16,731 karma · joined March 7, 2014
Of course, any "advanced nuclear" that doesn't even have a prototype yet will take longer than that. If it will ever happen.
They want to sell a PPA? For a technology for which they don't even have a working prototype? That has never produced a single kwh of energy? That's like... step 200 before step 0.5.
Backn in the days it was: Of course you can break DVD copyprotection schemes. But you cannot build a legal opensource DVD player software. Today it's: Of course every Netflix series can be found on the pirate bay. But you're not legally allowed to build an alternative netflix player frontend.
Even under ideal conditions (whether these can exist is debatable), the best QKD gives you is a securely encrypted channel only when you already have a securely authenticated channel. The latter is extremely important, makes the whole thing mostly useless, and is often omitted by QKD advocates.
It is really amazing how problematic all of this is, despite its widespread use. The HTML mail spec is really old, and contains almost no security considerations.
HTML in emails can only be a subset of HTML to be secure. But nobody has ever defined what exactly that subset is, so everyone does whatever they think. And unsurprisingly, this leads to an endless stream of security flaws.
See: https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/894-Efail-HTML-Mails-have-no...
Because as you say, you break SPF if you don't touch the envelope from. There's SRS to fix this. But if you do that, you break DMARC alignment.
So... something is always broken? It appears to me there's no way to make mail forwarding that works with full SPF/DKIM/DMARC setups.
That's total nonsense, I guess you never heard the word "energy efficiency".
I think it's fair to point that out. Usually, you expect that developers want to create software that is "as good as possible". They may have a different idea what exactly "good" means, but you usually don't expect that an open source project will actively want to be worse than it could be. But "open core" is exactly that: It's a software trying to be worse than it could be.
> A random example I found: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/mar/12/global-w...
Now if anyone gets a wrong impression here: I checked the linked article. It does not talk about an ice-free arctic. It doesn't even mention the word "arctic". It also does not make any predictions for a date that is now in the past.
It essentially explains that extreme temperature increases would make parts of the world uninhabitable due to the wet bulb temperature. Which is, well, not particularly controversial, as it is a fact that can be derived from very basic physics, and was as true in 2009 as it is today.
Old code:
expires = datetime.datetime.now(tz)
expires = expires.replace(year=expires.year + 1)
It broke yesterday, throws an exception ("ValueError: day is out of range for month"). It's kinda obvious that it does.
Fixed version code:
expires = datetime.datetime.now(tz) + datetime.timedelta(days=365)
expires = expires.isoformat(timespec="seconds")
Now we're just going 365 days into the future. Of course, this has a slightly different meaning and outcome, we are not always ending up on the "same date next year". But in this use case it doesn't really matter.
People think "RSA is easy", because someone gave them a lecture of a simplified/wrong/insecure version of RSA. Pretty much all "simple introductions to RSA" you can find out there are wrong.
The truth is: RSA isn't that simple. If you want to have RSA, and want to have it secure, there's a whole bunch of things to consider. But RSA looks simple.
So lots of people go ahead and implement their RSA. And then you end up with, hey, I can break almost a third of the top 100 webpage's RSA implementations. (I'm not kidding, I did that -> https://robotattack.org/ .)
I think the fact that crystals-kyber is obviously not that simple may actually protect us. Because hopefully most peopple will end up using some hopefully well audited optimized free implementation, because they won't even have the idea that they could do this on their own.
Often claimed, rarely supported by evidence or numbers.
It's also unlikely to be very practical, because that'd essentially mean running bitcoin miners in load-balancing mode, and not running them most of the time. Given that bitcoin hardware tends to loose value quickly, as the next generation of mining hardware comes to the market, this is unlikely to be a feasible model.
I mean, when I hear "clickbait", I think "the headline makes me think there's something interesting that isn't really backed up by the content". But here? The headline says "Matrix Trashfire", the content delivers exactly that.
This is based on a buffer overflow in glibc itself. It is my understanding that rust still calls into libc for many lowlevel system functions. And if you call C code from rust, well, it's still C code with C code bugs.
Ultimately, if you want to get rid of those, you'd have to rewrite the libc in Rust.
I think the later Running-on-top-of-DOS-Windows-versions - the last one was Windows ME I believe - where trying to hide their DOS-based roots, and you had to use some hacks to actually boot into DOS. I can tell you that I used those hacks.
I never migrated to the "native" (non-DOS-based) Windows versions (I believe XP was the first consumer-not-dos-based version), but switched to Linux around that time.
I was one of the people who still ran DOS when this wasn't really very common any more, and was constantly looking for things like drivers that would bring proper vesa or sound support to newer hardware on DOS. I ended up starting a webpage dedicated to collecting those drivers for DOS, which by now must've been decades ago.
It never grew very big, but I also never took it down. I wonder if it helped some people over the years.
I can see that blocking IP ranges is part of a strategy to protect service signups, logins, or contact forms. But a gov agency publishing a piece of text? What's the risk that is mitigated by blocking IPs here?
The authors compare this in an energy model, and come to the conclusion that methanol comes out on top if you don't have cheap (aka salt cavern) h2 storage. But of course, there are a lot of assumptions going into this.
Nice bonus: It's an open source model, so others can test it with different assumptions.
Not reasonable to write an article that sounds like this is an actual problem, only to tell people in the third last paragraph that it is largely a hypothetical scenario and in all likelyhood not going to matter for any real-world scenario.
Linux distros are converging towards using libxcrypt with yescrypt, which is a modern password hashing function. If you have a crypt function that wires back to libxcrypt's crypt, you can use that.
It's a bit unfortunate that people seem to be unable to agree on a modern password hash (other places tend to use scrypt or argon2), but well, I think yescrypt is fine, and having a way to generate and verify crypt-compatible hashes is certainly useful functionality.