2,004 karma · joined July 16, 2009
Skip to the appendix if you don't want to read irrelevant comparisons to U-Boats and stealth aircraft.
Even there, the details are light. They got spearphished with excel files with flash payloads (CVE-2011-0609). Those installed "Poison Ivy" (some remote admin a la vnc/rdp). They spread out from those points attacking other accounts/computers/servers. They looked around for interesting things, put it in passworded RARs and FTPed them out to other compromised (non-RSA) servers (apparently "Good[DOT]mincesur[DOT]com | up82673[DOT]hopto[DOT]org | www[DOT]cz88[DOT]net").
There is very little useful information in their breakdown. Everything they mention is standard fair, certainly not something special to "Advanced Persistent Threats". The flash vuln (with excel files) has been known for weeks. There is no discussion of what the attackers actually managed to get their hands on.
Drug testing is designed to prevent actually harm. With the manufacturer's plan it seems that the only people that will have to pay significantly more make over $100k/yr and probably have it covered under their health insurance anyways.
These are drugs that have never been approved by the FDA. No manufacturers were previously approved and no standards have been changed.
The FDA wanted clinical trials on the drugs. There are incentives in place to encourage companies to develop drugs for rare conditions where there are not enough patients to warrant investing in for economic rewards (and yet you envision companies in competition over them). These include grants for the required trials, tax credits for half of the cost of developing the drug, and a seven year monopoly on the drug.
That was my point. No sane person looks at the output of hex-rays and thinks they have received the original source code (minus comments and variable names). It is rare for me to find it even more readable than the assembly listing/graph view.
I sure hope the original source code does not resemble this.
> that humans can no longer read the resulting binary "object"
> code. That is in incorrect. Code can easily be decompiled
> back to (nearly) the original source. In our (Errata
> Security) pentests, we regularly find embedded usernames and
> passwords that nobody believe hackers can read. It usually
> takes us less than 5 minutes.
Really now? When you are talking about .NET assemblies this is close to true (in some cases). Not so much for C. So much for a "high-end cyber security consulting company".
However, that does not reflect on whether or not he is the one that is behind the attack on Comodo, which has no real indications of being difficult.
Comodo claims that it must have been an organized, planned out attack because they knew which domains to get certificates for. That does not explain why 3 were generated for one domain and one for 'global trustee'. Nor does it take a genius to figure out a set of domains you would want certificates for depending on what you are planning to do (in this case, it seems like attacking large webmail providers).
What Apple actually says is """As a columnist for The New York Times remarked soon after the launch of the service, "[nlothing like the App Store has ever been attempted before.""""
Yes, Apple is trying to push that idea, but it is not them that said it (in that instance). Apple even notes that similar mobile phone download marketplaces existed before their version of one (though they do not mention the Wii store or Xbox live marketplace which also predate it).
When presented with a model bug report (includes good description, test cases, and even a patch) he felt the need to change the function, but instead of using the supplied patch he rewrites it himself and commits it without testing it. It is still broken. When this is pointed out he gets angry and complains about people wasting his time, when it was he that decided to waste his own time rewriting it his own way and he was the one that still got it wrong.
Everyone would have been better off if he had taken the sensible path of "read bug report", "confirm bug", "test patch", "commit patch" instead of arguing and rewriting things out of spite.
Frankly, it is disturbing how much of 4chan slips into the thoughts and lexicon of today's youth.
That is to say, people were "computers" before they became "computer programmers".
I especially like the inaccurate[1] and racist ending.
[1] プログラミング、マザーファッカー (puroguramingu mazaafakkaa)
e: I was referring to http://oppugn.us/posts/1300784321.html I did not notice the link was different.
DNS is not used for key storage as DNS is not authenticated. There is nothing stopping your registrar from being a CA and issuing you certificates.
SSL certs are assigned to specific domain names. The CA really doesn't need to care if you are a Fooian Industries registered as a Romanian company. They are only interested in if you are the proper owner of fooian-ind.com. That your local government official knows that you are fierarul is of no value in determining if the cert someone sent me for fooian-ind.com is the correct one for fooian-ind.com.
The infrastructure to support SSL is the result of a large number of smart people sitting down together and working out solutions. Chances are that any deficiencies or alternative solutions you may think of were considered or result from your lack of understanding. It is clearly arrogant to think otherwise.
It works for ssh because you generally know the parties you are trying to connect to ahead of time and have ways to communicate with them (to confirm keys etc).
You do not have the same relationship with 99.99% of the servers you will be connecting to over https. It does not work.
These are not theoretical attacks. Any 16 year old with a $300 netbook can download software written by others and perform these attacks at your local Starbucks in a few hours. They would be able to see all traffic (even https) and without self-signed warnings the only outward sign would be the lack of the green url bar associated with EV certs.
All you need to do is generate your own cert for the site and the user will encrypt their traffic to you. This is why the lack authentication means that no confidentiality is provided.
If browsers do not throw big warnings at self-signed certs it is trivial to impersonate even sites that do have real certificates. The user sees a lock icon and thinks they are secure, but they are sending their credit card to someone other than Amazon.com. This is slightly fixed by EV certs, but there is still a large user training issue.
This isn't true. In 2008 it was 57% female/43% male and steadily growing more lopsided. [1]
[1] http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2010/section1/indicator07.as...
Frankly, this issue really shows how bizarre our adversarial system is. Sony must establish jurisdiction to the court, but they cannot. The court then orders unrelated service providers to disclose information about further unrelated persons to Sony. Sony then takes that information and uses it to try and prove what they are required to to the court (and also get the added value of learning the identities of a lot of consumers they presumably hate).
If Sony is allowed to make the court do its work for them, why do they even get to have the information disclosed to them? The court is the one that is going to decide on the evidence anyways, so why don't they (or a third-party appointed by the court) just look at it and decide?
I'm also reminded of cases where people have tried to request the source code of devices (voting machines and radar guns) to audit them. They could not even get it supplied to an independent third-party because of corporate privacy.