577 karma · joined May 21, 2009
(And I'm sure some people are very happy GPG users. But the majority of email users are not and will probably never be)
[-But it so happens that the-] Of course in OTP mode, the YubiKey protocol protects against replay attacks by using a counter on the YubiKey. This (authenticated) counter value is included in the messages that are exchanged during the authentication - and hence any replays can be detected/ignored as the counter value will be less than or equal to the last received counter value.
Edit (deletions marked with [- -]): I had no idea people used modes other than OTP with their YubiKey...
A great example of this would be [1], where a number of ISO-standardised authentication protocols failed to give even the most basic authentication properties. And this kind of issue isn't limited to ISO - the same kinds of issues appeared when analysing TLS, Signal, and others.
The problem is that implementation errors are usually more clearly violations of confidentiality (i.e. it is obvious that an attacker is able to access something they weren't supposed to) - so they are generally held to be more valuable - and hence more eyes spend time looking for them.
(Disclaimer: I am doing a PhD in this field with Prof Cas Cremers, which might bias my views on this subject a little)
1. http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/papers/B...
Now, it may well have been the case that when the inevitable court case to challenge the extradition in the UK took place, it might have gone all Gary McKinnon on them [2], due to public support after WannaCry etc. which I'd suggest is probably why the FBI chose to arrest him in the US rather than put in a formal extradition request or work directly with the UK authorities (AFAIK).
But yes, I do agree that with the advent of a worldwide communications network, travel to countries with oppressive, obscure, or stricter legal regimes has become more dangerous for some. The thing I find curious is that others haven't perceived this change in risk.
I wouldn't necessarily say this is a bad thing either - note there have been a number of (accused) botnet operators/cyber-criminals originating from Russia who were arrested whilst holidaying in the EU, and then extradited to the US. Since Russia has a reputation for being lax about prosecuting such "crimes" (especially if they only target people outside of Russia), and also tends to refuse to extradite Russian nationals, it doesn't seem that there are many other options.
Guess what - if you (as an example) encourage Chinese dissent online and it gets past the Chinese firewall - you stand a good chance of being picked up by the Chinese authorities should you go there. The only way the Internet is a different place is if you never leave the Internet/your home jurisdiction. The good news for US citizens is an extradition along the lines you mention seems unlikely (unless you also broke US law). In the UK (for example), the situation is far more bleak as their extradition treaties with the US and others are less protective.
P.S. this is in no way commentary on MalwareTech's guilt - that is for a judge and/or jury to decide - just discussing a common perception
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Declaration_of_the_Independe...
That said - the more professional members are generally also in that minority too - they tend to stick to using their phone or they don't bother tracking their runs at all.
The answer is likely multifaceted, but part of it is undoubtedly the usability of the client - which may be resource intensive, but that was likely a trade off for speed/ease of development.
I guess they don't put everything on BBC Worldwide due to costs (getting permission from rights holders etc.) and instead prioritise those things they think are likely to sell.
This is done on purpose [1], to prevent bots from calculating exact post/comment scores.
1. https://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq#wiki_how_is_a_comment.27s_sc...
That said, there are other quantifiable measures. In terms of security, Telegram has two main drawbacks:
1) it supports insecure chats - which means that for many (especially non-technical) users, they won't use the end-to-end encrypted messaging at all
2) whilst the encryption algorithms they use are standardised, the protocol they uses to transfer the messages is not well understood by the cryptographic community - and when it has been analysed, well-known flaws have been found [1].
In comparison, WhatsApp also makes use of standardised encryption algorithms, but also uses the Signal protocol - which has been studied by multiple groups, with better outcomes (such as [2]). One drawback to WhatsApp is they will generally make security decisions that are primarily based around avoiding sacrificing usability - if that is a problem, then perhaps Signal[3] or Wire[4] is a better choice.
On the encryption debate, using Russian algorithms vs US (Belgian) algorithms is somewhat academic - I believe that both are considered by the wider academic community to be strong when correctly used. I don't believe there is any evidence that Telegram or WhatsApp are incorrectly using them (beyond the attack found against Telegram, which may have been fixed by now?). This is the mostly the same for considerations about data storage location - if end-to-end encryption is enabled in Telegram, they are roughly equivalent.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1177.pdf
[2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf
> Rats of each group were supplemented with different beverages: (i) tap water, (ii) regular degassed CB (DgCB), (iii) regular CB (RCB) and (iv) diet CB (DCB)
Where CB is carbonated beverages.
[1] For examples: https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=router+RCE
I doubt browsers will ever check CAA, since it's even easier to tamper with than OCSP (since the majority of DNS requests are still over plain text).
It runs in a web browser on Linux just fine - and I find a lot of their suggested artists/tracks are closer to my tastes than I got from Spotify.