600 lines of dense POSIX Shell—in some respects that's even worse!
You would not be aware of the amount of trust you are putting into that.
49 karma · joined March 23, 2022
You would not be aware of the amount of trust you are putting into that.
Thanks, I see there's a slight (~50%?) overestimation there, but then again, even unit tests and comments in a target programming language count as syntactically correct code that needs to be evaluated and reasoned upon. I'm not that familiar with Rust's runtime introspection features, but in languages like Python, even the comments can directly affect code (e.g. `Foo.__doc__ = Bar.__doc__ + SOME_ANNEX`).
> _generate_seccomp_filter ... the entire function doesn't block anything
Many thanks! I've applied a fix—it's a single line added. The missing test is pending a runnable that invokes one of the forbidden syscalls. As I have no qualms about force-pushing around a repo that nobody forks, happy to credit you(r LLM) proper!
> Main script invokes working directory's .env as shellcode
The sandboxed process can't overwrite existing .env files [1], but it could create a new $PWD/.env file, hoping to "escape" at next sandbox execution. That's a valid concern I'll have to think about some more.
[1]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run/blob/c97d065184...
> Lots of race conditions
I sometimes experience "Slirp not ready in time" [2], but it's due to a so far unexplained upstream issue [3]. I you have time/tokens to spare, I'd appreciate those PRs and further similar feedback!
[2]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run/blob/c97d065184... [3]: https://github.com/rootless-containers/slirp4netns/issues/35...
Don't know whether it's a good idea. It sure has got its issues. But even as the SLOC count and the number of bugs metrics are proved correlated in literature [4], min SLOC is not the primary target—a reasonably graspable and stable composition of few dependencies is. Whereas overreliance on third parties nowadays often ends with a rug pull one way or another. We simply can't count on this "MXC" (...) to be maintainable/non-archived even a year from now, just when I'd get it all properly integrated and set up.
[4]: https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/1856...
> slightly concerned
Oh, I certainly wouldn't like to limit myself to promoting just this repo! ^D^ HN is a good venue, lots of smart people around! I see everyone shilling their own sh** all the time. Often in green usernames. :shrug:
I'd be way more confident building upon something I can grasp and understand. [2]
[1]: https://ghloc.dev/microsoft/mxc [2]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run
Now, why would anyone do that? (Like everyone and their brother) I wrote my own simple Linux/shell-based sandbox [1] (I can trust ...) and am successfully running PyCharm whole inside it ...
- Merge amendments up into the initial prompt.
- Evaluate prompts multiple times (ensemble).
What other dev OSs are there?
> once privileges are dropped [...] it doesn't appear to be possible to reinstate them
I don't understand. If unprivileged code could easily re-elevate itself, privilege dropping would be meaningless ... If you need to communicate with the outside, you can do so via sockets (such as the bind-mounted X11 socket in one of the readme Examples).
sandbox-run npx @anthropic-ai/claude-code
I use sandbox-run: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run
The above simple alias may work for node/npm, but it doesn't generalize to many other programs available on the local system, with resources that would need to be mounted into the container ...
[1]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-venv [2]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run
Persona seems to rely solely on NFC with a national passport/ID, so simply stolen documents would work for a certain duration ...
Dangerous times we live in.
Some things are better public. Some are not ...