1,003 karma · joined August 5, 2010
The use of LiIon batteries was a logical next step as well. Manufacturing issues in the first sets of batteries required them to re-engineer the safety system around them, and the vendors that created the batteries now have stricter standards to adhere to.
None of these issues currently compromise the safety of the airframes.
It's easy to pile-on after incidents occur, but these are machines made by people. People make mistakes all of the time. You wouldn't not use a computer because it had bugs. The likelihood of you falling out of the sky in a modern airliner is still vanishingly small and is getting smaller every day.
I fail to understand how updating a "cloud native" service requires downtime at all, much less this sort of outage.
MCAS must exist.
The flight regime where MCAS would need to act should be exceedingly rare. The bug isn't that MCAS exists. The bug is that there is a failure in the code/inputs to the system which allow it to trigger in regimes where it shouldn't.
I did use UUCP a few years ago over some HF radios. It still has some uses, but the usability of it is horrid.
[EDIT] I found the answer at the bottom of the README: https://habr.com/post/262563/
There is not a world where there will be one processor manufacturer. We will see multiple manufacturers on multiple architectures for as long as things continue to progress.
Intel may have a short-term existential threat, but that threat is minimal.
(2) is the real issue here.