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mcpherrinm

4,544 karma · joined January 24, 2010

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mcpherrinm··on Why SSL was renamed to TLS in late 90s (2014)
The downgrade attacks on TLS are only really present in the case of client behaviour where, on failing to achieve one version, they retry a new connection without it.

This was necessary to bypass various broken server side implementations, and broken middleboxes, but wasn’t necessarily a flaw in TLS itself.

But from the learnings of this issue preventing 1.2 deployment, TLS 1.3 goes out of its way to look very similar on the wire to 1.2

mcpherrinm··on Why not use DNS over HTTPS (DoH)?
Yes, ISPs absolutely do deep packet inspection.

With cleartext DNS, your queries may never reach your chosen server. Plenty of ISPs are configured to just answer any DNS query, regardless of its destination. Using a nonstandard port might help, but you’d be much better off deploying one of the DoH / DoT / DoQ / etc secure protocols.

mcpherrinm··on Why not use DNS over HTTPS (DoH)?
The most important part of DoH, etc is that it allows you to make a choice. You can choose a vendor in your country. As a Canadian, I might want to use the service offered by my national TLD operator https://www.cira.ca/en/canadian-shield/configure/firefox/

Many ISPs explicitly sell DNS data, and are also advertising vendors.

Cloudflare, on the other hand, doesn’t share or sell data and retains minimal data: https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns...

mcpherrinm··on Why I no longer have an old-school cert on my HTTPS site
Everything is an object, identified by a URL. You start from a single URL (the directory), and you can find all the rest of the resources from URLs provided from there.

ACME models everything as JSON objects, each of which is identified by URL. You can GET them, and they link to other objects with Location and Link headers.

To quote from the blog post:

> Dig around in the headers of the response, looking for one named "Location". Don't follow it like a redirection. Why would you ever follow a Location header in a HTTP header, right? Nope, that's your user account's identifier! Yes, you are a URL now.

I don't know if it's the pure ideal of HATEOS, but it's about as close as I've seen in use.

It has the classic failing though: it’s used by scripts which know exactly what they want to do (get a cert), so the clients still hardcode the actions they need. It just adds a layer of indirection as they need to keep track of URLs.

I would have preferred if it was just an RPC-over-HTTP/JSON with fixed endpoints and numeric object IDs.

mcpherrinm··on Why I no longer have an old-school cert on my HTTPS site
I'd take ASN.1/DER over JWS any day :) It's the weekend and I don't feel I have the energy to launch a full roast of JWS, but to give some flavour, I'll link

https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-...

Implementations can be written securely, but it's too easy to make mistakes.

Yeah, there's worse stuff from the 90s around, but JOSE and ACME is newer than that - we could have done better!

Alas, it's not changing now.

I think ASN.1 has some warts, but I think a lot of the problems with DER are actually in creaky old tools. People seem way happier with Protobuf, for example: I think that's largely down to tooling.

mcpherrinm··on Why I no longer have an old-school cert on my HTTPS site
I’m the technical lead for the Let’s Encrypt SRE/infra team. So I spend a lot of time thinking about this.

The salt here is deserved! JSON Web Signatures are a gnarly format, and the ACME API is pretty enthusiastic about being RESTful.

It’s not what I’d design. I think a lot of that came via the IETF wanting to use other IETF standards, and a dash of design-by-committee.

A few libraries (for JWS, JSON and HTTP) go a long way to making it more pleasant but those libraries themselves aren’t always that nice, especially in C.

I’m working on an interactive client and accompanying documentation to help here too, because the RFC language is a bit dense and often refers to other documents too.

mcpherrinm··on Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname
I tested before they acknowledged or disabled the method (I was able to use a 3.2.2.4.14 validation the “normal” way)
mcpherrinm··on Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname
I couldn’t reproduce the attack with a pair of my own domains, so I think it might be even narrower in scope than the initial post suggests. But I suppose we will just have to wait to see what the CA says.
mcpherrinm··on Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname
CAA plus DNSSEC also provides significant defense against some types of attacks on domain validation.
mcpherrinm··on TLS certificate lifetimes will officially reduce to 47 days
Must-staple has almost zero adoption. The engineering cost of supporting it for a feature that is nearly unused just isn’t there.

We did consider it.

As CAs prepare for post-quantum in the next few years, it will become even less practical as there is going to be pressure to cut down the number of signatures in a handshake.

mcpherrinm··on Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname
The certificate remained unrevoked in OCSP until after SSL.com acknowledged the issue, so I don’t think the reporter was the one who had it revoked.

It is also possible I was being served a stale/cached OCSP response.

mcpherrinm··on Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname
It would be possible to change, though that would be a pretty big change.

Personally I think this is another good argument for short lived certificates and reducing reliance on revocation systems.

mcpherrinm··on TLS certificate lifetimes will officially reduce to 47 days
There's no such thing as an ideal world, just the one we have.

Let's Encrypt was founded with a goal of rapidly (within a few years) helping get the web to as close to 100% encrypted as we could. And we've succeeded.

I don't think we could have achieved that goal any way other than being a CA.

mcpherrinm··on TLS certificate lifetimes will officially reduce to 47 days
It makes the system more reliable and more secure for everyone.

I think that's a big win.

The root reason is that revocation is broken, and we need to do better to get the security properties we demand of the Web PKI.

mcpherrinm··on TLS certificate lifetimes will officially reduce to 47 days
I'm on the team at Let's Encrypt that runs our CA, and would say I've spent a lot of time thinking about the tradeoffs here.

Let's Encrypt has always self-imposed a 90 day limit, though of course with this ballot passing we will now have to reduce that under 47 days in the future.

Shorter lifetimes have several advantages:

1. Reduced pressure on the revocation system. For example, if a domain changes hands, then any previous certificates spend less time in the revoked state. That makes CRLs smaller, a win for everyone involved.

2. Reduced risk for certificates which aren't revoked but should have been, perhaps because a domain holder didn't know that a previous holder of that domain had it, or an attack of any sort that led to a certificate being issued that wasn't desired.

3. For fully short-lived certs (under 7 days), many user-agents don't do revocation checks at all, because that's a similar timeline to our existing revocation technology taking effect. This is a performance win for websites/user-agents. While we advocate for full certificate automation, I recognize there are cases where that's not so easy, and doing a monthly renewal may be much more tractable.

Going to shorter than a few days is a reliability and scale risk. One of the biggest issues with scale today is that Certificate Transparency logs, while providing great visibility into what certs exist (see points 1 and 2), will have to scale up significantly as lifetimes are cut.

Why is this happening now, though? I can't speak for everyone, and this is only my own opinion on what I'm observing, but: One big industry problem that's been going on for the last year or two is that CAs have found themselves in situations where they need to revoke certificates because of issues with those certificates, but customers aren't able to respond on an appropriate timeline. So the big motivation for a lot of the parties here is to get these timelines down and really prove a push towards automation.

mcpherrinm··on Certification Authority/Browser Forum adopts new security standards
Firefox, Safari, and soon Android also support enforcing CT
mcpherrinm··on Certification Authority/Browser Forum adopts new security standards
I can’t see freely available intermediates ever happening. The first three reasons I can think of are here, but there’s more I’m sure.

1. No way to enforce what the issued end-entity certificates look like, beyond name constraints. X509 is an overly-flexible format and a lot of the ecosystem depends on a subset of them being used, which is enforced by policy on CAs.

2. Hiding private domains wouldn’t be any different than today. CT requirements are enforced by the clients, and presumably still would be. Some CAs support issuing certs without CT now, but browsers won’t accept them.

3. Allowing effectively unlimited issuance would likely overwhelm CT, and the whole ecosystem collapses.

mcpherrinm··on Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
OpenSSF scorecard flags dependencies (including GitHub actions) which aren’t pinned by hash

https://scorecard.dev/

https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#p...

mcpherrinm··on Draft RFC – ACME Extensions for ".onion" domains
I think the main reason is it allows for easier access to Tor hidden sides with a “regular” web browser. Consider a wifi network that exposed .onion domains via normal DNS, or a VPN, or other similar mechanisms. It’s not as good as Tor browser, but may be a lot more accessible.
mcpherrinm··on Warewulf is a stateless and diskless container OS provisioning system
I think Apple tests on "IPv6 Only" networks that have DNS64/NAT64 to reach v4 servers
mcpherrinm··on How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors
> That doesn't necessarily mean full CT support – they might just as well choose to completely distrust anything tagged SCTNotAfter, or to ignore it.

That's what the blog post I linked in the top comment suggests is the "more disruptive than intended" approach. I don't think it's a good idea. Removing the root at `SCTNotAfter + max cert lifetime` is the appropriate thing.

There's an extra issue of not-often-updated systems too, since now you need to coordinate a system update at the right moment to remove the root.

mcpherrinm··on How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors
The flipside of the same technical points is https://sslmate.com/blog/post/entrust_distrust_more_disrupti... where some non-browser clients don't handle this, or worse, handle it incorrectly.
mcpherrinm··on Warewulf is a stateless and diskless container OS provisioning system
Really depends on who you ask. You still need v4 to be "globally reachable", but v6 is optional.

AWS seems to finally be feeling the pinch of IPv4 exhaustion and is pushing v6 support everywhere now, and starting to charge for v4.

Mobile networks already have, and many are natively IPv6, with NAT64/464XLAT or other tech for bridging to v4. Apple's App store requires apps to support IPv6-only networks.

CDNs and clouds etc mean that websites don't even really need to worry about their own IP allocation, and just let their provider figure out exposing things worldwide.

mcpherrinm··on Brother accused of locking down third-party printer ink cartridges
Is there any mechanism to ensure you use "genuine" ink, or can you just dump whatever in?
mcpherrinm··on Certificate Transparency in Firefox
Right, any CA you add yourself that isn’t part of what Mozilla ships isn’t considered a publicly trusted CA.
mcpherrinm··on Certificate Transparency in Firefox: A Big Step for Web Security
No. CT is only required for public CAs. You only need those browser policy settings if you’re using a public CA without CT.
mcpherrinm··on Certificate Transparency in Firefox
In any security setting, it’s usually good to have both controls and detection.

CAA records help prevent unexpected issuance, but what if your DNS server is compromised? DNSSEC might help.

Certificate Transparency provides a detection mechanism.

Also, unlike CAA records which are enforced only by policy that CAs must respect them, CT is technically enforced by browsers.

So they are complimentary. A security-sensitive organization should have both.

mcpherrinm··on Part two of Grant Sanderson's video with Terry Tao on the cosmic distance ladder
.top is definitely a shady spot. They’re inexpensive and not very responsive to abuse reports - https://www.icann.org/uploads/compliance_notice/attachment/1...

.xyz though I mostly associate with abc.xyz, the investor relations page for Alphabet.

mcpherrinm··on It is time to standardize principles and practices for software memory safety
I fundamentally don't buy the argument that our products need to be shitty so that we can break them.
mcpherrinm··on It is time to standardize principles and practices for software memory safety
It’s time to stop governments from hacking people’s phones, taking away their privacy?

Users should have control and trust in their devices. If they can be remotely compromised, they cannot get that.

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