979 karma · joined December 31, 2018
With the amount of leaked and hacked data out there - almost everyone who is active on the internet is in one of these dumps. This is not evidence of any wrongdoing on their part.
For us they replaced a bunch of different tools and a hodgepodge of custom scripts and hacks.
For those who have not heard of them - it's basically asset and vulnerability management for absolutely everything you have running in the cloud. This includes stuff running in your k8s clusters, etc. And they do all this without having to manage a fleet of agents on everything and costing you money in resource usage. Not that Wiz is cheap, far from it :(
For CAs who get distrusted due to reasons which imply their issued certs might not be trustworthy, either revoke the certs individually or use a separate "never trust" list.
For example, Google proposed https://github.com/explainers-by-googlers/Web-Environment-In... and this was shot down by privacy advocates (for very good reasons).
So basically the choice for website operators is either to fight the bots and accept that their service will be unusable for some subset of their users or not fight the bots, which will lead to their service becoming unusable for everyone.
More and more, you see services pushing you very hard towards using their app and the reason is that with the app, they are able to actually verify that you are likely not a bot (or rather, in reality, that at least the app is running on an actual physical device, mobile phone bot farms are unfortunately also a thing).
As for Cloudflare - they offer it as a service, so when the website operator has a choice between using them or allocating several engineers for bot-fighting, why would they not just go with Cloudflare? Doing it yourself can be slightly higher fidelity, as you know your customers better, but it is also a lot of effort which could be better spent elsewhere.
1) People who anonymize their IP, use Linux, a browser with noscript, etc
2) People who are OK with having a government issued digital id and having to use it to access the internet
...look like, in your opinion?
But yes, to be fair, if you have email-based password reset functionality, it is not really an additional security vulnerability.
The email address you get from an oauth provider should never be trusted.
Is this a view some people actually hold? Would be interesting to see some argumentation why someone would think this is the case.
Edit: just to clarify, I agree with the article in principle, pinning public certs is just not a workable solution in the current TLS ecosystem and should be avoided, but the author of the article does not understand what attacks pinning is supposed to prevent in the first place, as the solutions offered do not offer the same security guarantees.
None of the solutions offered address the risk that pinning tries to mitigate, namely that you have a client who trusts a misbehaving/rogue/malicious CA (perhaps you installed a VPN or AV or something that added a system-wide CA to your machine?) and their connection to your service gets mitm-d.
Shorter certificate lifetimes - does nothing to mitigate that risk.
CAA records - not checked by client, only ensures that if a malicious actor somehow gets a hold of your domain, they need to use a particular CA to issue their publicly-trusted malicious cert.
CT monitoring - yes, for WebPKI certs, but does not protect against the risk above, as the bad CA-s are likely not sending certs to CT log.
Distributed DCV checks - sure, this is something CA-s should be doing, not something you have control over.
ACME URI in CAA - operational issues quite likely, good if you can pull it off, but again, does not address the risk above.
What is an actual alternative to cert pinning? Your API should have an additional layer of encryption with keys that you have full control over.
However, this is only for this particular exploit. The behaviour where cups-browsed automatically downloads and installs printers from random untrusted places on the internet is insane, especially as it does it for all printers it discovers on the local network by default. At minimum anyone on a LAN can cause a DoS type attack against all Linux workstations on the same LAN by just advertising a few million printers via zeroconf.
Most services won't even need a second layer of auth, if someone steals your wallet - do they really care about your reddit account?