So we tabled this problem for now and went with a free field, but please do open a github issue and we'll add look for ways to do it.
3,020 karma · joined March 15, 2010
https://signal.me/#eu/tJgEd9pEdyiankVrQI3j1y2n5jPNLW7y4cZ09RJ0Vhjh2mihvq9IwL6toyfg8Kma
So we tabled this problem for now and went with a free field, but please do open a github issue and we'll add look for ways to do it.
Unfortunately, mediawiki only support two levels of access control: fully locked or fully open, so I need to manually police changes as they happen...
One comment that we get very often regards the ordering of the recommended ciphersuite. We've made some choices that are documented in [2] such as, for example, preferring AES 128 to 256 or maintaining compatibility with CAMELLIA and DES-CBC3-SHA in the intermediate configuration. The best place to discuss these choices is probably the `talk` section of the wiki page [3].
[1] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS [2] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Prioritiza... [3] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Talk:Security/Server_Side_TLS
18 months in, I still think it was the right choice. Go is extremely powerful and yet simple enough for contributors to pick it up in a matter of days. I don't think we could have delivered as much value going with Rust, it's still too young and lack the necessary libraries (AMQP, OpenPGP, etc...).
Even if the MIG platform is compromised, agents and systems are safe, as long as the keys of authorized investigators (kept on their laptops) are not compromised.
What strikes me is that their conf is inaccessible to old client (no sslv3, no sha-1 cert). Honest question: does the government think it's ok to break website access from ancient clients (XPSP2 IE6)? Or will they be forced to enable legacy ciphers when the first citizens complain? I'm genuinely interested, because the topic of TLS modernity is a hard problem to solve. If that was easy, google.com wouldn't be using RC4-MD5 and a sha-1 cert...
Now, of course, you have to get used to Mutt first :)
[1] https://securitypitfalls.wordpress.com/2015/03/13/february-2...
$ ./cipherscan pinterest.com
................
Target: pinterest.com:443
prio ciphersuite protocols pfs_keysize
1 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
3 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
4 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 DH,1024bits
5 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
6 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
7 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
8 AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2
9 AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2
10 AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
11 AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2
12 AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2
13 AES256-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
14 ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 ECDH,P-256,256bits
15 RC4-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
Certificate: trusted, 2048 bit, sha256WithRSAEncryption signature
TLS ticket lifetime hint: 300
OCSP stapling: not supported
Server side cipher orderingSome of these sites have large user bases too, and it's making it hard to disable RC4 in Firefox. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1138101
That's not acceptable for us, which is why DHE is there. Mozilla aims to provide the best possible security to the larger number, and that drives a number of the choices in the recommended ciphers.
$ sudo ping -i 0.02 8.8.8.8
[...]
64 bytes from 8.8.8.8: icmp_seq=578 ttl=53 time=15.5 ms
^C
--- 8.8.8.8 ping statistics ---
579 packets transmitted, 364 received, 37% packet loss, time 13854ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 15.009/19.308/50.884/6.152 ms, pipe 2Architecture requires experience. Writing the fastest quick sort in a given language is an exercise for fresh young brains.
I used to believe that. It is unfortunately not true. TCP packets will come in all shapes and forms, and all must be treated equally, which is what makes TCP stacks so incredibly complex to implement.
The Linux TCP stack is quite safe and fast. Especially with tight integration with NICs hardware (checksum offloading and the like). I'm a bit unsure what a custom stack in userland can provide that the standard kernel stacks don't have.
DNS uses UDP primarily. I suspect the author meant "UDP/TCP/IP" by "TCP/IP".
Years ago, I wrote a basic TCP stack for a honeypot research project. It is hard and incredibly complex. So this statement raises a number of concerns, and will need to be audited before being used in production.
However, in the real world, the number of requests per second a http daemon can perform is the last thing to worry about. If the web is slow, it's not because Apache used to be bloated with thread. It's because of bad architecture: centralization of services, latency in page builds time, size of static components, data store bottlenecks, etc...
Nevertheless, a very cool project. One I'll follow closely.