pcaharrier

I'm also cringing a little bit to learn that the practice of misspelling words with a "K" is as old as the "Dumpster Kolector" from the 1940s.

Oh, I see now. The judge was treating the entire document as if it were a letter of response to the person that sent the post card to courthouse:

>I hope you found this helpful. Thanks for writing. It shows you care. You should. Sincerely & respectfully, Bill Young

Does someone know what's up with the part above the case caption? I don't think I've ever seen anything like that.

Perhaps having a parent that (for decades) taught kindergartners to read using phonics gives me a certain perspective, but it amazes me that at this point there's still any controversy at all about whether schools should be adopting phonics for reading instruction.

I saw a lot of headlines, but didn't realize just how slim the indictment was. Really makes it seem like a "the process is the punishment" kind of situation.

Link to the ruling: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/26080338-breyer-ruli...

In other jurisdictions that might have worked, but not in this one where this magistrate was the only one on duty at the time.

>Michigan is a border state, so anyone is subject to stop and search at any time

You know, if you're a Homeland Security agent you have to tell us, right?

This a good point too. Information can become "stale" to the point that it's no longer enough to support a search warrant or a conviction. One example of such a holding here (though the defendant lost the motion to suppress on other grounds): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3002057/united-states-...

I mean, there are a few noted here if you want a starting place for your research: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/p...

>Is that cutting corners? It sounds more like trying to break the law so they could find _anything_ to throw at the guy.

In my experience, yes, in many cases it was more laziness than something nefarious. Police often have a theory of the case in their head that just doesn't make it onto the affidavit. Things that seem obvious to them after investigating the case for some length of time are not as obvious to someone seeing it for the first time on a search warrant affidavit. Fishing expeditions happen, no doubt, but let's also remember Hubbard's corollary to Hanlon's razor: "Never attribute to malice or stupidity that which can be explained by moderately rational individuals following incentives in a complex system." They get in a hurry, don't read the affidavit with fresh eyes, and forge ahead anyway because they're under pressure to close cases quickly. Not that that's a good thing, but it's distinct from people who are intent on just breaking the law and violating people's rights.

>You believe way too much in the system.

Who me? I assure you I don't.

In the particular case I described above there were some factors about who the person was that make me pretty confident the police were wanting to sniff around for something juicier (though because of his situation, even the accusation of domestic violence was going to be enough to ruin certain things for him, even if nothing ever came of it). That's SOP for many things where, for example, certain departments train officers to use traffic stops as pretexts to "elevate" the encounter to a felony arrest. They don't care that the guy failed to come to a complete stop at that stop sign, but they like their chances of getting consent to search his vehicle and finding (or, in the egregious cases, planting) something else.

Edit: I see that you weren't replying directly to me. Sorry about that.

A warrant for the full contents of the phone violates the particularity requirement.

If they have a warrant that adheres to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, then anything they might find that it outside the scope of the warrant would be illegally seized. For instance, if the search warrant were to say "search the contacts on the phone" and they go looking for pictures.

They hinted at the issue in footnote 11:

"Our state Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 11, also guards against unreasonable searches and seizures. In fact, as amended by voter initiative in the 2020 general election, Const 1963, art 1, § 11 specifically provides that “[n]o warrant to . . . access electronic data or electronic communications shall issue without describing them . . . .” However, defendant’s claims below rested solely on Fourth Amendment principles. Therefore, we have no occasion to consider whether the language of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in this context. Compare People v Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, 634 n 6; 983 NW2d 827 (2022) (noting that Const 1963, art 1, § 11 is interpreted coextensively with the Fourth Amendment unless there is a compelling reason for a different interpretation), with People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30-31; 485 NW2d 866 (1992) (concluding that a textual difference between the Eighth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 16 supported a broader interpretation of our state constitutional provision)."

So really the downside is that the defendant's lawyer didn't raise the state constitutional issue (which looks even clearer).

>As others have mentioned the courts in Michigan don't have any real authority to stop this.

Who has said this? People are saying that a ruling of the Michigan Supreme Court won't stop Michigan police officers from getting search warrants without limitations? How did these people come to that conclusion?

> If I have access to your entire phone, I can use anything I find against you as probable cause whether it’s related to the crime or not.

Well, that gets into the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, but we're not doing a full criminal procedure law school course today . . .

Ironically, I heard more than one detective say that when they "dumped" a phone like that, they rarely found much useful evidence. There's just too much information on any given cell phone to be able to go through it all. So, in the end, their fishing expeditions end up being a waste of time and resources.

>If the suspect had a file named "Not evidence of me stealing my neighbor's safe" and "Definitely not a video of me practicing how to break open a safe" would it be fair to assume the warrant doesn't allow access to it?

No, this is silly. That's not how search warrants ever work. The Fourth Amendment imposes no such "only search where labeled" requirement. It does, however, mean that police can only search areas where they are likely to find evidence of the commission of the crime that is alleged in the affidavit. For example, if the crime is theft of a full-size refrigerator and police have probable cause to believe that the stolen refrigerator is located at the residence of the accused, they can go into his house and look for the refrigerator anywhere that a refrigerator could be. That does not, however, given them the right to go rifling through his file cabinet or his underwear drawer, unless they have specific, articulable facts (i.e., not just a hunch) that there is probable cause that some other evidence of the commission of that crime will be found in such places.

What does that look like when searching a suspect's cell phone? Obviously every case is going to be different, but the point is that warrants cannot be utterly boundless. Such "general warrants" are one of the reasons the American colonists listed as a grievance against King George in the Declaration of Independence and today issuing such warrants would be considered prosecutable malfeasance in office. if police want to use search warrants as evidence-gathering tools they have to follow the law or convince the legislature to change it.

EDIT: Actually, consider this as an example.

California Penal Code § 653m says the following (subsection b): "Every person who, with intent to annoy or harass, makes repeated telephone calls or makes repeated contact by means of an electronic communication device, or makes any combination of calls or contact, to another person is, whether or not conversation ensues from making the telephone call or contact by means of an electronic communication device, guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good faith or during the ordinary course and scope of business."

So let's say jilted boyfriend decides to ring up his ex-girlfriend a couple dozen times in the wee hours of the morning, but he uses something to block his caller ID. In that case, there might be evidence on his phone that he dialed the girlfriend's phone number when she claims the harassing phone calls came in. So can the police search his phone for evidence that he called her number? Absolutely. Can they look through everything on his phone (pictures, notes, settings, etc.)? Absolutely not.

Pretty absurd and sadly common (in my several years' experience working in the criminal justice system). Good for Michigan for putting a stop to it.

Several years ago I had the opportunity to observe when a detective came to a magistrate's office to petition for a search warrant. The warrant sought to search the contents of a person's phone, essentially without any limitations. The alleged crime was assault and battery on a family member. When asked "What is your probable cause that the phone is likely to contain evidence of the commission of this crime?" the detective had basically nothing to say (having put nothing to that effect in the affidavit for the search warrant) other than some vague (cooked up on the spot?) statements about the "mobile nature of our modern society and the fact that cell phones are everywhere and everyone has one." The magistrate denied the warrant, but it's a sad testament to the propensity of law enforcement to cut corners that that search warrant affidavit was far from the last one I saw that targeted the cell phone of an accused and claimed that it was necessary to search the entire contents of the phone.

I'm in good company in making this observation, it seems: https://reason.com/volokh/2025/08/26/trumps-flag-burning-exe.... "The executive order does not create any new bases for deporting a foreign national, but the order does potentially move flag burners to the front of the line in deportation cases."

> Is it?

Yes: https://reason.com/volokh/2025/02/03/may-aliens-be-deported-...

He's talking about the current state of the law on that point (i.e., deportation specifically).

That case most certainly did not hold that "we cannot legally burn a foreign country's flag in the US."

https://reason.com/volokh/2025/08/05/finding-that-defendant-...

"Theft in the second degree. — Any person convicted of theft in the second degree shall be fined not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or imprisoned for not more than 180 days, or both, if the property obtained or used has some value." https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/22-32...

>Finally, the Order contemplates deporting and otherwise denying immigration benefits to aliens who desecrate the flag, "under circumstances that permit the exercise of such remedies pursuant to Federal law." Whether deportation of aliens based on their speech is constitutional is unsettled.

I wouldn't be the first person to note that this executive orders seems like it's a distraction tactic for something else, but this part makes me wonder if the distraction tactic is right there on the face of the thing. Perhaps there's an attempt here to give the administration another "tool in the box" for stepping up immigration enforcement actions.

Note that this is not really a decision on the merits of the underlying claims in the lawsuit. Perplexity moved to dismiss "pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3)" alleging lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue (i.e., claims that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York can't assert jurisdiction over the defendants and that that court is the wrong place to sue them).

Suffice to say that before this morning I had only a vague idea about how legally complicated this could get. For instance, there's an opinion from the Department of Justice (albeit an old one) that concluded that the President can use the DC National Guard for law enforcement purposes (in that case, drug interdiction) without running afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act.

Source: https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/use-national-guard-suppo...

I see what you're saying: all else will not remain equal. Your argument is that any increase in supply will always be more than offset by a corresponding increase in demand.

>In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, landlords converted thousands of houses, hotels, apartment buildings, and commercial buildings into SROs, and by 1950, SRO units made up about 10% of all rental units in some major cities. But beginning in the mid-1950s, as some politicians and vocal members of the public turned against SROs and the people who lived in them, major cities across the country revised zoning and building codes to force or encourage landlords to eliminate SRO units and to prohibit the development of new ones.

So the greedy landlords are the would-be heroes of the story and the politicians are the bad guys?

You're saying that increasing supply (all else being equal) will increase prices? Seems like that turns standard econ on its head, so can you help me understand who you reached that conclusion?