offs based on the threat model. In the case of a resistance twitter account, I suspect that simply using Tor Browser Bundle will be sufficient, but it is hard to make a blanket statement.
2) anonymous
I'm not anonymous, I'm pseudonymous. There are hundreds, or thousands, of people that know my "real" name. It isn't important, I don't use it for anything. The only people who do use it are my mother and my bank. I've been using the same handle "grugq" for over two decades. Everything I have done is under my handle. I don't maintain two identities, I have only one -- the grugq. You can't link my handle with another identity because there isn't one.
Over a decade ago I was at a small art college where +Fravia was giving a talk. After his speech, we went for a walk and a chat. He lamented that all the hackers were dropping their handles and going by their real names for commercial reasons (so they could get jobs, basically.) He said to me, "you and I are the only ones left still using our handles." A few years later he died of cancer. So, now I am the only one left.
People who know my name, know where I live and know that it would increase my risk profile to expose me. They respect my wishes to use my handle, and they respect my privacy. It is no great secret, it is simply the choice I have made, an obligation to an old dead friend, and also one that could have very real security implications.
It always puzzles me why people care so much. A name is a name.
(also, you have no idea what I do for a living. lol)
There is no social safety net to speak of, but the extended family model provides a functionally equivalent version. Again, this was explicitly stated in the article itself.
Your insinuation that there is forced institutionalisation because the Thais don't respect "human rights" is, quite frankly, racist.
You should take the precautions appropriate for your threat model and risk appetite. I suggest deleting correspondence after a set period of time. I know people that do a yearly purge of all their sensitive mail for the previous year in January.
If you are encrypting for the sake of encrypting, as some people do (see: cover traffic), then you can keep archives of your mail because you face no negative outcome if your archive is compromised. There is no downside, so go for it.
If you and a friend want to discuss something secretly, then you can create new email accounts plus new PGP keys and exchange them out of band, e.g. via USB stick. This will allow you to remain somewhat anonymous in that neither email account nor key are linked to you. As long as you don't taint that compartment, it will be secure against compromising you.
That level of secrecy might not be necessary for your given threat model. It is up to you and your interlocutor how you want to secure your comms channel. This guide presents best practices that can be combined into a complete COMSEC plan.
This guide is not a strict HOWTO that presents a simple step by step solution for everyone. No such HOWTO can exist. Instead it presents a number of solutions to problems (and attempts to explain what problems they solve, why and how).
OP: From addresses are not to be rotated. Each communications channel should be in a compartment. Compartmentation requires minimizing the amount of information leaked, not maximizing it by contaminating a large number of addresses.
For more information on compartmenting and unlinking relationships, see [1].
This guide is not a complete COMSEC plan. A complete plan would be tailored to match the circumstances and requirements of the actors involved. This is a collection of notes and best practices. They need to be adapted and actively applied for the situation.
A complete COMSEC plan would include things like setting up dedicated email accounts for correspondence, creating the corresponding PGP keys. The confederates would exchange contact information, either out of band, or via another exist secure channel. Information exchanges would be via PGP email with fixed subject lines and only relevant information inside the content. All emails would be deleted in a rolling 7 day window.
[1] http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/03/18/the-paddy-factor/
As for the "market assessment" I find it implausible. It seems to be based on the assumption that the demand for capabilities has decreased over time while the availability of good bugs has increased. This is at odds with reality.
Here's a reconnaissance manual: http://ruckus.org/article.php?id=809
In general, blacklisting or whitelisting specific techniques is not the path to security. Looking for people conducting surveillance activities around targets is a good way to catch terrorist plots before they execute. The alternative, catching them after they execute, is not particularly good.
There are others.
This is a good start on the terrorist attack cycle and the surveillance techniques that are used. One of the problems with defense is that you had to protect against all possible attacks, and that includes people conducting on the ground surveillance.
As you suggest, more sophisticated groups will find better means of gathering the intelligence they need. Unfortunately, that still leaves crappy groups that don't know any better. Surveillance remains the best time to catch terrorists.
I can't speak to the specific example in the article, as usual the US is paranoid and over reacts, but the fundamentals are solid. Look for people conducting surveillance to catch terrorists.
Look for a copy of the "terrorist recognition manual", the 2nd ed. has leaked in PDF, and the 3rd edition is on amazon. It goes into quite a lot of detail regarding the terrorist attack cycle. Surveillance is a significant part of planning a successful terrorist attack.
If it helps, several terrorists have been caught due to conducting surveillance. It usually the best time to capture them, since they haven't conducted an attack that kills anyone yet :)
I wrote up an analysis of exactly this problem last year: http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/12/21/in-search-of-opsec-ma...
You purchase an access token (time limited from first use) from a third party (cryptostorm offers bulk rates for resellers). The entity which sells the tokens is based in a First Nation in Canada, meaning it has reduced legal attack surface. This entity is distinct and separate from cryptostorm.is the VPN service provider. They are compartmented and share no information. Neither one has sufficient information to link a specific individual to any activity.
That's the beauty of what they've done, they've made it so that you don't have to trust them. As I said, they could be compromised and log everything, it doesn't matter. They cannot tie an account to an individual. That's the problem that they solved. They removed trust from the equation.
Now, indeed, you should not use a VPN for anonymity. That is not what they are designed for and that is not what they are capable of providing. However, given that the cryptostorm VPN service can only know:
* you originating IP,
* your (anonymous) token ID, and
* the packet stream that exits their servers...
You can easily ensure a level of anonymity to your internet usage by accessing the VPN from an IP that is not associated with you (eg public library, coffee shop, etc). Provided you maintain discipline and never access it from an IP "owned" by you, they cannot know who you are.
I've spoken and written before about how VPNs are not tools for anonymity. A recent example is a "no logs" VPN used to catch a kid sending bomb threats to his school [0]. A VPN service is essentially just a proxy, and no single hop proxy is going to deter a nation state level actor. VPNs are tools for privacy, circumventing stupid IP restrictions, and evading (some) network access controls. They're not safe for robust clandestine activity.
I've spoken with them and they are competent, have been doing VPNs for years, and are passionate about privacy and security. That doesn't mean I trust them. The beauty of their architecture is that I don't have to.
[0]: http://grugq.tumblr.com/post/73393664323/no-logs-earthvpn-us...
If you are concerned about your privacy and want to use a VPN, then I would recommend using cryptostorm [1]. Firstly because it is run by people passionate about privacy, who have devoted considerable time and effort into creating a service that is both "safe" and fast. Secondly because those efforts have been directed at solving the right problems: unlinking, best practices crypto, and fast links.
The primary strength of cryptostorm is their decoupling of the VPN service provider and account management. You don't buy VPN service, you buy a token that is redeemable for VPN service.
Their banking is handled by a First Nation's bank (so effectively a country), and the financial transaction is between you and a 3rd party (not cryptostorm the VPN service provider).
So while some companies claim "we don't log account access", cryptostorm literally has nothing that they can log. They do not have access to any personal information at all. It is all handled by other people. Even if cryptostorm was compromised, or they lie about not logging, or they are forced to log due to court order - they are unable to provide any personal information.
So they solved the important problem: you are anonymous to your VPN service provider.
Their openvpn config is heavily tweaked to ensure that it uses only the most robust crypto (no RC4, thank you very much).
Of course, a VPN isn't really much use against a nation state level actor, but at least it can provide protection against local miscreants on an open wifi.
(Full disclosure: I've spoken with the cryptostorm guys about privacy and security, I respect their skills and knowledge. I might be biased for that reason [I also know anakata, teimo and peter sunde, and no disrespect to them but the cryptostorm guys did it correctly])
A hardened Gentoo is a more solid platform because of the reliability of GRsec + PaX for exploit mitigation. Unfortunately, configuring GRsec to work generically for a large number of usecases would be time consuming. I would still like to see it though.
There is an option on how to do it properly, but so far I don't believe that anyone is working on making it available publicly. I know it has been done in private at least twice but neither implementation is likely to become public. I would very much like it to be public. :(
If you are interested, it is a viable business, but I personally don't have the time to put into it.
I really don't like VirtualBox. I think Xen, KVM, VMware are all superior options.
I have never been able to get Qubes to install on any of my computers. It just fails. I guess I have the wrong hardware. I think it is sort of the correct approach, but there is a much better way. Email me if you want to devote some time to "doing it right". Would be in line with Whonix/Qubes, but different. :)
My main point, really, is that the content is not that relevant most of the time. It is far more interesting to see who is talking to whom, how frequently, and for how long. This sort of data provides rich information on the target network, both the edges and the nodes. This information can be used to analyze the network and to fit people back into the network if their identifying device/ID/etc is changed. You can still match the new activity against the old activity (particularly if the old activity has ceased) and get a match on who the "new" node actually is.
The metadata masking of Pond is what I like. It makes it a much more secure system than an XMPP based IM network. Even a private XMPP server is not secure against a global passive adversary. And thats basically the important thing for me. TextSecure is fine, but it leaks too much information for me to be completely comfortable using it. Pond addresses those issues (although, unfortunately, it fails on the usability front).
Thanks for the correction.
Pond is a sort of email replacement. I prefer it for security reasons. It protects against traffic analysis.
There is an issue for the torrc that is open on github, but it hasn't been applied yet. You might want to test it and see if it works for you.
The setup that you describe is actually implemented in Whonix [3], and personally I don't like it that much. I don't believe that VMs are very secure. I prefer the TAILS [4] system for a hardened Linux as a baseline, but it doesn't even use a VM to segregate the Tor daemon from the main OS. A superior hardened system (from a security POV) is Liberte Linux [5], however development is stalled and it is more complex to setup and use than TAILS. (Worth noting that TAILS is sponsored and has development resources, everything else is just a side project for various people).
If you want to setup a PORTAL that runs in a vm, it is really simple to do. QEMU will run the OpenWRT based PORTAL image, although someone would have to figure out how to configure the network settings appropriately. You'll probably want to use a VM for the "workstation" environment, as well as a VM for the Tor daemon. This will give you maximum control over the networking (this is what Whonix does).
At any rate, I suspect that JITSI is a better client than pidgin, but it gets no love (and unfortunately, it is Java). pidgin is basically technical debt which can never be repaid. Parsing network protocols in ad hoc parsers written in C is just not rational in this day and age. A client should use a managed language to minimise memory corruption bugs. I don't think using xulrunner is a good idea either, given how terrible Firefox is at security.
Ideally, there would be work put into making Pond [6] a viable instant message application.
I'd also be happy if the OTR spec was updated to bring it inline with the new TextSecure v2 protocol.
[1]: http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/10/05/thru-a-portal-darkly/
[2]: http://learn.adafruit.com/onion-pi/overview