2,305 karma · joined November 30, 2012
A great book that rings more true than ever talks about the obsolescence of weapons systems. I believe it was Freedman[1] A key thesis is that as a predominant weapon system becomes more vulnerable, it becomes more expensive, as it’s burdened with more defensive measures to survive from cheaper more expendable systems. In World War 2 the canonical example was the battle ship and the aircraft. Now it’s the fighter jet and the missile (or drone) etc. Just look at the ridiculous state of the JSF.
Manned missile trucks are valuable for countering electronic attack, but not dogfighting. Still, practice dogfighting is one of the most fun things you can do, too bad it hasn’t really been applicable since Vietnam. This post from the other day reminded me how fun it is and seems like a great fit for VR.[2] Onward last Samurais! Just try not to spend all the taxpayers money on the way out.
[1] https://www.amazon.com/Future-War-History-Lawrence-Freedman-... [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24255191
While there are exceptions the bootcamps seem to be geared toward path two. I wish bigger companies had training programs. I was working with a veteran who recently graduated from a local college and helping him with interview prep. He couldn’t pass the phone screen for the role I had available and ended up working for a small local consultant which seemed to be more IT focused than dev. I couldn’t in good faith just hire him without support from the team. I wish companies had training programs to hire local people into these jobs, but there really isn’t a shortage of talent that requires them to set these programs up. The shortage is in quality senior devs who could get into a top company but are willing to work for less elsewhere. Anyone who sets up one of these training programs and doesn’t pay FAANG salaries, is just training up candidates to move to FAANG. I guess in a way path two and three really are the training programs you are talking about.
And the stuff you are talking about regarding documentation, testing, etc. also sounds like other tangential roles like TPM or quality, which unfortunately are just being put on developers themselves at many places. I think most companies should have more people in these roles with the aspiration of moving into dev. Maybe a “training” role focused on this could help, but you may also run into resistance from people who are in these roles in organizations.
[1] https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Tesla-s-Fremont...
[1] https://www.amazon.com/Year-Rat-Clinton-Compromised-Security... [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-14-aUXlEac [3] https://time.com/5414055/american-nazi-sympathy-book/ [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying_Tigers
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1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management
2. https://quizlet.com/45297265/crew-resource-management-crm-th...
3. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p...
1. https://hn.algolia.com/?query=super%20tacano&sort=byPopulari...
2. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/470769.The_Future_of_War
From your link. In my mind that is the critical piece. The pilot did the right thing, pushed the nose down, heard the stall warning again, and did the wrong thing, pulled the nose up, because that made the stall warning go away. Having been in a plane upside down at night pointed toward the ground I can imagine the stress on the crew. It’s easy to say dump the nose when the stall warning goes off, but what if they had been upside down, then he would have been doing the right thing by listening to the warning. The fact the stall warning cut off was the final critical link in the accident, not pilot error.
> My company's error rates have increased on the "common fleet" by almost triple. [1]
The aircraft manufacturers and carriers want to get the most change with the least impact: updated jets with better gas mileage that don’t require pilots to retrain. It seems the FAA and other regulators have become too lenient in letting the manufacturers put significant changes into aircraft without requiring them to have different type ratings or at least add new training requirements.[2] Not communicating the MCAS changes seems to indicate a broken process at Boeing too.[3]
But you are also observing the Swiss cheese model of safety.[4] As the easier individual issues are fixed (mechanical) more difficult compound issues cause the accident, where multiple things (pilot training, bad communication, new system) all need to line up.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19376565
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_rating
While this may not be the cause of the most recent crash, the Lion crash alone seems to indicate a problem with Boeing and the FAA’s relationship. This probably extends to Airbus and other regulators as indicated in another comment about his or her carriers safety incidents tripling due to flying two aircraft of the same “type” but not really.[4] At a minimum the MCAS changes should have been communicated to pilots and indicates a process problem at Boeing with insufficient pilot involvement and too much engineering and business input. And the FAA probably needs to be much stricter in the training and documentation requirements between models.
[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p...
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19077371
That is Terrifying. It seems like the FAA has optimized for allowing the Manufacturers and Airlines to streamline changes and operations while slowly letting safety deteriorate. Perhaps these accidents will force what seems like a needed change in type ratings.
If MCAS is the culprit here, Boeing clearly released this functionality without proper vetting and testing. It’s a sad day for safety and for automation. These accidents will likely slow the advance of BVR for drones[2] and more autonomous flight for cargo.[3] The fact these accidents are occurring overseas where the pilots have less training will also buttress the decision for the 1500 hour rule.[4] Like I said, if MCAS is suspected here, probably time to ground the new 737 despite what it will do to Boeing, because right now it looks like they cut some corners, the FAA let them, and families are mourning. Pilot error isn’t really the issue, it’s engineering, process, and training.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19077371
[2] https://www.altiuas.com/bvlos-mean-commercial-drone-users/
[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-10/will-you-...
[4] https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2018/07/27/a-perfe...
[1] https://www.interdrone.com/news/dan-elwell-speaks-to-audienc...
[2] https://unmanned-aerial.com/drone-industry-responds-to-draft...
[3] https://www.utm.arc.nasa.gov/upp-industry-workshop/UTM%20PP%...
I think it’s also important to emphasize that getting to this level of safety is so much more cultural than technical. The ability to be open about failure and for people to feel safe in communicating to investigators is critical. The Navy would run two parallel investigations into an incident, one focused on Safety, where anything said was confidential and couldn’t be used in the administrative investigation (FNAEB) that could result in career ending consequences.[2]
Though I worry a bit with the constant wars and punishing deployments this culture may be heading in the wrong direction. [3] One of my XOs said, “One generation of Admirals will make their names breaking the Navy, and the next will make their names putting it back together.”
I have immense respect for the FAA and NTSB. They are trying to infuse this safety ethos into the fledgling drone industry. No easy task.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model 2. https://www.airwarriors.com/community/threads/my-fnaeb-exper... 3. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/the-n...
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2016/12/01/pro...
Sure. It's not just Boeings fault. I believe the FAA will course correct from this and probably all changes to flight controls will need to be reported to pilots. More lessons written in blood.
"Older 737s had another way of addressing certain problems with the stabilizers: Pulling back on the yoke, or control column, one of which sits immediately in front of both the captain and the first officer, would cut off electronic control of the stabilizers, allowing the pilots to control them manually.
That feature was disabled on the Max when M.C.A.S. was activated — another change that pilots were unlikely to have been aware of. After the crash, Boeing told airlines that when M.C.A.S. is activated, as it appeared to have been on the Lion Air flight, pulling back on the control column will not stop so-called stabilizer runaway."
If the above is true, it's near criminal that Boeing didn't notify pilots about the change. It's also not just about following checklists but understanding the systems of the aircraft.
But the US also acts through a democracy, while the countries mentioned above do not. I can criticize the stupid policies of the US in a public forum. The citizens of the countries listed above can not. Democracy is not the equivalent of an oligarchy or tyranny. The people of a country are different from the government that represents them. Unelected governments are illegitimate and a danger to the free world despite what their minions of propaganda post.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Life_in_the_Emerald_C...
Teams need leadership, not three leaders. Dev managers should be able to understand the architecture, and the product, and the team. Product advises on the direction. Tech leads argue for the implementation. But the dev manager needs to bring these things together and provide direction. Otherwise all three people will just point fingers when the results suck—diffusion of responsibility. Teams need leaders and leaders need to be accountable for results.